So Haidt's position on reason is that rational thought is never really rational and is always based on self interest. In fact he states:

the rider acts as the spokesman for the elephant, even though it doesn’t necessarily know what the elephant is really thinking. The rider is skilled
at fabricating post hoc explanations for whatever the elephant has just done, and it is good at finding reasons to justify whatever the elephant
wants to do next. Once human beings developed language and began to use it to gossip about each other, it became extremely valuable for
elephants to carry around on their backs a full-time public relations firm.

This does sound like "just so" story telling is a critical skill for all of us not only to justify our behavior to others but to explain it to ourselves as well. Psychology is replete with studies demonstrating the distortions and blindness to contradictory evidence to which each of us falls victim.

Later, he will argue that our intuitive moral beliefs are based upon a limited set of "moral foundations" which seem to be affective predispositions to respond positively or negatively to others behavior. Most of these seem to have been shaped by our evolutionary history and are incorporated into the stories we tell ourselves as we live. I am reminded of Hamlet's comment, "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

scotchbooks wrote:So Haidt's position on reason is that rational thought is never really rational and is always based on self interest. In fact he states:

the rider acts as the spokesman for the elephant, even though it doesn’t necessarily know what the elephant is really thinking. The rider is skilled
at fabricating post hoc explanations for whatever the elephant has just done, and it is good at finding reasons to justify whatever the elephant
wants to do next. Once human beings developed language and began to use it to gossip about each other, it became extremely valuable for
elephants to carry around on their backs a full-time public relations firm.

This does sound like "just so" story telling is a critical skill for all of us not only to justify our behavior to others but to explain it to ourselves as well. Psychology is replete with studies demonstrating the distortions and blindness to contradictory evidence to which each of us falls victim.

Later, he will argue that our intuitive moral beliefs are based upon a limited set of "moral foundations" which seem to be affective predispositions to respond positively or negatively to others behavior. Most of these seem to have been shaped by our evolutionary history and are incorporated into the stories we tell ourselves as we live. I am reminded of Hamlet's comment, "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

I keep thinking that it's important to specify that Haidt is talking about moral reasoning, just so people don't get the impression he would say that Charles Darwin, for example, was influenced by self-interest in his study of life. Reasoning is still the valuable, essential skill that everyone thinks it is. Our minds don't face a divide like that between the rider and the elephant at all times when reasoning is in play, such as when figuring a math problem, trying to understand our new smart phone, or working on a committee that wants to build a new school. But when it comes to that large area of our social lives that involves morality or reputation, reasoning does tend to be self-serving. I think you're right that Haidt takes that view. My own observation is that when we're with people we know well, in other words when the public aspect is removed, we are a lot more willing to be honest about our moral feelings, not dressing them up with specious reasoning nearly as much as we do when we're in a more public eye.

DWill wrote:

Robert Tulip wrote: What and why people believe is only grounded in logic within scientific culture. In traditional culture, people often have not thought about why they hold beliefs. They believe what they are taught.

This is giving far too much credit to people based merely on their belonging to a 'scientific culture,' .

I'm defining scientific culture as "basing opinions on evidence". As Saint Paul said in Romans 3:23 "all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God.” Even scientists have prejudice, and fall short of logical standards of evidence in the formation of their opinions. But to the extent people base opinions on evidence, they do not rely on intuition. There is a continuum from 100% evidence to 100% intuition.

The most moral position would seem to be 100% evidence, except that we often find ourselves in situations requiring judgment, and therefore have to base decisions on intuition and the synthesis of prior evidence.

DWill wrote:when it comes to that large area of our social lives that involves morality or reputation, reasoning does tend to be self-serving.

This is precisely the point that I find so disturbing about this whole discussion. Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations said the butcher and baker look to self interest in selling meat and bread, and are self-serving in their commercial reasoning. But really, that is not the whole of value theory. People do not simply equate self interest with the good. They also accept that rule of law is an objective good, where their personal interests may be reasonably constrained. The larger public interest of the common good are served through stability, fairness and other matters which inform legal precedent and which conflict with selfish reasoning.

Self-serving reasoning asks 'what can I get away with?' Objective reasoning asks 'what is the public good?' The latter is Kant's categorical imperative of duty. Haidt seems very nihilistic, like Hume, lacking any comprehension of duty.

Haidt's discussion of Plato and Glaucon seems to neglect this distinction between public and private good. But I will have to look further at Plato's Republic again before commenting further on this one.

First a thank you to DWill. I genuinely appreciate your prompt replies to contributors and the way you frame your responses to stimulate further discussion while still expressing your own opinions. Thanks! In fact the overall tenor of these discussions is quite rational

You are right of course, the risks of motivated thinking are most evident in beliefs about politics, religion and morality. But they also contaminate our thinking about issues where scientific knowledge should be dominant cf:

http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/ ... e1547.html

Scientists are held to standards of inquiry and observational verification not only by training but by their reference groups, professional organizations,peers, and journal review. This does not always prevent them from falling prey to confirmation bias or other errors but it does make it less likely. An imperfect system but the best we have. Don't get me wrong, motivated thinking does not equate to intellectual dishonesty. We are not dissimulating when we believe in ghosts, or adhere to prejudices. We are simply being human.

I keep thinking of Barbara Kruger's artful use of language: Belief + Doubt = Sanity. Whenever we are certain of our position we are most at risk of error.

Robert Tulip wrote: I'm defining scientific culture as "basing opinions on evidence". As Saint Paul said in Romans 3:23 "all have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God.” Even scientists have prejudice, and fall short of logical standards of evidence in the formation of their opinions. But to the extent people base opinions on evidence, they do not rely on intuition. There is a continuum from 100% evidence to 100% intuition.

