Robert wrote:If I have a goal, then my belief that the goal is objectively good is purely a matter of faith. In terms of systematic logic, my goal will always build upon simple propositions whose status is a pure value, such as that specific results are objectively good or bad.

The question isn't whether or not the goal is good or bad. The question is whether or not we can go from an is to an ought. And the answer is that we can, if we have a goal. Philosophers recognize that any such goal rests on subjective grounds. Sure, a goal could be an evil one. But that doesn't mean the is-ought problem doesn't have a solution. The question is how to arrive at moral goals without ignoring the threat of these goals drifting into poor moral territory. It's healthy to recognize these distinctions.

That we decide our goals upon pure value does not mean we only have faith. It's a matter of consensus of values. You can argue that consensus has been corrupt in the past, and falls victim to the ad populum fallacy. But how is faith any better? At least consensus necessarily maximizes happiness. Although I understand the weakness in that argument, I do believe out consensus has grown progressively more in tune with an ideal morality as our species has become more educated. So there is progress, and appeals to rotten consensus in history may not hold as strongly.

It is a truth universally acknowledged that flourishing is good, as Jane Austen famously said about a different moral principle. The semantic difference you are asserting here between moral goals and moral axioms is rather hard to discern.

A goal is subject to change. An axiom is less flexible. The greatest error of our species, categorically, is being too certain. The difference is large when you consider this.

Scientists can maintain the technical opinion that they do not take causality on faith, but in fact this looks disingenuous

If causation holds in every instance we explore it, then the conclusion isn't one of faith, but of logic. Inductive logic. There is a difference. When an exception is verified, induction will be flexible, but faith will not. The distinction here isn't black and white, but varying shades of gray.

There is a distinction between epistemic and social justification. The claim that causality is absolutely universal has a strong social justification as a simple presentation of a rational worldview, able to contest against those who maintain that God breaks the laws of physics.

You're speaking of epistemic justification here. Any social justification is secondary. The universality of causation and any appeal to a rational worldview is epistemic. These deal with propositions that can be shown true or false. The truth of which is independent of morality on the most basic level.

Whether or not eugenics would lead to superior homo sapiens is one thing. Sure, I think it would. But that does not mean this truth is morally correct - that it has social justification. In fact, I think the consensus would be unanimously against it.

I think there is a high moral purity in the principled rejection of faith, but as a tactical and strategic question of how to advance rationality in the world, such Trappist scientific isolation is rather detached and irrelevant to actual moral debate, which occurs on the terrain of faith.

I agree with you here. There's a knee jerk reaction to the defense of faith. For obvious reasons. But some faith is necessary.

But I think perhaps you're having a knee jerk reaction to the rationalists knee jerk reaction. You overcorrect as I see it.

Interbane wrote:The question is whether or not we can go from an is to an ought. And the answer is that we can, if we have a goal.

But what does that actually mean? In terms of the agenda of this thread, the relation between faith and reason, this is-ought question devolves to asking if we can logically derive values from facts. The point is that we can’t, and have to bring to bear something additional to the facts, something from the domain of faith, if we want to assert that any factual statements entail a moral decision.
When we consider a factual situation with moral weight, such as the fact that someone has done a crime, we never say the crime alone causes the punishment. The judgement involves a social and cultural decision about how serious the crime is, a decision that is never directly entailed by the fact alone but comes as you say from the realm of social goals. This realm of culture is constructed, in a way that has the nature of faith.
People want to say the situation alone provides a compelling logical basis for a response, and that desire is the basis for religious codes which assert divine blessing for moral beliefs. But the secular world cannot escape this faith dimension so easily, because secular myths such as universal human rights are just as faith based as any religion.

People would like to say that rights are universal and inalienable in terms of an absolute morality, but as you point out, there has to be something added to the facts, namely our moral judgment of our goals. Facts alone do not entail values. Our goals equate to our values and principles. Goals are normative, establishing our moral norms, which are conceptually different as a general category from any descriptive factual statement.

Interbane wrote:That we decide our goals upon pure value does not mean we only have faith. It's a matter of consensus of values. You can argue that consensus has been corrupt in the past, and falls victim to the ad populum fallacy. But how is faith any better?

I am trying to define a general conceptual understanding of a theory of value. My point is that our values don’t come from just the collection of facts, but as you say, from the goals we share about the type of world or life we want to make. What is universal about such goals is that they have the character of faith.

