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Posted: Mon Oct 12, 2009 8:00 pm
by DWill
tbarron wrote: So I would claim that equality and genes *don't* have independent existence of their own. They only exist as concepts in some kind of representation -- written, depicted, recorded on videotape, or thoughts in someone's mind.
tbarron, did you mean to write 'memes' instead of 'genes'?

Posted: Tue Oct 13, 2009 6:24 am
by tbarron
DWill wrote:
tbarron wrote: So I would claim that equality and genes *don't* have independent existence of their own. They only exist as concepts in some kind of representation -- written, depicted, recorded on videotape, or thoughts in someone's mind.
tbarron, did you mean to write 'memes' instead of 'genes'?
Thank you for the question, DWill.

No, I meant 'genes' in the sense of something that persists over long periods of time. The instances don't persist beyond the individual organism that contains them, and that's all I would say exists in the physical world. A genetic pattern is an idea. A species is an idea. What we see in the world are instances of those ideas, not the ideas themselves.

Memes, of course, are another example of something that we encounter only as instances.

So my opinion is that abstract patterns and categories (genes, memes, species, equality) are concepts that we create based on similarities among objects and events we see in the physical world. Those concepts are often very useful and in part because they are, we find it easy to confuse the concepts with things and come to see the concepts as having an existence of their own, independent of their representations (mistakenly, IMO).

Maybe I should be writing in the thread about "What I believe but can't prove." :)

Posted: Tue Oct 13, 2009 12:31 pm
by DWill
tbarron wrote: No, I meant 'genes' in the sense of something that persists over long
So my opinion is that abstract patterns and categories (genes, memes, species, equality) are concepts that we create based on similarities among objects and events we see in the physical world. Those concepts are often very useful and in part because they are, we find it easy to confuse the concepts with things and come to see the concepts as having an existence of their own, independent of their representations (mistakenly, IMO).
Thanks for that reply. I have been arguing that, concerning memes, a mistake is to speak of them as hthough they have some independent existence in the world. You seem to go much farther than I'd be inclined to when you disqualify genes and species as things with physical existence. True, it is objects or instances themselves that have this realness, but once we hang a name on even one individual, we have created the concept of a group. So this seems unavoidable if we are to use language at all. Is your concern that if we detach the name from the physical instance, we will be mistakenly wielding it as a real thing in itself? Maybe we do this with concepts such as communism and freedom. Or this may not be what you mean, and perhaps giving an example would help me understand.

Posted: Tue Oct 13, 2009 5:14 pm
by Robert Tulip
Before continuing the marathon on the philosophy of evolution and knowledge with Interbane, may I say thanks and warm welcome to Tom Barron for finding us here at Booktalk and engaging in this discussion. The idealist theme Tom raises of persistence through time as the criterion of reality is one that I have mentioned often, without finding traction, perhaps because idealism has come to be seen as such anathematic wool.

I’m tempted to say where there’s wool there’s a way, along the lines of where there’s smoke there’s fire, but the pun is too bad and the content rather dubious. Too much woolly thinking is simply false. However, my sense is that the high Dawkins ethic of precise quantified logic does wrongly exclude areas of thought that are potentially allies to his cause, with Platonic idealism a prime candidate.

A key issue here is that there are two sorts of reality, the reality of matter and the reality of information. The philosophical challenge, as I see it, is to produce a systematic schema in which the relation between matter and information is properly described. Information persists through time in a way that has a material substrate but which cannot be simply explained in terms of that substrate. We see this clearly in genes, where the information embedded in the DNA code persists as adaptivity to an ecological niche, so the reality of the gene is seen in its phenotype (embodied trait) rather than simply in the chemical bases. The ‘river of time’ is made of matter, but its direction and logic is made of information.
tbarron wrote:
DWill wrote:
tbarron wrote: So I would claim that equality and genes *don't* have independent existence of their own. They only exist as concepts in some kind of representation -- written, depicted, recorded on videotape, or thoughts in someone's mind.
tbarron, did you mean to write 'memes' instead of 'genes'?
Thank you for the question, DWill. No, I meant 'genes' in the sense of something that persists over long periods of time. The instances don't persist beyond the individual organism that contains them, and that's all I would say exists in the physical world. A genetic pattern is an idea. A species is an idea. What we see in the world are instances of those ideas, not the ideas themselves.
Where I take issue here is the claim that a concept exists only as represented. Genes persist in the world as units of information. Like the truths of mathematics, these units and their relations can be discovered, and are not created by human description. The information exists in the physical world, but its existence is ideal rather than material.
Memes, of course, are another example of something that we encounter only as instances. So my opinion is that abstract patterns and categories (genes, memes, species, equality) are concepts that we create based on similarities among objects and events we see in the physical world. Those concepts are often very useful and in part because they are, we find it easy to confuse the concepts with things and come to see the concepts as having an existence of their own, independent of their representations (mistakenly, IMO).

