Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

Chris OConnor · Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2005 3:41 pm Post subject: Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

This thread is for discussing Ch. 3 - Better Brains Through Genes. You can post within this framework or create your own threads. ::193

Edited by: Chris OConnor at: 11/1/05 12:28 am

MadArchitect

Some topics for chapter 3:

1. A passage on page 40 makes me wonder if perhaps Gazzaniga doesn't have the issues a little mixed up: "But what is hyperagency, really, but the human, evolutionary drive to engineer our survival?" In so far as PGD screening is just a matter of extending life spans across the board, that observation holds roughly true. But when you start talking about using PGD to engineer preferential characteristics -- everything from athleticism to eye color -- you're no longer talking about the survival of the species but about the social advantages extended to whomever can afford to assert their preference. Gazzaniga gives very little consideration in this chapter to the socio-economic implications of PGD screening, that gene selection could (and probably would) become a means of social and economic stratification. Those who could afford PGD screening would be at liberty to give their children genetic advantages over those who could not. To some extent, this happens as a simple matter of courtship, but there have historically been social factors that have evened the playing field out to some extent. If PGD seems likely to make the playing field incontrovertibly uneven, then I think it's worth considering the ethics of that situation. The problem could be taken so far, it seems to me, that the have nots could eventually be at such a disadvantage that they face potential extinction. In "selfish gene" terms, that means essentially the extiction of a particular set of genes -- determined in part by social approbation -- but in humanist terms it means the subjection of individuals, families, and entire social classes to poverty and potential suffering.

2. More social utopianism on Gazzaniga's part: "... we see that those closest to new technologies immediately respond with good sense. The greater social good prevails." (p. 51) Gazzaniga arrives at this conclusion on the strength of a single example -- that of Microsort -- and without a very thorough analysis of what influenced their policies. On page 54 he advises that we "let an innate morals-ethics system assert itself and stop us from going too far. We have never annihilated ourselves." Self-annihilation isn't exactly a live and learn situation. That we haven't done so far doesn't serve as a rational basis for the belief that we'll never do so. Gazzaniga's optimism concerning social-scientific change ought to make for an interesting bridge to an earlier reading selection, Jared Diamond's "Collapse". It should be kept in mind that the Easter Islanders only annihilated themselves once, and if anyone is at liberty to learn from their mistakes, it's those of us who have been fortunate so far to avoid the same fate. The lesson, it seems to me, is that self-preservation is not an infallible instinct in humans as a species.

3. Quoting M. J. Sandel, Gazzaniga raises an argument for PGD selection on the grounds that "stupidity" may be considered a "disease" -- that is, we may treat it categorically the same way that we would treat a genetically heritable disease like myotonic dystrophy or psychopathological disorders like Schizophrenia. This goes to the question of how we determine the normative states of being human, and I don't think it at all obvious that we should treat variations in intellectual grasp as we would treat a limitation on lifespan imposed by traditional medical disease.

4. From page 51: "Overall, Watson believes that genetic decisions should be a matter of free choice." Putting aside for the moment the suspicion that Gazzaniga may be implying an argument from authority -- the authority of James Watson, co-discoverer of the gene -- the major ethical question here is, "whose free choice?" PGD screening does not give a wider freedom of choice to the person who will actually exhibit the selected traits, so I'm not sure that we're justified in believing that there's a greater freedom of choice in these circumstances. More importantly, PGD screening creates a situation in which we may observe the autonomy of the child being incrementally subordinated to the will of the parent. Random selection has the virtue, at least, of taking the initiative out of the parent's hands. Trait selection is, in this regard, not so worrisome with clearly harmful traits -- disease, for example -- but on preferential matters it becomes a form of arbitrary control. Consider the case of a trait that is debatably negative -- a tendency to certain sexual dispositions. Gazzaniga raised the question of homosexuality, but let's view the case in reverse -- presume that homosexual is attempting to have offspring through IVF and wants to ensure that their child will have at least this one commonality with them: that it will grow to prefer same-sex partners. Given the social climate towards homosexuality, such a decision may be likely subject the offspring to a great deal of hostility, and the offspring may grow to wish that it had been born heterosexual instead, if merely for reasons of safety. Moreover, the child may perceive that their PGD selected trait is somehow not uniquely their own, but is as much the decision of the parent as the piano lessons they were forced to take when they were four years old.