The question then is why we think one hoped for world or life is better than the alternative. We might say because the preferred future will maximize happiness or wealth or peace or some other value that we hold dear. But in all these cases what our values hold in common is that they rest upon conceptual moral principles and beliefs.
When we apply such beliefs in practice, reflecting social consensus such as a belief in the principle of rule of law, this practical certainty has the structure of a religious faith, even where a secular community sees that its goals do not have a religious basis. I am trying to show that the nature of faith against general principles does not simply fit in conventional labels. There are some universal phenomena of faith which apply equally in religious and secular contexts in terms of how they motivate our moral values.

Interbane wrote: At least consensus necessarily maximizes happiness.

Far from it. Russia had a consensus about communism that maximized suffering. Often our faith can be evil.

Interbane wrote: Although I understand the weakness in that argument, I do believe out consensus has grown progressively more in tune with an ideal morality as our species has become more educated.

That assessment is like saying turkeys have a consensus on the morality of trusting farmers to feed and care for them. Turkey morals work perfectly well until the day before Thanksgiving. Our turkey morality is causing the sixth world extinction event, and we should really be lifting our moral gaze higher. Humans have a better ability to predict the future than turkeys do, despite appearances.

Interbane wrote: So there is progress, and appeals to rotten consensus in history may not hold as strongly.

Yes there is progress in caring for the weak, probably driven more by economic growth and ability to pay for unproductive members of society. Even today, poor societies that cannot fund good health and welfare systems quietly practice euthanasia and infanticide.

Interbane wrote: A goal is subject to change. An axiom is less flexible. The greatest error of our species, categorically, is being too certain. The difference is large when you consider this.

That is why I suggest that we should be very conservative, simple and basic in defining moral axioms. For example, from my point of view it is reasonable to say that measures which will enable humans to avoid extinction are moral, at a universal axiomatic level, since all humans should agree that human extinction would be a bad thing.

Interbane wrote: If causation holds in every instance we explore it, then the conclusion isn't one of faith, but of logic. Inductive logic. There is a difference. When an exception is verified, induction will be flexible, but faith will not. The distinction here isn't black and white, but varying shades of gray.

The beliefs that causality is universal and that no uncaused events occur add to the logic of induction by asserting a fact about the nature of reality rather than just a confidence about testable models.

Interbane wrote: You're speaking of epistemic justification here. Any social justification is secondary. The universality of causation and any appeal to a rational worldview is epistemic. These deal with propositions that can be shown true or false. The truth of which is independent of morality on the most basic level.

Actually I disagree with all your statements here. In assessing the relation between faith and reason, a purely scientific worldview can totally ignore all faith, in a pure factual worldview with no faith. That is epistemic. Only if we have any concern about what is important, valuable and useful – ie the social justification of belief – do we need to go beyond the nihilistic solipsism of pure epistemics. We cannot show that causation is universal, any more than we can show that parallel lines never meet. Our practical reliance on causality is a matter of induction. Our belief that causality is universal can only be a matter of faith in a proposition we consider to be a self-evident axiom.

Interbane wrote: Some faith is necessary. But I think perhaps you're having a knee jerk reaction to the rationalists knee jerk reaction. You overcorrect as I see it.

Again, no, my view is not a kneejerk reaction. There is a scientific atheist worldview which holds the opinion that faith is intrinsically false, blind and malignant, as a general inference from the error of traditional religion. It is like induction: philosophers say that when they examine a range of examples of faith, and find that none of them stand up to scrutiny against evidence, they infer that all faith is wrong. However, that general inference is wrong. People hold very simple obvious generally shared beliefs, such as that the universe exists and obeys consistent physical laws which can be discovered by logic and evidence. The belief that such simple ideas are absolutely true is a matter of faith. Science has no absolutes. If we think any universal proposition is absolutely true then our opinion is strictly a matter of faith.

Robert Tulip wrote:But in all these cases what our values hold in common is that they rest upon conceptual moral principles and beliefs.

I don't think it's true in all cases. A large part of morality is the avoidance of harm. When we judge the severity of a crime, we do so in many cases based on how much we empathize with the victim. This isn't a matter of conceptual moral principle. It's a matter of feeling and empathy. We each have this undeveloped sense of justice, unrefined until we learn the philosophy behind it.

Pain doesn't necessarily mean physical either. All our conceptual mores are founded on moral emotions. These emotions are very real, even if they're subjective. I don't take it on faith that extreme emotional pain caused to me by someone else should be met with punishment for that person. It's how I feel.

The consensus of morality comes from an aggregation of these feelings across society. We tease the feelings apart and figure out where someone is liable or not, and how much harm they've done. In many court cases, it can be called a "fact" that a mother feels harm for the death of her child. And that's the foundation for moral action in many cases.

