Robert Tulip wrote:What is required in scientific terms is analysis of how popular belief articulates into a scientifically credible theoretical framework. As our interpretation of myth changes under the power of scientific reason, new readings will find meanings that mesh with objectives and values supported by knowledge, and belief will evolve to harmonise better with knowledge.
I am fine with some re-interpretation of myth based on science and obscure astronomical phenomena, but I insist that it must always be reinterpreted from the inside, that is, by someone who has some internal sense of why it matches "is" with "ought". If the myth doesn't speak to me, as myths of tearing apart the royal "horned god" (as represented in "The King Must Die" and "Mists of Avalon") do not speak to me, then I should not be trying to re-interpret or re-construct them.
Robert Tulip wrote:even these dreams, considered insane by some modern theories of rationality, hold their own reasonableness, providing a durable and robust framework for hope and identity for their holders.
Now that strikes me as appropriate criteria.
Robert Tulip wrote:By contrast, what you aptly term ‘monotheistic intellectual imperialism’ is based on imposing a modus vivendi for clashing cultures, a set of beliefs suitable for political stability. These imperial beliefs evolve under cultural pressure, co-opting elements that serve the ruler’s purpose and needs.
Nomad clans in the stone age had no great need to hold or promulgate false beliefs, except out of sheer ignorance, whereas teaching a lie can be supremely useful for a monotheist empire as part of its security and stability strategic agenda.
I think "teaching a lie" is entirely too simplistic. Suppose we accept, for the moment, the thesis that Constantine wanted a single orthodox version of Christianity primarily because he wanted a unified Roman Empire and a single religion to promulgate within it. He still had to select from perspectives which actually existed, and he could not have created a "there is only one true Christianity" version from whole cloth if all sides had agreed that "we don't know if Christ was divine or human or both, even though some of us believe one and others believe another."
In the same way, a given view of the workings of the supernatural had to make sense to someone at some point, because it told them the basis for what "should be done" in a way that made sense. (For example, We are all God's children, so we treat all humans equally.)
Robert Tulip wrote:
Culture is by nature heavily repressive, censuring activity outside narrow norms.
Kind of a new thought for me. I will consider it further.
Robert Tulip wrote:Mythology sought to encode allegory, and to present an emotionally appealing story which held a deep symbolic meaning. The encoding of allegory was necessary because the dominant culture was repressive towards the encoded material, and would not countenance it appearing in public,
There was an incredible variety of mythologies in the world of the Greeks and Romans. I have trouble believing that every time someone resorted to supernatural entities there was some evasion of repression going on.
Robert Tulip wrote:The supernatural error that became enshrined in church dogma arose more as a social response to mythic coding of nature, not strictly because of that coding as an evolution from it.
I fear I did not follow that. What is the distinction being made?
Robert Tulip wrote:Harry Marks wrote: The "true explanation" of what we observe does not have to be a view that was true originally and can still be considered true today. The true explanation can be that there were errors in the past, and we face the challenge of separating useful myths of meaning from the erroneous way they were expressed in the past.
Yes, you are rightly clarifying the unclarity in my suggestion that myth can be seen as inherently natural in its genetic origin. Myth arises from the transcendental imagination, a capacity of mind that is inherently linguistic, governed by concept, and therefore central to spiritual belief and practice, imagining how ideas persist through time by embodiment as entity.
Interesting. This does strike me as useful, and valid to at least some degree.
Harry Marks wrote: And yet even spiritual belief is natural in a larger sense, even where its content is imaginary and literally false, since it responds to natural evolutionary drivers of cultural selection.
Okay, but that does not mean Anansi or Narcissus have anything to do with the seasons or the moon or the precession of the equinoxes.
Robert Tulip wrote:Harry Marks wrote:
This offers the advantage of flexibility - we do not have to cherry-pick observations which support a monolithic "true explanation" as an alternative, but can go wherever the evidence leads.
Evidence only leads us where an organising theory looks for it. Falsification of an organising theory can look for challenges and difficulties, while the proponent of theory will focus on the strongest supporting evidence.
Wait, wait. Again you have imposed a false dichotomy. An organising theory does not have to be a single unified theory. It can be a simple notion such as "heavier things have a stronger desire to fall, so they fall faster than lighter things."
Many disciplines have begun with chaotic observations which gradually gathered evidence, and the organising theories tended to arise because there actually was an organising principle at work. Kepler's Laws are apparently unconnected observations, gathered from Brahe's data. Newton used Galilean mechanics to put together an overall account of their common structure because he was analyzing the real phenomenon of gravity which actually explained them. It remains to be shown whether there is such a single natural structure which can make sense of all use of supernatural talk. As I have said, I rather doubt it.
Robert Tulip wrote: rationality has not yet provided a higher quality of myth.
Harry Marks wrote:Why would you think rationality is at all suited for providing such a framework of meaning?
