You sound more together with your moral reasoning than the respondent Haidt quotes in the book, who stammers a lot as he is backed into a corner. I think that Haidt would still want to tell you that you didn't go through any of that reasoning if you had an immediate, intuitive reaction of "not right" when you heard the scenario. And I agree with him that some things just present themselves in our minds as a totality, not as a bunch of logically reasoned arguments. We've been told for years that incest (even the word indicates its forbidden quality) is taboo, and there might even be some innate component to the prohibition. So our beliefs about incest have become part of the elephant that has the actual control of our lives. Those beliefs are there independent of what we present, when we're acting socially, as our reasons for thinking incest is always wrong.

DWill wrote:You sound more together with your moral reasoning than the respondent Haidt quotes in the book, who stammers a lot as he is backed into a corner. I think that Haidt would still want to tell you that you didn't go through any of that reasoning if you had an immediate, intuitive reaction of "not right" when you heard the scenario. And I agree with him that some things just present themselves in our minds as a totality, not as a bunch of logically reasoned arguments.

I am pretty sure I agree with this, but would add that I do think there are reasons behind the feelings we have. I was working backward from the thoughts to the feelings that lead me to have the thought and I would say there is even another layer the programed in responses (those things that make people regardless of culture feel good (smile) and feel disgust (grimace). I wonder if the the response to incest is more or less "programed" in.

To DW: This has nothing to do with anything, but have been wanting to point this out for a while. Do you realize that the only person on BT that has more posts than you is Chris O? The only member member that has more posts than you is the banned member Stahrwe. I am #8 on the list with 2685 posts. By member #17 the number of posts falls away pretty dramatically, to 836.

Saffron wrote:

DWill wrote:You sound more together with your moral reasoning than the respondent Haidt quotes in the book, who stammers a lot as he is backed into a corner. I think that Haidt would still want to tell you that you didn't go through any of that reasoning if you had an immediate, intuitive reaction of "not right" when you heard the scenario. And I agree with him that some things just present themselves in our minds as a totality, not as a bunch of logically reasoned arguments.

I am pretty sure I agree with this, but would add that I do think there are reasons behind the feelings we have. I was working backward from the thoughts to the feelings that lead me to have the thought and I would say there is even another layer the programed in responses (those things that make people regardless of culture feel good (smile) and feel disgust (grimace). I wonder if the the response to incest is more or less "programed" in.

I don't want to get all dogmatic on this; I'm just trying to give Haidt's view instead of my own. When you've read more of the book, tell me if you think I'm right that he would insist that there are not reasons behind the moral feelings that we have, not if "reasons" mean the mental process of "moral reasoning." Our reasons are sort of "in front of" our moral feelings, where we put a social face on our feelings.

On my post total: god I'm a bigmouth. This also indicates that my thanks-to-posts ratio is relatively low! Currently, it's so hot outside that I have nothing better to do but gab on this forum. But I'm also really interested in Haidt's book. If the temperature goes down to 90 or so before dark, I might go out for a bike ride. the water in the Shenandoah river is so warm that it's barely refreshing at all. I heard that the water in DC public pools was 94 degrees.

DWill wrote: When you've read more of the book, tell me if you think I'm right that he would insist that there are not reasons behind the moral feelings that we have, not if "reasons" mean the mental process of "moral reasoning." Our reasons are sort of "in front of" our moral feelings, where we put a social face on our feelings.

I sure will!

DWill wrote: On my post total: god I'm a bigmouth. This also indicates that my thanks-to-posts ratio is relatively low! Currently, it's so hot outside that I have nothing better to do but gab on this forum. But I'm also really interested in Haidt's book. If the temperature goes down to 90 or so before dark, I might go out for a bike ride. the water in the Shenandoah river is so warm that it's barely refreshing at all. I heard that the water in DC public pools was 94 degrees.

Well, I wouldn't say bigmouth...not to mention IMHO you are in good company: Interbane, Penelope & me. As for thanks we all have about the same ration. As for the temp - I think Washington DC hit 104 this afternoon! I will be chasing down some ice cream once I get off the computer.