We might say because the preferred future will maximize happiness or wealth or peace or some other value that we hold dear. But in all these cases what our values hold in common is that they rest upon conceptual moral principles and beliefs.

However, these conceptual moral principles and beliefs in turn rest upon our emotions and desires. We wish for a future where our children can experience the most happiness with the least harm. This desire is tempered by understanding that there must exist some form of broader altruism, in the style of game theory. Otherwise happiness for our children is at odds with other children's happiness, and that's not sustainable.

In assessing the relation between faith and reason, a purely scientific worldview can totally ignore all faith, in a pure factual worldview with no faith.

I'd say there's a need for faith in the consistency of sense datum, that what we're seeing is real. Beyond that I don't disagree with you. A purely scientific worldview isn't realistic. Anyone who claims they subscribe to one is using philosophy whether they realize it or not. They follow a sort of metaphysical naturalism.

Our belief that causality is universal can only be a matter of faith in a proposition we consider to be a self-evident axiom.

You believe causality is universal? That beyond the edge of the known universe, causation works the same as it does here on Earth? That back before time began, causation worked as it does now? Your statements are good on the surface, but I think you're sticking with general statements to prove a point that isn't supported when you dig deeper.

The belief that such simple ideas are absolutely true is a matter of faith.

Sure. But why would anyone believe something is absolutely true? I don't think that's wise.

Interbane wrote:

Robert Tulip wrote:But in all these cases what our values hold in common is that they rest upon conceptual moral principles and beliefs.

I don't think it's true in all cases. A large part of morality is the avoidance of harm. When we judge the severity of a crime, we do so in many cases based on how much we empathize with the victim. This isn't a matter of conceptual moral principle. It's a matter of feeling and empathy. We each have this undeveloped sense of justice, unrefined until we learn the philosophy behind it.

The term “these” in my statement that you quoted referred to the function of morality in trying to create a better future. That is a main, if not exclusive, purpose of morality, which does address logical analysis about consequences, duty and principle. You have pointed out that morality also gives vent to feelings, which might include irrational emotional reactions such as revenge and empathy. That is an important point, but readily answered.

Against the purpose of this thread, which is to argue that a rational faith is possible, what you call an “undeveloped sense of justice” can be compared to an irrational faith. Victims feel aggrieved at crimes, and want revenge on the criminal. But the point I was making about values that try to create a better future means that such emotional reactions should be assessed more calmly and rationally. When we do try to apply more objective conceptual frameworks, we see that punishment based on vengeance often fails to fit the crime or to build a better world, just as faith based on blind comforting desire will not be ethical.

A good illustration of this point is seen in the US prison system. America’s jails are an utter disgrace, a hellhole of horror, a complete moral indictment of any claim the USA has to support human rights to freedom, justice and equality, and indeed its own supposedly inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The US is sinking into a cesspit of its own making, continuing to traumatize, shock and horrify its culture with jails, movies, ads, guns, drugs and violence, because as a nation America allows stupid emotional reactions rather than intelligent moral concepts to set its public policies.

Jesus Christ said in the Bible (Matthew 25) that one of the seven works of mercy that will determine if a person is saved or damned is whether they visit prisoners. This clear and simple suggestion from Jesus illustrates how the Gospel principles of love and reconciliation offer a rational path to a better future, whereas the older morality based on revenge causes a spiral of damage and collapse.

This reading does not imply that a rational faith should believe that literal stories such as the return of Jesus Christ on the clouds of heaven are more than myths. It means that the moral lessons contained in such mythology are well worth analyzing for their parabolic content.

Mr. Tulip wrote:Jesus Christ said in the Bible (Matthew 25) that one of the seven works of mercy that will determine if a person is saved or damned is whether they visit prisoners.

Well I just re-read that chapter and it has the inspiring parable of the servants managing money / increasing god-given talents. And the admonition you quote which also includes feeding the hungry and housing strangers, etc. But then Jesus has to ruin it all by warning of eternal punishment, evidently the foundation of morality for many people i.e. doing good only to avoid hell.

LanDroid wrote:

Mr. Tulip wrote:Jesus Christ said in the Bible (Matthew 25) that one of the seven works of mercy that will determine if a person is saved or damned is whether they visit prisoners.

Well I just re-read that chapter and it has the inspiring parable of the servants managing money / increasing god-given talents. And the admonition you quote which also includes feeding the hungry and housing strangers, etc. But then Jesus has to ruin it all by warning of eternal punishment, evidently the foundation of morality for many people i.e. doing good only to avoid hell.