Here I see the problem, as I alluded earlier in my summary of the battle of Gods and Giants from Plato’s Sophist, that modernism has been so heavily indoctrinated with the claim that only material things exist that people find it very hard to recognise an alternative schema in which information has its own existence, as concept rather than as thing. The helical pattern of the genetic code was not created by Crick and Watson (or Franklin or Miescher), it had existed in all organisms since the dawn of life, waiting to be discovered. The same applies to phenotypes, which are abstract universal concepts that describe how DNA is expressed in the world. These concepts are not created by scientists, but describe what is uncovered as a conceptual reality that persists through time.

Posted: Tue Oct 13, 2009 10:35 pm
by Interbane
RT: "Before continuing the marathon on the philosophy of evolution and knowledge with Interbane"

Better than crosswords puzzles! You won't get alzheimer's at this rate.

My problem with the distinction between what is real and what is merely for our understanding is that I haven't yet encountered a criterion for demarcation between nonphysical things. Focusing on the physical aspect of it all is like limiting yourself to spatial dimensions. Finding a framework that integrates time is essential. There are some things we can point to as real in time, such as causality and motion. However, I'm sure there is much more. For example, arbitrary 'rules' can be said to be real if whatever framework we use includes a good understanding of the human brain in order to link a 'rule' to a process. It may sound silly at first, but I think some criterion of demarcation is necessary. There should be an anchor to the spatio-temporal.

Rules have real impact, but an examination of them at first glance has no anchor to anything spatio-temporal. However, we can rely on the description that information is real contingent upon an interpreter. There is no 'reflection of reality' unless we have a way to interpret it as such. Perhaps this is a better way to understand the two sorts of reality as you mentioned. Genes are interpreted by the interpretive function of growth. If what is interpreted does not fit within the niche, the information isn't selected for the gene pool. The phenotype which is interpreted from the gene is the interface with the environment, but the phenotype is contingent upon the genes. It is the genes that are selected for, vicariously through the phenotype.

There is something to be said of states of mind. If there is a rule we all decide to live by, the neural arrangement is similar amongst all people that abide by that rule. One thing to note is that I'm not saying the category of 'rules' is real, but rather each rule as an instance. They govern our physical action. The realness of rules is different from other types of information. Some information is an abstraction, a loose reflection of reality. Rules are known to be within our minds, as contingencies we abide by, they don't claim to reflect anything in reality. Their reality is that they are a part of the system of human behavior, an 'on/off' switch of neurons. With this reasoning, we can say that rules are a real part of a process. The reasons we come up with rules are a different topic. If you'll note, this is a concession of mine. I've also used the word 'reflection'. However, all of this fits within my worldview. This is your best segway into returning to the discussion of guiding principles.

RT: "A key issue here is that there are two sorts of reality, the reality of matter and the reality of information."

I agree with this, but I would include 'processes, energy, and forces' in with 'matter', to include temporal reality rather than only spacial reality. As I said before, I think the reality of information is contingent upon an interpreter or an interpretive function. If we try to picture 'information'(such as a magazine) as drifting idly through space with no humans or aliens or computers anywhere near, we still have the sense that it contains something real. However, I think that is a reaction that is based on the fact that we immediately interpret our perceptions(this would be an internal perception). We can't divorce our own interpretive tendencies from our thoughts, it's what we are.

So this intuition pump would be better served by thinking of some different type of information, such as an exact 'replica' model of a solar system. This does away with most of the interpretive requirement to see it as representing something else. However, without an interpreter, what is it, really? Just a jumble of organized matter? I would hesitate to be so reductive again. We can perhaps assign some objective characteristic to this piece of information so that it is unique from random matter. We could say that it has 'interpretive potential', similar to how a heavy rock on a hill has potential energy. I am okay with this explanation.

RT: "We see this clearly in genes, where the information embedded in the DNA code persists as adaptivity to an ecological niche, so the reality of the gene is seen in its phenotype (embodied trait) rather than simply in the chemical bases."

This doesn't fit. A phenotype is still a concept we use to understand reality. We can find instances of the category everywhere, but connecting the dots is done within our minds to form the category. This is an example of the type of information that is different from 'rules'. There is nothing special about phenotypes unless we look beyond them to the genes that specify them. The genes have interpretive potential, but the phenotypes do not.

Posted: Tue Oct 20, 2009 5:37 pm
by Interbane
I need to use my brain again RT, come back. My brain is fuzzier after responding to Stah.

