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Introduction to Primates and Philosophers

#67: June - Aug. 2009 (Non-Fiction)
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DWill

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I just received the book, and, reading the introduction, I had some doubt about the rigor of the discussion that was going to follow. It's not clear what moral goodness (or badness) is. Is it enough to avoid doing bad things, or does one have to do an altruistic act to be morally good? Then, where does morality itself fit in? Following a system of morality doesn't necessarily result in acts that we have to judge as good--if they reflect discrimination, for example. It might be highly "moral" to deny gay people the right to marry. In addition, calling moral goodness something real is ambiguous, as Mary has already observed. The question of whether we are basically good or bad is not a difficult question, just a poorly put one. How would we ever be able to determine such a thing?

Things may change in the body of the book (I hope).
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Grim

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DWill wrote: In addition, calling moral goodness something real is ambiguous, as Mary has already observed. The question of whether we are basically good or bad is not a difficult question, just a poorly put one. How would we ever be able to determine such a thing?
I agree with your impressions of the topic here. The relevance of such an inquiry is also questionable, considering that relativism is supposedly off topic I also find the scope rather narrow - but still a bit more focused. But on what exaclty? I think that it would help to separate the topics you mention. There is moral and there is goodness, these I believe we can talk out without too much latent relativism.

Sorry I haven't read the book in a while so I'm much less than fresh for discussion here.

Any thoughts on any kind? Anyone?

:book:
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Robert Tulip

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Veneer Theory

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I've been pondering de Waal's Veneer Theory of morality, his claim that law, economics, religion and politics assume that human nature is evil and requires a set of moral rules to control it. I think it is a very useful depiction. Veneer Theory has much in common with the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, that our fallen nature requires a higher moral grace - a veneer if you will - to save it.

De Waal is correct in my view that Veneer Theory fails to understand our evolutionary essence, as observation of apes demonstrates that we are originally social beings integrated into community. We are not the autonomous individuals described by Hobbes in his depiction of natural life as nasty brutish and short.

This is a really complicated area. At first I agreed with de Waal because I disagree with Augustine, in the sense that de Waal points to how divine grace bestows an original blessing on humanity rather than a curse. However, de Waal's theory breaks down under analysis. If morality is intrinsic to our genes, we should act morally by instinct. But our instincts are a mixed bag, favouring our kin rather than supporting impartial justice. Impartiality requires a veneer of reason.

The difference between morality and instinct was discussed by Plato in The Republic, where Thrasymachus says justice is helping friends and harming enemies. Socrates points to a higher ideal of justice, linked to equality, fairness and other values. In de Waal's terms, Thrasymachus seems to offer the natural instinctive morality while Socrates argues for something like a veneer.

The Platonic view evolved further in the Christian injunction to love your enemies. The issue here is that Christ says our instinctive morality is not sufficient - even evil people love their friends - so we need to construct higher concepts which will serve to regulate modern needs.
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DWill

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Re: Veneer Theory

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Robert Tulip wrote: This is a really complicated area. At first I agreed with de Waal because I disagree with Augustine, in the sense that de Waal points to how divine grace bestows an original blessing on humanity rather than a curse. However, de Waal's theory breaks down under analysis. If morality is intrinsic to our genes, we should act morally by instinct. But our instincts are a mixed bag, favouring our kin rather than supporting impartial justice. Impartiality requires a veneer of reason.
Good post there. Without reverting to Augustine's weird theory of the transmission of original sin, we can still see reflected in the Eden story the essential truth that we are endowed with the capacity for good, but always find it a struggle to place the interests of others over ours. This is not Veneer theory, since that supposedly means that we are bad or selfish at the core.

De Waal claims that the building blocks of morality are in our genes, just as they are in the genes of other primates. But acting morally means acting with a certain disinterestedness, which requires the ability to reason, and which is also, of course, in our genes. It has been said, however, that genes do not necessarily produce complex behaviors or conceptions such as moral thinking. They make it possible for these to occur; possibly they predispose one individual to moral thinking more than they predispose another. I think that while reason is more than a veneer for us--it is just as much a part of our genes as the moral emotions--we certainly do not escape through its presence the conflict with evolutionarily more ancient drives.
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Krysondra

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Re: Veneer Theory

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Here is what I found interesting in the Introduction:
Yet at this point the question arises of whether Kitcher and Korsgaard are setting that bar of morality at a level that most human action fails to reach. Each philosopher offers a self-consciously normative account of morality as how people ought to act, rather than a descriptive account of how most of us actually do act most of the time.
A normative account of morality does us little good as most humans cannot reach that high ground. It is difficult for any person to constantly promote the greater good while avoiding the amount of harm that they do to others. So, using normative morality may not be the best way to judge morality in humans or in other species.
So there seems to be a risk of comparing apples and oranges: contrasting primate behavior (based on quantitative and anecdotal observation) with human normative ideals.
This does seem to be one of the biggest problems that will be present in the book. Primates lack speech, so they cannot explain the intentions behind their actions. Without intentionality, it is difficult to prove that they are acting morally. They appear to be acting morally, even according to human standards, but we cannot know what they mean by it or if they have the theory of mind to conceptualize how they are acting
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DWill

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Thanks. You said that well and brought out a couple of main sticking points in the discussion that follows. Glad to have you reading along.
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Iluvbookz13
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This points squarely to Dawkins’ idea and his book The Selfish Gene. It’s not that I disagree with Dawkins (although some scientists do with respect to the level at which selection occurs - see the 6th post about in "supporting literature" about S J Gould), it’s that the word “selfish” is a bit like “real.” Dawkins knows this of course, and he in no way intends the word to carry any intent with respect to genetic material. Yet somehow this meaning seems to have been carried through into what de Waal is calling “vaneer theory.”
I guess I am unclear on the indifference of Selfishness and Reality. I cannot create the connection in my head as to what this may mean :rant: :rant:. Can someone please clarify?
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