"Reflections on Little Rock"
Posted: Tue Dec 11, 2007 2:25 pm
Arendt raises some compelling considerations on the U.S.'s civil rights history. Dividing the country into the largely accepted trinity of political, social and private realms, she addresses the desegregation of public schools. She notes that the Supreme Court was only able to address desegregation because of state laws that mandated segregation. It is only in this legal realm where the federal government could legitimately reach. Yet in addressing state laws of segregation, the federal government invaded the social realm, enforcing desegregation largely against social custom and opinion. For Arendt then, the legal disestablishment of segregation was warranted and, more so, essential to ensure the life of the republic, while the legally-enforced disestablishment of social segregation was unfounded. "For the crucial point to remember is that it is not the social custom of segregation that is unconstitutional, but its legal enforcement" (202) [emphasis original].
Arendt illustrates her argument with regard to desegregation and the political/social realm by addressing anti-miscegenation laws, which were not overruled by the Civil Rights bill at that time. She argues that the "right to marry whoever one wishes is an elementary human right" and paramount to segregation laws regarding buses, hotels, amusement and schools, or even political discrimination like the right to vote. In not striking down state anti-miscegenation laws, the Supreme Court never addressed what Arendt felt was a more profound violation of the "inalienable human rights to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'" It's a solid argument, which makes her conclusion all the more compelling. She pointedly adds that "had the Court ruled the antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, it would hardly have felt compelled to encourage, let alone enforce, mixed marriages" (203). At first blush I accepted this outright, and it was eye-opening. And, though it still gives pause, I think it's important to note that enforcing miscegenation would be an encroachment of the government on the private realm, while enforcing desegregation is an encroachment on the social realm. And while that doesn't invalidate the example, it does complicate it.
The bulk of Arendt's essay focuses in various ways on the distinction between social discrimination and the legal enforcement of such discrimination. Arendt names equality as the "innermost principle" to the political realm, and goes on to name discrimination as the innermost principle to the social realm. She argues that "people belong to certain groups whose very identifiability demands that they discriminate against other groups in the same domain," and urges that "without discrimination of some sort, society would simply cease to exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear" (205). Her argument evolves to address the threat that conformism, as a result of the total elimination of discrimination, would have on a republic with such an "extraordinary heterogeneity of its population." Thus, she argues, "the moment social discrimination is legally abolished, the freedom of society is violated" (209). This argument, again, is very persuasive. And while Arendt's theoretical discussion holds up for me, I'm having some problems with her examples.
For instance, in dividing the social and political realm, Arendt gives two specific examples. She mentions "restricted" country resorts that discriminated based on race and ethnicity, arguing that such practices are "only an extension of the right to free association." She adds that this would not apply to theaters and museums "where people obviously do not congregate for the purpose of associating with each other." She also declares the use of buses, railroad cars, and hotels and restaurants in business districts "another matter." So she is drawing a distinction between services for entertainment or amusement
Arendt illustrates her argument with regard to desegregation and the political/social realm by addressing anti-miscegenation laws, which were not overruled by the Civil Rights bill at that time. She argues that the "right to marry whoever one wishes is an elementary human right" and paramount to segregation laws regarding buses, hotels, amusement and schools, or even political discrimination like the right to vote. In not striking down state anti-miscegenation laws, the Supreme Court never addressed what Arendt felt was a more profound violation of the "inalienable human rights to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.'" It's a solid argument, which makes her conclusion all the more compelling. She pointedly adds that "had the Court ruled the antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional, it would hardly have felt compelled to encourage, let alone enforce, mixed marriages" (203). At first blush I accepted this outright, and it was eye-opening. And, though it still gives pause, I think it's important to note that enforcing miscegenation would be an encroachment of the government on the private realm, while enforcing desegregation is an encroachment on the social realm. And while that doesn't invalidate the example, it does complicate it.
The bulk of Arendt's essay focuses in various ways on the distinction between social discrimination and the legal enforcement of such discrimination. Arendt names equality as the "innermost principle" to the political realm, and goes on to name discrimination as the innermost principle to the social realm. She argues that "people belong to certain groups whose very identifiability demands that they discriminate against other groups in the same domain," and urges that "without discrimination of some sort, society would simply cease to exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear" (205). Her argument evolves to address the threat that conformism, as a result of the total elimination of discrimination, would have on a republic with such an "extraordinary heterogeneity of its population." Thus, she argues, "the moment social discrimination is legally abolished, the freedom of society is violated" (209). This argument, again, is very persuasive. And while Arendt's theoretical discussion holds up for me, I'm having some problems with her examples.
For instance, in dividing the social and political realm, Arendt gives two specific examples. She mentions "restricted" country resorts that discriminated based on race and ethnicity, arguing that such practices are "only an extension of the right to free association." She adds that this would not apply to theaters and museums "where people obviously do not congregate for the purpose of associating with each other." She also declares the use of buses, railroad cars, and hotels and restaurants in business districts "another matter." So she is drawing a distinction between services for entertainment or amusement