I suppose then it would be useful to define what it means to be a man. In my opinion a man (as opposed from the animal) is a rational, deliberate thinker whose thoughts have a meaning which are understandable to other men. These men would form a population which could then be identified at varying of levels of detail. Obviously there would be a minimum amount of similarity required for consideration within the group as their would be a maximum point of correlation at which redundancy, irrelevance, and non-relationship would become factors and no further relationships should be concieved. This is examining the difference between men. These similarities are abstract and can be percieved in a variety of ways within agreeable or opposing context. In an abstract sense I would suppose that the minimum similarity needed to be included with the context of man would be the potential alone for shared understanding of conceptual meaning. The ability to assimilate truth as it is defined at this moment in history. A man who cannot be understood is an invalid, a non-man, a savant - taken as problems that are addressed, not as solutions to man's identity problem. Likewise the monkey could never be a solution for man's question because the monkey is man's problem. Unless, of course, the question had significance as a answer, but even so this "inquiry-answer" supposes a higher order rationality regarding the situation, and several alternative higher order questions associated to the question-as-answer (Why does man need to identify himself with animals? What type of animal is man?). In another sense it is the inability to see the seperation of moral questioning and the philosophical questioning of morality as fallacy. Not only is their no final answer determining the nature of our moral connection to apes, there is no piece of evidence that is not a value statement; as such every shred of normally objective state becomes morally subjected to philosopical analysis and reduction as aliquid stat pro aliquo. As the ape that stands for man.

Grim wrote:No body has yet claimed themselves a Vaneer Theorist because no one really is! I highly doubt that you could convince many half educated person to admit a belief that man is inherently selfish or bad as a result of genetic relationship to animals.

Genetic fallacy has a mass in this discussion, its gravity altering debate, pulling dissimilar ideals and ideas into an unnatural, non-realistic alliance. A naturalistic perversion.

Morality has become too sacred, it blinds and binds as if it were beyond, as if it was ideal, as if in practical sense it were not a thing of man. A quantity or quality rather then a value. I am not moral I am a man who moralizes.

The ape a metaphor, a device, the tool, the base of other men's towers. The child forgotten, at birth incomparable except in ways that cannot be observed. Difference, forgotten as well in a view that takes the sum of parts as an understanding for the entire system.

Metaphoric verbs pandered about in bites too bitter to swallow whole, and so I ruminate, becoming increasingly skeptical - or so convince myself that I should - unfortunatly few are able to do much better.

I assume that the above is free-form poetry or poetic prose. It preaches and proclaims, wrapping its preconceptions and assumptions in silvery bows and flowery paper. I find that I'm not inclined to open the package for fear that hyperbole might spring forth with stunning certitude and throttle my gentle ganglion to tears.

-smile-

Please don't hesitate on some elaboration....

Odd Greg wrote:I find that I'm not inclined to open the package for fear that hyperbole might spring forth with stunning certitude and throttle my gentle ganglion to tears.

It is a bit odd quoting oneself, I admit, but my self-quotation is germane to the point in this case.

I apologize if I wasn’t clear, Grim. Perhaps my tangential humor is too vague or unappreciated here. While I am able to elaborate at some length on a number of discussion points, I find that I am unwilling to make the effort to parse, decode and interpret your meaning in the post in reference. It’s not that I can’t - or at least I’m fairly certain that I could - it just seems like too much work. Perhaps you could summarize with less metaphor (etc) and clearer phrasing.

Or (with no disrespect) at least in terms less condescending.

Grim wrote: it would be useful to define what it means to be a man. In my opinion a man (as opposed from the animal) is a rational, deliberate thinker whose thoughts have a meaning which are understandable to other men.

Your distinction between man and animal ignores the commonality between humanity and animals, and also ignores the large spectrum of human behaviour which does not fall under the ‘rational, deliberate thinker’ rubric. You idealise a rational symbol while ignoring that most human activity, determined by genes and conventions, is not deliberate in the terms you specify.

These men would form a population which could then be identified at varying of levels of detail. Obviously there would be a minimum amount of similarity required for consideration within the group as their would be a maximum point of correlation at which redundancy, irrelevance, and non-relationship would become factors and no further relationships should be concieved. This is examining the difference between men. These similarities are abstract and can be percieved in a variety of ways within agreeable or opposing context. In an abstract sense I would suppose that the minimum similarity needed to be included with the context of man would be the potential alone for shared understanding of conceptual meaning.

Unfortunately this definition of humanity puts many of the demented, the deluded and the disabled outside the boundary. It is better, as per de Waal, to start from empirical observation and build definitions which are in accord with reality.

The ability to assimilate truth as it is defined at this moment in history. A man who cannot be understood is an invalid, a non-man, a savant - taken as problems that are addressed, not as solutions to man's identity problem. Likewise the monkey could never be a solution for man's question because the monkey is man's problem.

