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Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science https://www.booktalk.org/chapter-3-the-nature-of-normal-science-t11918.html |
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Author: | Chris OConnor [ Mon Dec 12, 2011 11:49 pm ] |
Post subject: | Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science |
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions by Thomas S. Kuhn Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science
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Author: | Robert Tulip [ Sun Jan 15, 2012 6:52 am ] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Post subject: | Re: Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Professor Pajares Study Guide describes this chapter as follows, quoted, with my comments in between. http://des.emory.edu/mfp/Kuhn.html
But I don't agree that this deductive nature of science implies that facts are theory-laden. A fact is true or false regardless of our knowledge. Our perception is certainly governed by theory, but real facts have an external objectivity. It is true there are many facts we will not discover until we have theory that enables us to do so, and Kuhn gives numerous examples of this. But the theory is just the path to the fact, it is not the fact itself, which is a statement of what is the case about nature.
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Author: | ant [ Mon Jan 16, 2012 10:54 pm ] | ||||||||||||||||||
Post subject: | Re: Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science | ||||||||||||||||||
Crackpots are not the first thing that came to my head. Inherent in all social institutions are conceptual machineries who's objective is to keep the individuals of the institution in step. Efforts to maintain legitimization of the institution's way of doing things ( for Science, research, data accumulation and interpretation, acceptable methods of experimentation, etc) is of paramount importance to the survival of the institution. It maintains the reality that the institution orients itself in. The reality the current paradigm has defined as "universal, necessary, and certain knowledge" is in place as long as it is not infiltrated by a deviant from outside the "normal" structure set in place. It can be said that Einstein started the quantum paradigm and became a pariah to it when he turned his back on a random universe. He was woking so far on the edge of the physics of Bohr, Schrodinger, etc, that he was essentially boxed out of the scientific community as a result. Of course I realize that Einstein is not the type of crackpot you are referring to. However, it can be stated that there is forceful resistance to most deviants/rebels that will work on the outskirts of the paradigm in place to protect the comfortableness of the paradigm/institution. |
Author: | Interbane [ Tue Jan 17, 2012 11:32 am ] | |||||||||
Post subject: | Re: Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science | |||||||||
I think scientists have historically defended the incumbent paradigm not with forceful resistance, but through heated discussion. Forceful resistance makes it sound as if they threaten each other with beatings and imprisonment. Even scientists who were at direct odds would have conversations, sometimes only in writing.
I disagree. Before a set of words can even form a factful sentence, we must go through a great deal of learning to understand the sentence. If a fact is to exist in some ether while we learn to understand it, I'd have you point me to it's location. We must be taught the corresponding or incorporated concepts of the fact, and if we are taught them incorrectly, the fact is no longer true to us. If all culture takes on our misunderstanding and turns it to the norm, the fact would then be false, by virtue of a shift in our knowledge. What I mean is, facts don't exist outside our knowledge. They are part of the whole, and would be influenced by it in some manner. Perhaps you could say "A fact is true or false depending on different aspects of our knowledge." |
Author: | ant [ Tue Jan 17, 2012 2:46 pm ] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Post subject: | Re: Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
I tend to agree with Robert on this one regarding facts being true regardless of our knowledge of them, but for probably different reason(s) than Robert. I ask this: What about mathematical truths? Perhaps they are the only absolute truths that exist outside our realm. That is the theory of some mathematicians - mathematics are a discovery of man, not an invention by man. Take for instance someone like Ramanujan? How was this person able to extrapolate mathematical theorems that years later were applicable in the "real" world? Was the language of mathematics innate for Ramanujan? Also, Chomsky hypothesized that certain linguistic characteristics are innate. |
Author: | Robert Tulip [ Wed Jan 18, 2012 5:04 pm ] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Post subject: | Re: Chapter 3 - The Nature of Normal Science | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||
At every phase, the range of legitimate facts within the debate is narrowly prescribed by prevailing theory. There is as much psychology and politics in this change process as objective research.
I'm glad you picked up on this point Interbane, as I really was angling for such a response regarding epistemology. What is a fact? Your response raises the complex problem of the relation between language and truth. Your statement that facts don't exist outside our knowledge implies there are no unknown facts, that this idea is a contradiction. However, your view here contradicts the common use of the term fact. For example, we commonly say things like "unknown to all, the volcano was in fact getting ready to erupt." The fact of tectonic movement exists independently of human knowledge of it, and does not become a fact only at the moment of perception. People generally regard facts as states of affairs in the world, not linguistic representations of those actual realities. However, in science the language factor is far more important, because our theoretical vision of reality governs what we accept as fact. But this illustrates the distinction between fact and perception. A fact is a reality in the world, regardless of whether we know about it. As we start to relate to the fact, we explain it as a perception that is governed and framed by our concepts. In philosophy, there has been a big debate about whether we have access to reality. Kant introduced a distinction between phenomena, or things as they appear to us, and noumena, or things as they really are. He argued that all our knowledge is of appearance, and we can never tell if our knowledge penetrates to the actual reality. I find that Kantian line absurd, as it is obvious that we often do know a lot about what things really are in themselves. Granted we do not know everything about anything, but we do know something. For Kant to say we can know nothing about things in themselves puts our thought entirely into a fantasy bubble, with no real access to an objective external reality. Paradigm theory, especially the way facts are selected and valued on the basis of theoretical priorities, shows that there is more such Kantian fantasy in human knowledge than many scientists would often wish to admit. But this requires balance. We should not say that facts found by scientific research are open to doubt when the methods to find them are obvious and sound and abundantly confirmed. Where doubt does legitimately enter the picture is when science extrapolates from facts to formulate universal theories. Even here, there is often ground for strong confidence, for example in the laws of evolution and physics. No one says these laws tell us everything there is to know, but science does claim that they accurately describe how processes must have occured. |
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