Posted: Tue Oct 20, 2009 6:33 pm
by CWT36
Interbane wrote:I need to use my brain again RT, come back. My brain is fuzzier after responding to Stah.
:laugh:

Posted: Wed Oct 21, 2009 1:24 am
by Robert Tulip
Hi Interbane, I feel almost like I am becoming a Richard Dawkins expert, what with now reading The Extended Phenotype as well. Although I don’t know if it has been studied, I’m wondering about the evolution of dopamine as an example of group selection, as a response to the adaptivity of group level goals. Which ever tribal group had the best genes for operating as a group (ie strategic goals as neural adaptation) would have prospered, so there is a form of group selection inherent in rationality.
Interbane wrote:My problem with the distinction between what is real and what is merely for our understanding is that I haven't yet encountered a criterion for demarcation between nonphysical things. Focusing on the physical aspect of it all is like limiting yourself to spatial dimensions. Finding a framework that integrates time is essential. There are some things we can point to as real in time, such as causality and motion. However, I'm sure there is much more. For example, arbitrary 'rules' can be said to be real if whatever framework we use includes a good understanding of the human brain in order to link a 'rule' to a process. It may sound silly at first, but I think some criterion of demarcation is necessary. There should be an anchor to the spatio-temporal.
You are blurring the distinction between a thing and a concept. You describe causality and motion as things, but would you call love and justice things? In my opinion, the criterion of demarcation you are looking for is how nonphysical things relate to time. There are three classes of nonphysical concepts, the logical, the physical and the ethical, each of which have their own form of eternity.

Here is a short chapter from my essay that I have been discussing with Camacho

1. A way of bringing these divergent approaches to time within a common framework is to look at the differing meanings of eternity demarcated by the criterion of time. Three different meanings of eternity are illustrated by the three disciplines of logic, physics and ethics studied in Plato’s Academy. Considered together, these disciplines cast light on how the scientific and historical paradigms address the meaning of time.
2. The first meaning of eternity is illustrated by logic. To say the theorems of logic are eternal means they are outside time, in the sense of principles which are neither dependent on matter nor subject to change. Mathematical theorems are eternal in this sense - pure logical relations, such as pi, the constant ratio between the diameter and circumference of a circle, are independent of time, matter and knowledge. Traditional theology claims that God’s eternity is similarly independent of time and beyond the changing universe.
3. It is hard to understand how a God who is outside time can appear in history. The answer derives from a second meaning for eternity, that of perpetual endurance within time or lasting forever. The laws of physics exemplify this second meaning of eternity. Scientific laws, such as the laws of gravity and entropy, last forever and do not change, they apply absolutely to the totality of reality, and their truth is independent of human understanding of them. The laws of physics have a different temporal basis from those of pure mathematics in that they only describe the behaviour of matter. For this reason the laws of physics, unlike the theorems of logic, exist only within time and have no meaning separately from time. Through such laws, God as eternal truth within time brings every moment of time together into the immortal unity of the whole.
4. A third meaning of eternity applies to unchanging ethical values such as love, faith and justice, which are thought of as universal and enduring forever. The ontological status of pure ethical ideals differs from that of the laws of physics and logic, in that ethical ideals are meaningful only in relation to human life and spiritual truth, and have no existence independently of human life. The timeless ideals of love and justice only become meaningful in application to human circumstances.
5. The three meanings of eternity established respectively by logic, physics and ethics view eternity as outside time, lasting forever within time, and encapsulating a timeless spiritual truth. These approaches meet the requirement imposed by the principle of the unity of truth that ideas must make sense within the eternal stream of time of the universe, pointing to ontological structures that define the nature of time and the relation between humanity and eternity. The essential demarcation provided by time is between unchanging eternal truths, including the laws of logic, physics and ethics, and the changing temporal realm of historical facts. This model makes time a uniting factor for systematic thought, as the relation of ideas to time is considered an essential criterion for defining their status.
6. A rigorous approach to the meaning of time and eternity enables time to be used as both a unifying criterion to categorise reality and a critical prism to assess ideas and critique false beliefs. The sort of spirit in which I am trying to use time is similar, at least in its goals, to the way the message of God is presented in the prophets of the Bible as “like a refiner’s fire”, discarding the dross and trying to retain the pure truth. For illustration, time can be used as a logical tool to evaluate central ideas of traditional Christianity, such as the traditional idea of personal salvation expressed in the belief in an afterlife in heaven. The idea of continued individual life after death in a mythical heaven touches deeply felt hopes, but heaven, as traditionally conceived, is entirely separate from the stream of time observed by science, so science has the greatest difficulty in seeing the idea of an afterlife in heaven or hell as more than a primitive myth based on the pre-scientific flat earth model. From the scientific perspective, heaven looks more like a comforting story people have invented to cope through hope than a meaningful idea of salvation. Leaving aside questions which are unprovable, the principle of the unity of truth requires that religious ideas such as heaven and hell should be assessable against scientific criteria. In making such assessment, it is important to note that criticism of simple literal interpretation of myth can be a part of looking for deeper underlying meaning.