Sorry Grim, but there is a certain Niezschian pomposity to your comments here, especially your statement that people who cannot be understood are not human. I do not follow your reasoning regarding monkeys, as it seems obvious to me that study of the other primates is an important part of human self-understanding. People are monkeys’ biggest problem.

Unless, of course, the question had significance as a answer, but even so this "inquiry-answer" supposes a higher order rationality regarding the situation, and several alternative higher order questions associated to the question-as-answer (Why does man need to identify himself with animals? What type of animal is man?).

Your term ‘Significance’ here reminds me of Derrida and deconstruction. But your question ‘Why does man need to identify himself with animals?’ is very good, and is central to de Waal’s book. We share blood and earth with the other animals of our planet, having branched from the apes very recently in genetic terms. Understanding how our genes form our morals is an important contribution of science to philosophy, with many instructive lessons to be found in the study of the apes.

In another sense it is the inability to see the seperation of moral questioning and the philosophical questioning of morality as fallacy.

Sorry, I don’t understand this comment. It seems like your earlier statement that explaining part of morality by genetics is inherently fallacious. Would you care to explain the distinction between moral questioning and the philosophical questioning of morality?

Not only is their no final answer determining the nature of our moral connection to apes, there is no piece of evidence that is not a value statement; as such every shred of normally objective state becomes morally subjected to philosopical analysis and reduction as aliquid stat pro aliquo. As the ape that stands for man.

Evidence is objective and factual. What we choose to do with that evidence is where values come into the picture. I think you are right though with your nice piece of Latin Mediaeval Semiotics. A commentary is at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/semiotics-medieval/ . De Waal does indeed use the ape as a sign for man, suggesting we can understand human morality by seeing its inner core as displayed in our genetic bond with our simian cousins.

Robert Tulip wrote:You idealise a rational symbol while ignoring that most human activity, determined by genes and conventions, is not deliberate in the terms you specify.

While you describe well the metaphorical even hypothetical hominind in us all I feel you miss adequately describing the men we actually are to any significance. Perhaps this is a vaneer, perhaps the vaneer is the only relevant part of who we are, as we have been raised to become.

Robert Tulip wrote:Unfortunately this definition of humanity puts many of the demented, the deluded and the disabled outside the boundary. It is better, as per de Waal, to start from empirical observation and build definitions which are in accord with reality.

I would disagree with anyone who would attempt development of broadly relevant forms of savant morality.

Robert Tulip wrote:Sorry Grim, but there is a certain Niezschian pomposity to your comments here, especially your statement that people who cannot be understood are not human. I do not follow your reasoning regarding monkeys, as it seems obvious to me that study of the other primates is an important part of human self-understanding. People are monkeys’ biggest problem.

Pomp is one thing I suppose, the man as civilized and moral is used in a different sense than human. More metaphor perhaps? I suppose in the same way one would feel different towards the term: trained chimp, then one would toward: monkeys.

Robert Tulip wrote:Your term ‘Significance’ here reminds me of Derrida and deconstruction. But your question ‘Why does man need to identify himself with animals?’ is very good, and is central to de Waal’s book. We share blood and earth with the other animals of our planet, having branched from the apes very recently in genetic terms. Understanding how our genes form our morals is an important contribution of science to philosophy, with many instructive lessons to be found in the study of the apes.

I'm not familiar with Derrida, perhaps you would like to include a quote or something...anything? I'm not sure if identifying with animals is de Waal's point, I thought that de Waal was creating the moral animal (human), identifiably sourced out of concepts normally relating to men observed in the behaviors of chimpanzees.

Robert Tulip wrote:Sorry, I don’t understand this comment. It seems like your earlier statement that explaining part of morality by genetics is inherently fallacious. Would you care to explain the distinction between moral questioning and the philosophical questioning of morality?

Well there is the genetic fallacy which denies the possibilty of moral genes. The discussion of morality is a purely philosophical matter, the philosophical questioning of morality, as such it would seem that even apparently objective evidence that supposes an emperical solidification of morals as physical are still just value statements and therefore subject to deconstruction and definition.

Robert Tulip wrote:Evidence is objective and factual. What we choose to do with that evidence is where values come into the picture. I think you are right though with your nice piece of Latin Mediaeval Semiotics. A commentary is at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/semiotics-medieval/ . De Waal does indeed use the ape as a sign for man, suggesting we can understand human morality by seeing its inner core as displayed in our genetic bond with our simian cousins.