Your interpretation illustrates a prevailing error regarding the Biblical theory of salvation, namely the simplistic mistake that the phrase here “eternal punishment” means literally going to hell, understood as a spatial and temporal destination for personal permanent existence after death of those who fail to perform works of mercy.

Granted, JC does provide a bit more graphic detail, cursing the wicked and selfish as destined for “everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels”, but this statement is more symbolic than literal.

The point he is making is a moral argument that is entirely compatible with the rational scientific analysis of natural selection by cumulative adaptation and descent by modification, that societies where people behave morally by performing works of mercy will prosper, while those who fail in this basic agenda of common humanity will decline and collapse. Now this is obviously counterintuitive, since there is a general observation that the wicked prosper and the good struggle. I think though that Jesus, or his inventors, is taking a deeper and wiser look at human motivation.

That is a complex argument, requiring interpretation of religion against the EO Wilson theory of social evolution. Species that are social do better than those that are antisocial. The writers of the Bible could see that the fall from grace involved a massive hit to sociality. They therefore identified these seven key problems of sociality, and said that supporting them equals salvation while opposing them equals damnation.

The dispute between Dawkins and Wilson over social evolution by group selection could be read as less a scientific dispute than a religious one, since the science dispute is more philosophy than facts. Dawkins’ selfish gene theory promotes rational empirical individualism, while Wilson’s social evolution theory promotes faithful loyal communities. These scientific models involve conflicting mythical frameworks about the nature of the world, regarding whether our morality should be more about faith or reason. Here is a good summary of Wilson’s eusocial theory of the centrality of faith to salvation by evolution. http://longnow.org/seminars/02012/apr/2 ... est-earth/ This incidentally mentions some key points in our current book selection Tribe, such as how well chimps can read each others’ intentions.

The big problem regarding the seven works of mercy advocated by Jesus is that the popular interpretations of religion are the rationalisations of the damned, those who put a supernatural fantasy in place of logic and evidence. People want to trust their instincts of revenge, their desire to punish criminals, rather than listen to the Gospel story of restorative justice. So this absolute core ethical principle of the Bible, about how Jesus would rule the world in love, simply gets ignored by Christians who rationalise their prejudices and completely fail to see the transformative meaning of the new covenant of love of enemies that the Gospels propounded.

The “housing strangers” line that you quote is often translated as “welcoming strangers”, and is widely used by refugee advocates in a way that produces fear among those whose moral focus is on property rights and rule of law. Again, the relevance is that welcoming strangers requires a faith in the good intentions of others, a social framework of group selection, as distinct from the solely rational and faithless model of traditional genetic kin selection.

Robert wrote:The point he is making is a moral argument that is entirely compatible with the rational scientific analysis of natural selection by cumulative adaptation and descent by modification

You're off your rocker. That's not the point he's making. You can "interpret" the words to mean that, but the original intent is almost certainly much different.

Against the purpose of this thread, which is to argue that a rational faith is possible, what you call an “undeveloped sense of justice” can be compared to an irrational faith. Victims feel aggrieved at crimes, and want revenge on the criminal. But the point I was making about values that try to create a better future means that such emotional reactions should be assessed more calmly and rationally.

You’re missing my point I think. These emotions we’re talking about are the driving force behind justice, morality, etc. Which necessarily means these concepts are not merely based on faith. They’re based on something tangible – emotion.

Emotion and faith are different things. Reason must still be applied to emotion for all the reasons you mention, but that doesn’t lead to what you call rational faith.

Applying reason to faith is like multiplying something by zero. You still have a foundation of nothing.

Interbane wrote:

Robert wrote:The point he is making is a moral argument that is entirely compatible with the rational scientific analysis of natural selection by cumulative adaptation and descent by modification

You're off your rocker. That's not the point he's making. You can "interpret" the words to mean that, but the original intent is almost certainly much different.

No, I am not off my rocker thank you Interbane, this is a perfectly reasonable hypothesis regarding Christian origins, which it seems has touched a nerve for you regarding some prejudices and assumptions you may hold about ancient thought. The fact that the Gospels contain arguments that are compatible with evolutionary thinking does not at all mean that evolutionary thinking was an explicit driver. Rather, my point is that today, rationality means we understand progress in scientific evolutionary terms, so if we look at ancient theories of progress, we can assess their merits against our more evolved rational scientific understanding. And when that evolutionary heuristic is applied to the Bible, there is an immense amount that is completely compatible with theories of group selection.

