DWill wrote: 'evolution operates' implies that a higher-order entity, governing both the physical constitution of organisms and the phenotypal expression of one species of organism--humans--has been demonstrated to exist. If it has, I don't know about it.
To say ‘evolution operates’ does not imply that evolution is an entity. Gravity operates as a higher order law of nature but is not an entity. The laws of physics operate but are not entities. Operators in mathematics (+-/x) operate but are not entities. Evolution is not an entity.
Evolution does govern both phenotype and genotype. Phenotype is defined as “the observable physical or biochemical characteristics of an organism, as determined by both genetic makeup and environmental influences.” Human phenotypic characteristics include culture and the physical influence we have on our planet.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenotype# ... _variation says
phenotypic variation is a fundamental prerequisite for evolution by natural selection. It is the living organism as a whole that contributes (or not) to the next generation, so natural selection affects the genetic structure of a population indirectly via the contribution of phenotypes. The idea of the phenotype has been generalized by Richard Dawkins in The Extended Phenotype to mean all the effects a gene has on the outside world that may influence its chances of being replicated. These can be effects on the organism in which the gene resides, the environment, or other organisms.
Anthropogenic climate change is a big part of our global phenotype. Greenhouse gas emissions present a prime threat to human future, risking global destabilisation, conflict and collapse.
Phenotypes evolve because living systems are incremental and adaptive. Each step in an incremental process is a small change from the previous step.
Homeostasis, the tendency of systems to stay within stable boundaries, means that without external pressure for change a system will usually be evolutionarily stable. But when the homeostatic context changes, we see what we call selective pressure, causing the system to evolve to a new stability. A big change in the context punctuates the equilibrium of steady evolution towards higher complexity by disrupting the set of available niches.
Rising temperature is a selective pressure in the human extended phenotype. When there is a steady phenotypic change, as seen in global warming, selective pressure is placed on all evolving structures within the phenotype.
The incremental nature of evolution applies to genes and memes. A meme, as a phenotypic effect seen in culture, evolves in a step by step linear path. For example musical styles have a memetic evolution, with gradual steady linear change.
A memetic or genetic revolution can be caused by steady directional selective pressure on a system, and by sudden external influence. All the big eras of our planet, Precambrian, Cambrian, Permian, etc, are characterised and separated by changes in environmental selective pressures.
DWill wrote:
If by 'evolution' you mean that both the biology that subsumes all organisms and the culture of one organism that is nested in that biology, demonstrate step-wise change, I see no reason to dispute that. But you know the devil or god will be in the details.
Recognising that culture is nested within biology refines the set theory of the relation between culture and nature. All culture is natural and biological but not all nature or biology is cultural.
Evolution is more than step-wise change, it recognises that mutation is random, but successful mutation involves cumulative adaptation in response to selective pressures. Evolution therefore operates on a defined path, responding to natural selective pressures that can to a fair extent be quantified. When new selective pressures are induced, as is happening with global warming, evolutionary change can be rapid, as seen in poleward migration.
DWill wrote:
There are fundamental differences between how organisms change and how what are essentially products of thought, or culture, change. We should expect to see in the world a diversity of types of change, and we do.
All change in living systems is evolutionary. There are no ‘types of change’ that conflict with the law of evolution. There are fundamental similarities in how genes and memes evolve. Homeostasis is one similarity, incremental change is another, and cumulative adaptation is another. You will not find examples of cultural change that conflict with these laws of nature. When homeostasis breaks down, as is happening now with global anthropogenic climate change, evolution is pushed across tipping points into new chaotic patterns.
DWill wrote:
'evolutionary selective pressures' implies that in the two realms of biology and culture, we see the operation of a specific, uniform principle. You assert this, but it appears that you're saying it must be so, philosophically, not that science itself has had anything to say about it.
Memes are a purely scientific theory, observing that culture obeys the law of evolution. People are free to be creative, but culture is nested in the set of biology. All memetic evolution of human culture obeys the genetic law of natural evolution by cumulative adaptation, because natural homeostasis will rein in any trends that approach the boundaries of the physically possible.
Memes change faster than genes, and can have cyclic structures, but they have the same increasing complexity as genes when occurring within a stable environment, as all available niches aregradually explored by the systematic chaos of mutation.
We can expect the memetic structure of the human phenotype to change rapidly under the selective pressure of global warming. Only those memes suited to a hotter world will adapt and survive. This means that obsolete memes, such as denial of science, will go extinct or become less powerful.
DWill wrote:
We didn't evolve with the ability to live in the air or the water, but through our culture we have done so. We don't even know precisely the limits that evolution or nature places on our ability to adapt. I don't follow your reasoning all the way, but it seems that now you are distinguishing between something in culture that is meme and something that is non-meme (or seemingly non-meme), something that does not build on precedent. How would the latter case even be possible?
Those cultural abilities to fly and float are memetic, as seen in the evolution of technology. I don’t think there is anything in culture that is not memetic. Evolution is all-encompassing.
DWill wrote:But this distinction [between meme and non-meme] could be a positive point, in that it begins to distinguish culture change from evolution change. One of those distinctions would be in the area of 'durable results.' What is a durable result vs.what isn't can be very difficult to ascertain, and subject to tremendous bias on the part of the observer.
A durable meme, such as an idea that has been around for thousands of years, has proved its adaptability, and can expect to be robust against selective pressure. Christianity is an example. But when the environment changes to something different from the environment in which the meme evolved, the meme must adapt or fail.