I think you're missing the point if you try to explain why any given example is wrong. Any example can always be tweaked to become an example that is immune to most of the reasons people give. The point is to find out whether people react first and explain ad hoc, or whether they assess and analyse first and then react. The finding is that most people studied reacted first and then gave justifications that were not coherent given the scenario. That's what I think is so impressive about Haidt's research, even though I disagree somewhat with his explanation and interpretation of the results.

Not having read the book, I still find this a fascinating topic. My view is that liberals do not understand the 'slippery slope' theory that supports conservative moral principles. If you hold strongly to the view that stealing is morally wrong on principle, and you encounter an opportunity to steal, you will not do it. But if your thinking is framed in a rational liberal perspective, of whether anyone will find out, and whether you will do any harm that you can tell, you are more likely to steal.

Conservatives say that this initial succumbing to temptation corrupts your personal attitudes, making it more likely that you will do and allow steadily worse things in future, sliding down the slippery slope of the wide and easy path to hell, paved with good intentions. The harm is to your personal attitudes, morally corrupting your sense of principle.

Robert Tulip wrote:Not having read the book, I still find this a fascinating topic. My view is that liberals do not understand the 'slippery slope' theory that supports conservative moral principles. If you hold strongly to the view that stealing is morally wrong on principle, and you encounter an opportunity to steal, you will not do it. But if your thinking is framed in a rational liberal perspective, of whether anyone will find out, and whether you will do any harm that you can tell, you are more likely to steal.

Conservatives say that this initial succumbing to temptation corrupts your personal attitudes, making it more likely that you will do and allow steadily worse things in future, sliding down the slippery slope of the wide and easy path to hell, paved with good intentions. The harm is to your personal attitudes, morally corrupting your sense of principle.

I consider my self a liberal (American) and I find your post insulting. My morals are not based on whether anyone will find out. Harm is a little bit of different issue in that causing harm is part of the criteria for me of what makes something wrong. However, I can imagine actions that would still be wrong even if they did not per se cause harm.

Sorry Saffron, maybe I will leave this discussion. I read summaries of Haidt's ideas, and perhaps I misunderstand him. He seems to be saying that conservative morality is defective because conservatives cannot rationally explain their views, implying that a morality that is easy to understand and explain is superior to one that rests on intuition and tradition. I'm simply raising the possibility that this debate is a lot more complex.

The issue of 'finding out' is central to the examples Haidt provides, especially eating the dead.

Haidt has raised the emotionally offensive topics of incest and cannibalism, implying that a liberal will think these are okay if they cause no perceptible harm, while a conservative will be open to ridicule for their principled opposition. That is a very provocative argument, if you don't mind me saying so. He seems to be saying, from the very summary reading here, that liberalism is based on reason and conservatism is based on emotion, that the dogma of opposition to incest and cannibalism should be revised on the basis of whether people can get away with these practices without causing harm or being found out. Or am I misreading him?

Robert Tulip wrote:Sorry Saffron, maybe I will leave this discussion. I read summaries of Haidt's ideas, and perhaps I misunderstand him. He seems to be saying that conservative morality is defective because conservatives cannot rationally explain their views, implying that a morality that is easy to understand and explain is superior to one that rests on intuition and tradition. I'm simply raising the possibility that this debate is a lot more complex.

The issue of 'finding out' is central to the examples Haidt provides, especially eating the dead.

Haidt has raised the emotionally offensive topics of incest and cannibalism, implying that a liberal will think these are okay if they cause no perceptible harm, while a conservative will be open to ridicule for their principled opposition. That is a very provocative argument, if you don't mind me saying so. He seems to be saying, from the very summary reading here, that liberalism is based on reason and conservatism is based on emotion, that the dogma of opposition to incest and cannibalism should be revised on the basis of whether people can get away with these practices without causing harm or being found out. Or am I misreading him?

Robert, I believe you have totally misread Haidt. I don't think he is making any judgement statements at all. I think he is looking at what science can tell us about the biological underpinnings of morality and the implications. He is making the argument that for everyone the basis of moratlity, regardless of there ideology, begins with the feeling or intuition that something is wrong.