Because irrationality involves believing contradictions, whereas rationality is committed to coherence, bringing all data into an encompassing explanation. Based on science, a theory of everything that addresses social formation as well as physics would provide a powerful framework of meaning.
As I suggested before, for this to provide meaning, it must be experienced by some people as meaningful. Simply stating that "someone must collect the garbage" is not the same as seeing "ah, yes, collecting the garbage is what I am meant to do."
Robert Tulip wrote:I think modern rationality is a long way from supplying such a framework of meaning that addresses the concerns addressed by religion. Atheism often fails to understand the social value of religion, the moral values of conservative societies, and its own religious mythic structure. As I mentioned before, Carl Jung’s analysis of the relation between reason and symbol explores unconscious factors that would have to be brought out explicitly for rationality to become suitable as a framework of meaning.
Humanistic psychology, as represented by Maslow and Frankl, have gone a long way toward providing a useable framework without the supernatural. Those two were wise enough not to engage the issue of the supernatural, but have a lot to say about the relationship between facts and ultimate sources of meaning. Making the unconscious conscious is a less promising path, in my view, because, like Tillich's "broken myth" it presupposes some internal perspective which is outside the perspective which finds meaning in the old connections. I think terms like "unconscious" are going to have to be replaced by more explicit propositions such as "instinctive" or "repressed" or "raw perception".
Robert Tulip wrote:That is an interesting hypothetical situation, but common interests, for example planetary survival, are more important than individual interests that clash with the common interest, as we see in the 1.5 degree warming target agreed last year in Paris. Global evolution is towards interconnectedness, and part of the religious agenda is naturally how liberty can be protected even while regulation becomes more entwined.
I did not mean to get caught up in arguing about individual vs. group priorities. Common interests are not always more important than individual interests, as the common interest in simplicity of gender assignment shows. I will back away from my assertion that rationality is automatically fragmented, but I think my deeper point is true, that people's motivations are not primarily modified by means of reason.
A narrative about how "the way things are" fits with "what we are meant to do" will tap into a sense people already have about what makes life worth living, and will make sense of the behavior they have seen modeled and the experiences they have had of it. Thus we are in a chicken-and-egg cyclicality between culture making sense of fitting purposes in life, on one pole, and the actual behavior of the people within that culture. The fragmentation brought by modernity's lack of structure is the child of the fragmentation brought by the violence of the pre-modern world, and the denial of the value of that violence by its major religions.
Robert Tulip wrote: Reason examines evidence, consequences and accountability, with self-correcting mechanisms. The problem though, as encapsulated in the enthronement of Supreme Reason in Notre Dame during the French Revolution, is that our theories of reason remain, as you say, fragmented and incomplete.
Explaining why it is worth living a life of empathy when the aggressive prosper is not a matter of sufficient exercise of self-correction by evidence.
Robert Tulip wrote:We are very irrational.
Can't disagree with that.
Robert Tulip wrote:Detachment gives time and freedom to contemplate deep meaning, often leading to results that are compatible with scientific reason,
Christianity is compatible with scientific reason, even in its literal, supernaturalist forms. I think you are a bit side-tracked if you are thinking that the "error" of attachment to material things is the same in kind as the "error" in believing phlogiston is responsible for combustion.
Robert Tulip wrote:Harry Marks wrote:This is about values, not about mechanical cause and effect. If we are attached to comfort, wealth, social position and security the anxiety that results is likely to lead us to be unhappy and to take actions which make others more unhappy than they already are.
Your anxiety theory looks causal,
Well spotted. From long habit, I explain values in terms that are as naturalistic as possible. I think when asking people to consider a different frame of reference it is helpful to explain as much as possible within their own frame of reference. The point remains that "detachment" is not about overcoming error by more careful science, it is about what we should value. The "why" is where the revelation comes in.
Robert Tulip wrote:Only by having some people free from attachment can the society maintain a conversation about values that come from deep contemplation.
A somewhat different "why" and one that, I might add, is much more sympathetic to a Brahman social hierarchy practice (e.g. caste system) than mine was.
Robert Tulip wrote: Overcoming anxiety requires that facts be explained as part of a story that provides hope and meaning.
Or maybe it requires discarding polygamy, slavery and large families, so that everyone can afford the time to be contemplative. The fit between "is" and "should" is not independent of the material conditions.
Robert Tulip wrote: The guide that I suggest is provided by astronomy is a simple matter of seeing culture as part of nature.
I don't think it is a sufficiently comprehensive guide to the incredibly complex matter of how culture fits with nature. Astronomy has nothing useful to say about managing aggression, the problem of adultery (cuckolding) for child-rearing, the enforcement of reciprocity in altruism, or the relationship between integrity and enforcement. Sociobiology seems to me to have its questions in more or less the right place, even if it is committed to too restricted a set of methods for answering them.