Can evildoers think well?

MadArchitect · Posted: Fri Dec 07, 2007 6:12 pm Post subject: Can evildoers think well?

Bear with me. In this post I intend to present you with a central problem (see title), several quotations from the essay "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy" (don't worry if you haven't yet read it), a paraphrase of Arendt's paraphrase of Plato's interpretation of Socrates (less complicated than it sounds), and a some related questions.

To begin,

irishrose · Posted: Fri Dec 07, 2007 10:00 pm Post subject:

MadArchitect · Posted: Fri Dec 07, 2007 11:47 pm Post subject:

[quote="irishrose"]

irishrose · Posted: Sat Dec 08, 2007 2:19 am Post subject:

Wow, poorly outlined inquiry on my part. Let me try again.

When you asked that question: “How can you tell whether their contributions to the discussion are valid or whether they’re specious?” I had read it in regard to both parts of the metaphor. So I had read, and I think you’re asking the same: How does a criminal, with regard to her internal dialogue, determine the validity of her own thought? And, I assume, to progress this discussion you have to accept that the criminal won’t be able to tell. But I don’t necessarily accept that an individual, criminal or no, can’t tell whether her thoughts are “valid” or “specious” in the same way that she can’t tell with regard to a second party. How well can we possibly deceive ourselves? And that’s genuinely an inquiry. I really don’t know.

But I’d need more convincing to think the metaphor holds up all the way to the conclusion that an individual who commits an immoral act has impaired her ability to determine the validity of her own thought. And without accepting that we are subject to deceit within our internal dialogue, in the same way we are subject to another’s deceit, I’m not sure how to move on. But if you want us to accept it, for the purpose of discussion, I’d be willing to do so for a bit.

I might be more likely to accept this type of discussion if it centered on judgment and not thought. I don’t necessarily assume that our thought can be impaired by immoral activity—not in the way that we can deceive ourselves into believing we are thinking something different than what we really are. But I could accept that our judgment can be impaired by criminal activity, if for no other reason than because of the discussion that Arendt raises in “Personal Responsibility and Judgment”: that our moral choices determine how we are to live with ourselves. A person who participates in immoral activity and goes on living with herself in relative peace, I imagine, would be more likely to commit an immoral act again. Thus her ability to judge has been impaired. But this is a different train of thought than what you’ve raised here.

MadArchitect · Posted: Sat Dec 08, 2007 3:08 am Post subject:

irishrose · Posted: Sat Dec 08, 2007 10:13 am Post subject:

Well, I certainly didn’t mean to derail this line of inquiry, not that I think you have any intention of letting it lie. But, beating you to the punch, is it possible to turn the question on judgment, rather than thought, as I had suggested? I haven’t read “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy” and had meant to skip it at least until I’ve discussed most the rest of the book, but it seems, in what I’ve read thus far, Arendt speaks quite a deal about judgment.

Going back to the Plato you quoted from Arendt:

MadArchitect · Posted: Sat Dec 08, 2007 12:40 pm Post subject:

irishrosem · Posted: Tue Jan 15, 2008 12:28 am Post subject:

I was looking over this thread and the other on “Personal Responsibility” and noted that, though my arguments aren’t necessarily opposed in these two discussions, they aren’t altogether compatible either. In “Personal Responsibility” I was arguing that I don’t think people who participate in totalitarian governments are always likely to be conscious of the fact that, by submitting to the government, they are offering their consent. Whereas, in this thread I wasn’t convinced that one can deceive one’s self within an internal dialogue. But, I guess if one wasn’t conscious of the deception, which I think Mad was suggesting here, it would be similar to the argument I was making in “Personal Responsibility.”

I’m just saying, Arendt has a way of making my head spin in circles.

Perhaps I’ll take a swing at “Some Questions of Moral Philosophy” so I can better address what’s been raised here, though I wouldn’t be surprised if I end up looking like Casey.

MadArchitect · Posted: Tue Jan 15, 2008 11:24 am Post subject:

I hear Mudville is a much happier place these days. Economic revival, or some such.

My copy of Arendt is still at my parents' house after the holidays, but they're supposed to be sending it my way soon. So go ahead and take a look at "Some Questions" if you feel up to it, and I'll respond as best I can, but it'll be away before I can double check my memory on what I read, so bear with me if I start talking some jive what don't make sense.

irishrosem · Posted: Fri Jan 18, 2008 12:16 pm Post subject:

I read about half this essay last night, and I learned that I need to read me some Kant.

irishrosem · Posted: Sat Jan 19, 2008 3:46 am Post subject:

I’ve only gotten through part of this still. But is Arendt suggesting that the only way to avoid atrocities like Nazi Germany is to develop a moral philosophy that is separate from the dictated laws, and subsequent obedience, of both government and religion? Otherwise, people will be capable of trading dictated moral codes, which are really just mores, as easily as a group can be persuaded to change their table manners—as she’s noted more than once.

MadArchitect · Posted: Sat Jan 19, 2008 7:05 pm Post subject:

Arendt seems to distrust moral systemization. I'd say that's at root in what she's suggesting here. To fix moral as something external, something that can be referenced like a book in a library, gives rise to too many problems. One is that ease with which populations and individuals can trade one for another. A second -- one that Arendt deals with less -- is that such systems tend to be inflexible, making misapplication endemic.

What she's suggesting as an alternative, it seems to me, is related to the idea of a moral sense or faculty. Or rather, the re-envisioning of morality as an approach to problems of conduct, rather than proscriptions for conduct.


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