DWill wrote: When it comes to building on precedent, it's interesting that this is exactly what often does not happen in the give and take or dialectic of intellectual history.
With intellectual history, I quite like Hegel’s theory of dialectical change, with a thesis giving rise to its antithesis, and the emerging polarity then being combined in a new synthesis. This model of the history of ideas is entirely evolutionary, showing how ideas evolve as natural memes. Conflicting memes can be locked in Red Queen arms races.
That is a big exaggeration. Fads go in cycles, and respond to selective pressures. When the economy or technology or society changes, it enables a new set of fads. These may seem original, but they have a causality, always nesting within a memetic evolution of ideas, including the return of the repressed. And in fact, theoretical fads do not always reject their predecessors.
Leaving aside the pejorative and ephemeral idea of fad, theory evolves step-wise, with each new theorist learning from existing theory. Often differences from current views are highlighted in debate because they are at the edge of chaos, the most interesting area of uncertainty where new things emerge. But this focus on difference can fail to see the areas of identity between new and old theories. Even Darwin built upon and modified existing thought about evolution.
DWill wrote: RobertTulip wrote: philosophy can make binding statements. 1+1=2 is more a statement within philosophy than within science, and is totally binding. Kant showed that such analytical a priori statements are binding, as their truth is contained in the definition of their terms.
I'd be interested to know what others think about this matter. You cite a micro-example that is at odds with the generality of what you've been arguing. On matters of generality, which is at least popularly what most people conceive as the territory of philosophy, philosophy does have the flavor of the optional.
I don’t see how the universality of mathematical truth is at odds with anything I have said. Mathematics is absolutely not optional. The rise of the optional as an attitude towards philosophy is associated with broad cultural trends, notably the acceptance of cultural relativism and multiculturalism. These are widely seen as ethically positive because of their respect for diversity. But relativism produces its own antithesis, in an interest in shared identity and truth. Science in its pure form is not culturally bound but universal. Relativism expresses the social view that philosophy is inherently incapable of finding universal truths that bridge differences between cultures.
DWill wrote: It's even essential that we know [that philosophies are optional], so that we don't come under the sway of a destructive philosophy such as racial supremacy.
Your premise does not imply your conclusion. I don’t think that racial supremacy is a starter within any potential respectable philosophy. My own view is that the least powerful cultures are often the most important. But there is much room for argument about the worth of different cultures.
Jared Diamond has a very sophisticated way of analysing cultural difference. In
The World Until Yesterday, Diamond points out that there are many things about primitive life that we are well rid of, and also many things that we can usefully learn from. Diamond’s negative observations should not be considered optional just because of a distaste for attention to cultural difference. Many features of primitive life, such as bad health, risk, violence, poverty and superstition, are bad. But equally, primitive life often has more social capital than modern life. Where Diamond’s analysis is sound it should be accepted, for example on what traditional and modern cultures can learn from each other.
DWill wrote: Please don't try to remove philosophy from the humanities.
Philosophy is the home of human freedom. We are free to think what we like, and that engages philosophy with all the humanities.
In terms of the questions here on how philosophy and science contribute to understanding how selective pressures operate on cultural evolution, we are talking about the philosophy of science, by exploring the possibility of a science of culture. It doesn’t remove philosophy from the humanities to say that the science of cultural evolution requires a philosophical framework. Whether culture can be studied scientifically is a contestable philosophical proposition.
DWill wrote: When it comes to ethics, especially, philosophy isn't meant to be binding in the same way that science is, at least I hope not.
Kant held that duty is binding. This was part of his rejection of the utilitarian view of ethics as non-binding.
DWill wrote: If memory serves, you disputed one of Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative, that we should not use people as means to an end, but see them as ends in themselves.
I was simply pointing out that we do in fact routinely use people as means to our ends, for example we use a plumber as a means to fix a tap.
DWill wrote: You did this in the spirit of philosophy. In a similar manner, Robert, your determinations on the present topic cannot hope to be binding, which doesn't mean at all that you should desist.
The question of what is binding in philosophy opens up the problem of whether systematic understanding is possible. If we start with science, and accept that confirmed scientific statements cannot be sanely rejected, and see a similar necessary status for true mathematical statements, we then come to the problem that statements in ethics lack similar consensus. I find it a very interesting question whether ethics can have necessary truths as found in physics and logic. Kant’s analysis of duty is one way to explore this question. Duty requires a legitimate authority to which consent is binding, and is seen in institutional obligations. But generalising beyond institutions to broader duties is another matter. I believe we have a duty to our planet to sustain human life. That flows through into ethical requirements for action to stabilise the global climate.
DWill wrote:
the term 'culture selection' … seems a lot more appropriate than to use 'natural selection' for culture. I might prefer 'culture creation' or somesuch, but it's in the right direction.
There is only as much selection in culture as nature allows. The sets of society and culture and economy are entirely within the set of nature, as shown in this Venn Diagram.
- Nature Economy Society Culture Set Diagram.jpg (112.52 KiB) Viewed 3419 times
Ecology determines parameters of culture as a freely evolving set within natural boundaries. Natural selection works very slowly, mostly over decadal and longer units of time, whereas culture appears to change very fast. However, where cultural formations are incompatible with nature they do not prosper for long.
DWill wrote:The universal theory does remain elusive (though perhaps partly because its utility might be questioned), but I don't think that the agents working on such a theory feel bounded by others' belief in the supernatural.
No, the supernatural does not make sense. Part of the problem with supernatural theories is that they are unscientific. But universal scientific theory grounded in evolution can recognise that supernatural traditions have adaptive traits.