But the evidence we are dealing with here is anything but objective and factual. The so called emperical observations are the ones supposing that they can determine the metaphysical origin of morality, that morality can be compared physically in an objective and factual manner using terms like emotion and empathy!! That pesky genetic bonds nags at my skepticisms, what kind of bond? to what relevance? what are we really seeing? what type of animals are we really? do we really exemplify the chimp? I don't feel that these questions were properly addressed by de Waal or in this forum expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the expression of similarity between man and ape is at the exclusion of difference.

Please excuse grammatical, factual, and recitation mistakes!! My last post was a bad one in these respects.

Grim: "Well there is the genetic fallacy which denies the possibilty of moral genes."

That a proposition resembles a fallacy denies nothing. I could say that using the expression "rule of thumb" is bad since it started with picking a stick to beat people with no larger than the thumb. That would be a pristine example of the genetic fallacy. Then, I could turn around and say that lynching is bad because it was originally used to hang black people. If you claimed that this was also an example of the genetic fallacy, you'd be wrong, even though it fits the mold perfectly. Lynching is bad because mob murder is bad.

If you claim that the idea that there is a moral gene commits the genetic fallacy, perhaps you can provide evidence that it is indeed a fallacy? I personally doubt there is such a thing as a 'moral gene', but I do believe the mechanism for moral behavior is genetic. There is likely a combination of hundreds/thousands/... of genes which cooperate to provide this altruistic mechanism; via feelings of guilt and shame as negative controls and empathy as a positive control.

If you're going to gain a better understanding of morality Grim, you should read a book such as "The Selfish Gene" to better understand the influence of genetics on morality. There is a connection, and it can't be 'denied' by the inappropriate invocation of a fallacy.

Grim wrote:

Robert Tulip wrote:You idealise a rational symbol while ignoring that most human activity, determined by genes and conventions, is not deliberate in the terms you specify.

While you describe well the metaphorical even hypothetical hominid in us all I feel you miss adequately describing the men we actually are to any significance. Perhaps this is a veneer, perhaps the veneer is the only relevant part of who we are, as we have been raised to become.

The hominid in us shares most of its genes with the apes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_evol ... y_genetics states that over 70% of our genetic material is common – far less than the 98% figure that is bandied about. Language is a big part of the difference, and is at the core of our veneer, but our moral feelings have deeper roots than language, and form part of our old genetic inheritance.

Robert Tulip wrote:Unfortunately this definition of humanity puts many of the demented, the deluded and the disabled outside the boundary. It is better, as per de Waal, to start from empirical observation and build definitions which are in accord with reality.

I would disagree with anyone who would attempt development of broadly relevant forms of savant morality.

Please define what you mean by savant morality.

Robert Tulip wrote:Sorry Grim, but there is a certain Niezschian pomposity to your comments here, especially your statement that people who cannot be understood are not human. I do not follow your reasoning regarding monkeys, as it seems obvious to me that study of the other primates is an important part of human self-understanding. People are monkeys’ biggest problem.

Pomp is one thing I suppose, the man as civilized and moral is used in a different sense than human. More metaphor perhaps? I suppose in the same way one would feel different towards the term: trained chimp, then one would toward: monkeys.

You distinguish here between man and human. Does this equate to a distinction between the ideal and the real? It seems wrong to me to develop a vision of man as the ideal rational moral being without integrating this idea of man with the observation of what it is to be human.

Robert Tulip wrote:Your term ‘Significance’ here reminds me of Derrida and deconstruction. But your question ‘Why does man need to identify himself with animals?’ is very good, and is central to de Waal’s book. We share blood and earth with the other animals of our planet, having branched from the apes very recently in genetic terms. Understanding how our genes form our morals is an important contribution of science to philosophy, with many instructive lessons to be found in the study of the apes.

I'm not familiar with Derrida, perhaps you would like to include a quote or something...anything?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacques_De ... .80.931972 states “Derrida contributed to the understanding of certain deeply hidden philosophical presuppositions and prejudices in Western culture, arguing that the whole philosophical tradition rests on arbitrary dichotomous categories (such as sacred/profane, signifier/signified, mind/body), and that any text contains implicit hierarchies, by which an order is imposed on reality and by which a subtle repression is exercised, as these hierarchies exclude, subordinate, and hide the various potential meanings. Derrida refers to his procedure for uncovering and unsettling these dichotomies as deconstruction.” As such, Derrida is the high priest of relativism, with his view that such categories as sacred/profane, signifier/signified, mind/body are subjective rather than objective.

I'm not sure if identifying with animals is de Waal's point, I thought that de Waal was creating the moral animal (human), identifiably sourced out of concepts normally relating to men observed in the behaviors of chimpanzees.

De Waal does suggest that identification with animals is a better way to support them than seeking to provide animals with legal rights. Here we see the morality of empathy at play.

Robert Tulip wrote:Sorry, I don’t understand this comment. It seems like your earlier statement that explaining part of morality by genetics is inherently fallacious. Would you care to explain the distinction between moral questioning and the philosophical questioning of morality?