Interbane wrote:

Against the purpose of this thread, which is to argue that a rational faith is possible, what you call an “undeveloped sense of justice” can be compared to an irrational faith. Victims feel aggrieved at crimes, and want revenge on the criminal. But the point I was making about values that try to create a better future means that such emotional reactions should be assessed more calmly and rationally.

You’re missing my point I think. These emotions we’re talking about are the driving force behind justice, morality, etc. Which necessarily means these concepts are not merely based on faith. They’re based on something tangible – emotion.

You seem to be making an absolute argument here that the concepts of justice and morality can be understood by seeing them simply as expressions of emotions such as revenge. That is a highly contestable and controversial opinion on your part, removing all suggestion of objectivity. Like David Hume, you are reducing ethics to sentiment, and further, identifying justice with the Mosaic Law of retribution rather than the Christian idea of restoration. What I was saying was that if we consider as a moral axiom the idea that it is good to create a better future, then we can objectively and dispassionately form shared views about what in fact a better future looks like, and our concepts of justice and morality can be defined according to whether they help produce that future or not.

Interbane wrote: Emotion and faith are different things. Reason must still be applied to emotion for all the reasons you mention, but that doesn’t lead to what you call rational faith.

Perhaps we could say that faith is an emotion? Generally faith commitments are held with strong emotion, with adherents forcefully rejecting arguments against their view. Within philosophy though, where we are trying for a cooler and more objective look, we can readily ask whether our faith commitment is compatible with scientific knowledge. If I hold as an article of faith that the universe actually exists, and further that it obeys consistent laws that can be described by logic and evidence, we should be able to agree that this faith commitment is completely compatible with reason, even though it is not something that can be proved by reason alone.

Interbane wrote: Applying reason to faith is like multiplying something by zero. You still have a foundation of nothing.

That argument only applies if your faith is misplaced. If your faith has a good purchase on reality, such as a belief that the universe exists and can be understood by use of reason and evidence, then applying reason to this faith stance can produce all scientific knowledge. But if we have misplaced faith, such as that God made the world six thousand years ago, then using that as a foundation will produce further delusion and suffering, not knowledge and happiness.

Robert wrote: The point he is making is a moral argument that is entirely compatible with the rational scientific analysis of natural selection by cumulative adaptation and descent by modification.

Interesting interpretation, but I'm with Interbane - that is a Yooge stretch...

When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, he will sit on his glorious throne. All the nations will be gathered before him, and he will separate the people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats. He will put the sheep on his right and the goats on his left.

Then the King will say to those on his right, 'Come, you who are blessed by my Father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world.

..."Then he will say to those on his left, 'Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels.

...Then they will go away to eternal punishment, but the righteous to eternal life."

It's very difficult to see how those events support your interpretation.

Sorry for a sidetrack, but this also brings up modern Christian requirements for salvation. Contrary to what the bible says, Christians insist the 7 good behaviors listed in Matthew 25 will NOT earn salvation; a personal relationship with Christ is required where one begs for, and receives, forgiveness for sins. The whole bloody mess is riddled with contradictions.

Robert:
If your faith has a good purchase on reality, such as a belief that the universe exists and can be understood by use of reason and evidence, then applying reason to this faith stance can produce all scientific knowledge.

mighty13:
I completely agree, the faith is something we all have, we have faith in the new day or faith in the people that surround us, faith is not necessarily believing in an all-mighty power.

We're drifting into loose definitions of faith. If we get back to info johnson1010 quoted earlier, much of this clears up.

johnson1010:
Faith is an expectation without evidence, against the evidence and regardless of the evidence. That means no new information will change your faithful belief. If you ever stop believing in an article of faith then it’s because you have LOST faith in that thing… and possibly gained confidence in something else.

Confidence is an expectation built on the preponderance of evidence in support of it. Confidence is flexible. It can increase or decrease depending on the quality of the data. Data which builds a predictive pattern that will either fail or succeed to correlate with the events of reality demonstrating the objective accuracy of that expectation. And as the true mark of justified belief this correlation determines the amount of confidence you should have in your belief.

The difference between confidence and faith is the entire purpose of the scientific method.

As mighty13 suggests, people have told me "You believe the sun will rise tomorrow don't you? See?! You DO have faith!" Well let's look at that a minute. The earth is 4.5 billion years old. Multiply that by 365 then add (4.5 billion / 4) days to account for leap years and we have the sun coming up roughly 1,643,625,000,000 times in a row without interruption. With that much evidence, it is not an article of faith to sing "the sun will come up tomorrow!"