The economics of alliance
In chapter 16, section II, there's a particularly notable instance of the British-French-Russian alliance's weakness in the face of post-war plans. Of course, that sort of thing isn't entirely unexpected, but it's interesting to me that nations could vest so much in a wartime alliance, and then wrangle over the as-yet unwon spoils of war to the extent that they'll actually consider abandoning the alliance.
Further, this section also shows them parcelling out spoils on conditions that include maintaining the alliance as a provision. Constantinople and the straights were essentially bartered to Russia on condition of a) successful continuance of the war, and b) Russian sympathy to French and British imperial interests in the rest of the OE.
That Britain and France played that game is, I think, illustrative of the motivations that play into the relations between nations. They handed over Constantinople and the straights out of a) fear
that they'd lose the war for lack of Russia as an ally, and b) desire
for the ME territories they had their eye on, even at the cost of the gateway between Europe and the East.