Well there is the genetic fallacy which denies the possibility of moral genes. The discussion of morality is a purely philosophical matter, the philosophical questioning of morality, as such it would seem that even apparently objective evidence that supposes an empirical solidification of morals as physical are still just value statements and therefore subject to deconstruction and definition.

Your term ‘purely philosophical’ ignores how philosophy draws from evidence as well as reason. You cannot deconstruct evidence, except by showing that it is skewed by values or assumptions of the compiler. Deconstruction refers to ideas which are assumed to have objectivity, such as the sacred and the profane, but which conceal implicit cultural values. Yes, de Waal has implicit cultural values, but his evidence about ape morality operates more at the level of fact than value.

But the evidence we are dealing with here is anything but objective and factual. The so called empirical observations are the ones supposing that they can determine the metaphysical origin of morality, that morality can be compared physically in an objective and factual manner using terms like emotion and empathy!! That pesky genetic bonds nags at my skepticisms, what kind of bond? to what relevance? what are we really seeing? what type of animals are we really? do we really exemplify the chimp? I don't feel that these questions were properly addressed by de Waal or in this forum expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where the expression of similarity between man and ape is at the exclusion of difference.

De Waal is not primarily engaging in metaphysics. Rather, he seeks to show that our actual bond with the apes can be shown to underpin our moral sentiments. Hence his approval of Hume’s view that morality is more a function of passion than reason. Where I disagree with de Waal and Hume is that I think we can form an idea of the ultimate good (eg the Sermon on the Mount) and use that as a framework for moral reasoning.

Robert Tulip wrote:Language is a big part of the difference, and is at the core of our veneer, but our moral feelings have deeper roots than language, and form part of our old genetic inheritance.

Language as a vaneer...wow, what irrelevance what reductio ad absurdum, what a genetic fallacy. Even if you were able to teach a monkey to communicate with man, the chimp would still possess the mind of a ape!! Moral sentiment changes through time, as not only expressed, but in no small measure, influenced by language, by our attitude towards certain words and thoughts. The mechanism as genetic, a metaphor, a rationalization, an excuse - ultimately a misunderstanding of the relevance of morality, a misunderstanding of the true nature of morality - expressed as a grave genetic fallacy.

Robert Tulip wrote:You distinguish here between man and human. Does this equate to a distinction between the ideal and the real? It seems wrong to me to develop a vision of man as the ideal rational moral being without integrating this idea of man with the observation of what it is to be human.

Haha, no, man is less than ideal. Even as a metaphor this view does disservice to the true nature of morality. As if it were apart from man, as if it is also the morality in man which is real. What is it to be human?

Robert Tulip wrote:“Derrida contributed to the understanding of certain deeply hidden philosophical presuppositions and prejudices in Western culture, arguing that the whole philosophical tradition rests on arbitrary dichotomous categories (such as sacred/profane, signifier/signified, mind/body), and that any text contains implicit hierarchies, by which an order is imposed on reality and by which a subtle repression is exercised, as these hierarchies exclude, subordinate, and hide the various potential meanings. Derrida refers to his procedure for uncovering and unsettling these dichotomies as deconstruction.” As such, Derrida is the high priest of relativism, with his view that such categories as sacred/profane, signifier/signified, mind/body are subjective rather than objective.

De Waal tells us to disreguard relativism. Morality relative to the man...of course. man/morality as dichotomous...perhaps in a certain abstract sense, but generally a dichotomy is any splitting of a whole into exactly two non-overlapping parts. I think that I was pointing to the human-ness of morality after all it is e re nata, e vestigio.

Robert Tulip wrote:Your term ‘purely philosophical’ ignores how philosophy draws from evidence as well as reason. You cannot deconstruct evidence, except by showing that it is skewed by values or assumptions of the compiler. Deconstruction refers to ideas which are assumed to have objectivity, such as the sacred and the profane, but which conceal implicit cultural values. Yes, de Waal has implicit cultural values, but his evidence about ape morality operates more at the level of fact than value.

Depending on the nature and context of the evidence. Evidence pointing to the relevance of chimp morality is actually a value statement. Behaviorisms seem less than factual within the context of a primarily psychologically verified debate.

Robert Tulip wrote:De Waal is not primarily engaging in metaphysics. Rather, he seeks to show that our actual bond with the apes can be shown to underpin our moral sentiments. Hence his approval of Hume’s view that morality is more a function of passion than reason. Where I disagree with de Waal and Hume is that I think we can form an idea of the ultimate good (eg the Sermon on the Mount) and use that as a framework for moral reasoning.

Simia quam similis, turpissimus bestia, nobis! - Cicero

Not really of relevance I suppose?