Posted: Wed Oct 21, 2009 12:15 pm
by Interbane
You are blurring the distinction between a thing and a concept. You describe causality and motion as things, but would you call love and justice things? In my opinion, the criterion of demarcation you are looking for is how nonphysical things relate to time. There are three classes of nonphysical concepts, the logical, the physical and the ethical, each of which have their own form of eternity.
The paragraph you quoted says much the same thing. That there are nonphysical things which need to be distinguished somehow. This cannot be done without an anchor to something 'real'. An example is causality. There are causal processes which determine human behavior. This unavoidably must tie into ethics, whether you would like it to or not. Of course, such a discussion would lead us straight into discussing the merits of Free Will, and I'm willing to do that. There are a few books I've read that I can recommend to get us on the same page.
There are three classes of nonphysical concepts, the logical, the physical and the ethical, each of which have their own form of eternity.
You may have to explain to me or copy/paste what you've written previously explaining why 'physical' is in the class of nonphysical concepts. Contrasted with nonphysical concepts, do you propose physical concepts, with a physical class of physical concepts? :hmm:

A way of bringing these divergent approaches to time within a common framework is to look at the differing meanings of eternity demarcated by the criterion of time.

I'm can't place this concept into my head; that time is a criterion of demarcation for eternity. Perhaps events within time would be, but time itself is a component of the idea of eternity, not a criterion for demarcation. You also mention different 'meanings' of eternity. Do you instead mean components of eternity, or aspects of eternity? You use some ambiguous wording Robert. Even though you may have the idea well versed in your head, you still have to use the right words to get it through to others. Of course you know this. I stopped at this first sentence since it seems pivotal to the rest.

Thanks for the reply, I ponder stuff on my 1/2 hour drive to work each day, it passes the time.

Posted: Wed Oct 21, 2009 7:01 pm
by Robert Tulip
Interbane wrote:
You are blurring the distinction between a thing and a concept. You describe causality and motion as things, but would you call love and justice things? In my opinion, the criterion of demarcation you are looking for is how nonphysical things relate to time. There are three classes of nonphysical concepts, the logical, the physical and the ethical, each of which have their own form of eternity.
The paragraph you quoted says much the same thing. That there are nonphysical things which need to be distinguished somehow. This cannot be done without an anchor to something 'real'. An example is causality. There are causal processes which determine human behavior. This unavoidably must tie into ethics, whether you would like it to or not. Of course, such a discussion would lead us straight into discussing the merits of Free Will, and I'm willing to do that. There are a few books I've read that I can recommend to get us on the same page.
My point is that the real anchors for logic, physics and ethics are conceptually distinct, structured by different relations between these fields of enquiry and the nature of time and eternity.
There are three classes of nonphysical concepts, the logical, the physical and the ethical, each of which have their own form of eternity.
You may have to explain to me or copy/paste what you've written previously explaining why 'physical' is in the class of nonphysical concepts. Contrasted with nonphysical concepts, do you propose physical concepts, with a physical class of physical concepts? :hmm:
There are non-physical physical concepts! Gravity, entropy, causality and evolution are examples. These concepts depend on physical entities for their existence, and are perpetual in the universe, but are not themselves physical entities.
A way of bringing these divergent approaches to time within a common framework is to look at the differing meanings of eternity demarcated by the criterion of time.

I'm can't place this concept into my head; that time is a criterion of demarcation for eternity. Perhaps events within time would be, but time itself is a component of the idea of eternity, not a criterion for demarcation. You also mention different 'meanings' of eternity. Do you instead mean components of eternity, or aspects of eternity? You use some ambiguous wording Robert. Even though you may have the idea well versed in your head, you still have to use the right words to get it through to others. Of course you know this. I stopped at this first sentence since it seems pivotal to the rest.
The three different meanings of eternity, deriving respectively from logic, physics and ethics, are outside time, perpetual within time, and values. Mathematical relations are outside time, physical laws last for ever within time, and good values seek to define and approach an eternal ideal.
Thanks for the reply, I ponder stuff on my 1/2 hour drive to work each day, it passes the time.
You’re welcome Interbane, I wrote this material a few years ago, and it is fairly dense so I’ve not really discussed it much before.