Others have written about logical standards of evidence, but that's simply not what this book is about. Morality, politics, and religion divide people for reasons that have little to do with falling short of logical standards.

The most moral position would seem to be 100% evidence, except that we often find ourselves in situations requiring judgment, and therefore have to base decisions on intuition and the synthesis of prior evidence.

Okay, I don't see much to argue with here. Judgment is what the book is all about.

Robert Tulip wrote:

DWill wrote:when it comes to that large area of our social lives that involves morality or reputation, reasoning does tend to be self-serving.

This is precisely the point that I find so disturbing about this whole discussion. Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations said the butcher and baker look to self interest in selling meat and bread, and are self-serving in their commercial reasoning. But really, that is not the whole of value theory. People do not simply equate self interest with the good. They also accept that rule of law is an objective good, where their personal interests may be reasonably constrained. The larger public interest of the common good are served through stability, fairness and other matters which inform legal precedent and which conflict with selfish reasoning.

Self-serving reasoning asks 'what can I get away with?' Objective reasoning asks 'what is the public good?' The latter is Kant's categorical imperative of duty. Haidt seems very nihilistic, like Hume, lacking any comprehension of duty.

Haidt's discussion of Plato and Glaucon seems to neglect this distinction between public and private good. But I will have to look further at Plato's Republic again before commenting further on this one.

I should have modified the word 'reasoning' with 'moral. I think it is essential to keep the discussion from spiraling out to a larger frame of meaning than Haidt intends in this part of the book. If you'll look at his procedure, he attempts to back up his conclusions with experimental evidence, which is necessarily going to answer specific questions, not the larger philosophical ones you bring up. He says that when people engage in moral reasoning, that is, when they tell us why they have judged as they have, they tend to want to make themselves look good because people are watching. I hope others will tell me if they disagree, but Haidt doesn't rule on ideals such as the ones you mention above. People may well have these ideals; Haidt is neither saying they don't or that such ideals aren't good to have. I think you aren't taking into account the approaches scientists need to use if they are going to look into these matters of psychology. They need to steer well clear of advocating for certain goods, as you seem to want Haidt to do.

DWill wrote:Morality, politics, and religion divide people for reasons that have little to do with falling short of logical standards.

Do you really think that? I suspect these divisions have a lot to do with an absence of good logic.

As a thought experiment, could it be true that if people had perfect logical standards, they would agree on everything? The argument here would be that division arises when illogical beliefs intrude into debate, and it is just because life is so very far from logic that we cannot imagine what it would be like to have a rational culture.

Public debate generally tries to use logic, convincing people by power of reason. As noted earlier, no one can admit to believing things despite knowing they are untrue. Logic can generally prove when a claim is false. But the problem is that most debaters refuse to put their premises up for examination, so they ignore elephants in the room. People rationalise their beliefs rather than subjecting their beliefs to logical scrutiny.

But then I suppose people will differ about their ends, their visions of the good life. For example with abortion, people differ on the extent to which the right to life or the right to choose are legitimate moral ends. All the evidence and logic in the world is not going to change these value frameworks.

scotchbooks wrote:Whenever we are certain of our position we are most at risk of error.

Hello scotchbooks, welcome to booktalk.

Your comment here is surprising. In fact it is untrue. More commonly, whenever we are uncertain of our position we are at most at risk of error. This is the exact opposite of your proverb.

Sorry if my comment here looks pedantic, or ignores the spirit in which you made your comment. But it is an interesting example of a statement whose real intent is very unclear, as to whether it is a joke or serious, but which can readily become the foundation of other claims that are not so innocent.

It sometimes happens with fanatics that people are certain despite being wrong. But that is no basis to generalise about a link between certainty and error. Generally they are opposite.

The aphorism you made has the quality of a paradoxical homily, a light-hearted homespun Franklinism designed to inculcate humility and modesty. But consider the implications. Cliches like this have a perverse effect, leading people to doubt things that are actually true, especially claims that are fully based on scientific evidence.

Robert Tulip wrote:

DWill wrote:Morality, politics, and religion divide people for reasons that have little to do with falling short of logical standards.

Do you really think that? I suspect these divisions have a lot to do with an absence of good logic.

As a thought experiment, could it be true that if people had perfect logical standards, they would agree on everything? The argument here would be that division arises when illogical beliefs intrude into debate, and it is just because life is so very far from logic that we cannot imagine what it would be like to have a rational culture.

I can see why you would be surprised at my statement, but what I mean is that the attachments that people can't avoid having are in general what create this sometimes troublesome, other times welcome, but always interesting mix of human voices. If you're saying there is some ideal condition under which we would all have the same attachments, and that condition would be brought about by everyone having perfect logic, I disagree. It's very possible for the logic of different views to be okay, in fact, yet for the division to remain.

Public debate generally tries to use logic, convincing people by power of reason. As noted earlier, no one can admit to believing things despite knowing they are untrue. Logic can generally prove when a claim is false. But the problem is that most debaters refuse to put their premises up for examination, so they ignore elephants in the room. People rationalise their beliefs rather than subjecting their beliefs to logical scrutiny.

Now it's my turn for surprise. Your public debate in Australia must be of a totally different kind than ours in the U.S. As you've said yourself, when we are forced to make judgments, which actually we do both automatically and deliberately, we need to rely to a degree on intuition. Then, if we give ourselves time and have the right habit of reflection, we might modify the inititial affective flashes we get from intuition. However in Chapter 4 of the book, Haidt tells us that only under certain conditions does the pause to consider really help us divert our thinking from its wonted path.

But then I suppose people will differ about their ends, their visions of the good life. For example with abortion, people differ on the extent to which the right to life or the right to choose are legitimate moral ends. All the evidence and logic in the world is not going to change these value frameworks..

Ah, yes. And what is implied is that logic is not one side or the other.