Look at it another way. A particular familial environment may incline a child to racism. Being removed from that family environment may give the child the opporunity to broaden their perspective, to escape from a disposition towards bigotry, and we would, I think, for the most part agree that this is a good thing. But once the family preference is written into the genetic code, offspring are less capable of escaping the prejudices of their parents. Gazzaniga attempts to deflate the control exerted by the parent by pointing out that adult traits are the product of the interaction between genetic predisposition and uncontrollable environmental factors, but that makes the argument one of degree. The PGD screened offspring is still genetically inclined towards the parents' preference, and if they are still allowed some measure of autonomy we should at least consider the fact that it's a smaller measure. Even a disposition towards physical beauty may seem oppressive if it as viewed as an aspect of parental dominance. So I think we're justified, perhaps even obligated, to ask which is the more cruel taskmaster, chance or design?

tarav

This may not ignite a conversation, but I learned something new on p 45. Gazzaniga says, "In other words, the older you get, the more your IQ resembles that of your biological parents. I was not aware that heritability of some cognitive abilities increase with age. Now, I know!

MadArchitect

Yeah, that wasn't something that I was accutely aware of, but it makes sense to me. Human life is, after all, a process of development. That certain inherited traits aren't fully expressed until later stages of development stands to reason. To give it a somewhat disconcerting analogy, an inherited predisposition to certain diseases will sometimes only find outward (as opposed to genetic) expression in the later stages of life. In other words, you only get the disease when you're old enough, even though the disposition is there from the moment of conception.

JulianTheApostate

Actually, Matt Ridley's very good book Nature Via Nurture explains that.

As people grow older, they gain more control over their environment, in terms of their activities and the people they hang out with. For example, people with a proclivity towards reading will spend more time reading and will have friends who read a lot. Consequently, your intrinsic personality, which is heritable, becomes more prominent as you age.

Edited by: JulianTheApostate at: 10/29/05 8:47 pm

JulianTheApostate

In the book, Gazzaniga raises some important questions but does a lousy job of answering them. While I agree with many of his conclusions, his reasoning is uninspired.

Also, there are two varieties of genetic manipulation. Potential parents may seek an abortion or choose not to implant an embryo in response to generic information. Or, genetic engineering could splice custom DNA to shape the resulting person. I was disappointed that this chapter covered the former situation but not the latter.

My take on the topic is that a child without food or medical care is far more disturbing that a child created through genetic engineering or culled due to their genetic profile. Since so many children currently suffer from horrible childhood environments, I can't get too worked up about genetic manipulation in the future.

ginof · Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2005 12:33 am Post subject: Re: Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

Quote:
p45 - Finally, neither genes nor family environment accounts for a substantial portion of the variation in complex human behavioral traits.

So, is anyone else curious as to what does? As the father of a 10 month old son, I am! I hope he answers this later

ginof · Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2005 12:38 am Post subject: Re: Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

Quote:
p 48 - So, overall, the interaction between genese and environment makes us what we are.

he uses this section to say that selecting genes would not be an effective way of getting the kids we 'want'. And this seems true, at least in the short term. However, would this really be true in the long term? As the generations move on, more and more selection of the same genes would lead to a type of 'inbreading' where certain traits would be more likely to be found, don't you think?

ginof · Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2005 12:42 am Post subject: Re: Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

I think I have to disagree strongly with the authors assertions about how our social sense modulates our private decisions (p51). If this was the case, then we would not be seeing the high levels of male preferences in births. At the very least, we would be seeing a moderation in the balance of births. However, this does not seem to be happening, so the evidence is not supporting his conclusion.

ginof · Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2005 12:45 am Post subject: Re: Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

p 53 - Can we handle it?! This is one of the things discussed in our previous book, "Collapse". We seem to be subject to the law of unintended consequences and not having good memory for the mistakes we've made. However, Gazzaniga draws the opposite conclusion. I think I'm inclined to agree more with the author of "Collapse"

ginof · Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2005 12:46 am Post subject: Re: Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

the conclusion of this chapter seems so optimistic. After discussing all the recent advances in the field, he seems to say the third law prevents us from making further advances! I just don't find this convincing.

Jeremy1952 · Posted: Sun Nov 13, 2005 1:30 pm Post subject: Re: Ethical Brain: Chapter 3

Ginof

Quote:
“p45 - Finally, neither genes nor family environment accounts for a substantial portion of the variation in complex human behavioral traits.” So, is anyone else curious as to what does? As the father of a 10 month old son, I am! I hope he answers this later

I think he does, but the best in depth answer is found in Harris, Judith: The Nurture Assumption. Short answer: It's peers.

If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everything. Daniel Dennett, 1984


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