Robert Tulip wrote:
I’ve been meaning to comment on this post from DWill, and now Grim has reminded me with his post just now, so thank you Grim. My feeling is that emotion is primarily genetic while reason is a mix between genetic, memetic and logical sources. Of course, emotion can be manipulated by reason, but raw emotions such as anger or sympathy seem to arise from instinctive reactions rather than from thought-out responses. This emotion/reason divide could well match the 98%/2% ratio of how many of our genes are common with the apes to how many are uniquely human. If our emotions are largely in common with the primates, and if emotion is a primary source of morality, then we can see how much of our morals are from monkeys. However, I do think it is possible to see reason as a veneer, a surface code that seeks to control irrational emotional instincts. The memetic and logical content of reason is seen most clearly in law codes, which evolve by precedent as a form of social control. As DWill noted, adhering to rational morality requires strenuous effort. This observation seems to me to contradict the “Russian Doll” model of human identity that de Waal proposes. Our ethics are not at the core of our genetic identity, but are a learned adaptive response to our environment.
This interesting perspective is an example of the many this topic can generate. I haven't seen any disputes about facts in de Waal's book or in the discussions we've had, I think. We are firmly in the territory of perspective, which is also firmly the territory of philosophy. I would hope we could agree that there isn't a correct perspective to be sought, just more conversation to be engaged in. This may smack of relativism to you, Robert, but it is a proper relativism. When you think about it, how self-explanatory that de Waal, observing primates most of his life, would so value the emotional similarities between us and them, and ground our morality in these similarities. His debate partners, all philosophers, unsurprisingly see rational thought as a far more crucial element of our morality.
In my own perspective, the element of conflict has the highest profile. We can know that situations present conflicts between what we want and what we should do. Other animals have only momentary conflicts between two desires--the chimp who holds out his food to share without even looking at the receiver, or the dog who comes to his master though she would really like to sample that delicious smell. Our, more significant, moral conflict is what often goes on on our surface, contrary to what Veneer Theory supposedly says. The surface in VT is morality, actually moral hypocrisy, since we just use morality to give a good name to our selfish goals. But that is rubbish. We obviously do resolve our conflict sometimes in favor of what we think we should do rather than what would feel best. The surface in my view is the interplay between morality and our desire to get advantage for ourselves. This is not always a conflict, though, since getting advantage for ourselves is also demonstrably a good thing. In other words, sometimes I should be selfish instead of thinking about others.
The other problem I have with moral reasoning as a veneer over our irrational emotional instincts is that I feel, as de Waal does, that it must be "down there" in some way as well as on top. I could agree with the metaphor of a flowering plant with extensive roots, or maybe a spring with its origin deep underground, to express this.[/quote]
