Robert Tulip wrote: an intentional mind of God seemed the best available explanation. That is despite the paradigmatic anomalies such as stupid bugs that could never be installed as features by a smart designer but could only occur by accident, like the neck nerves of a giraffe.
It is just like how before Copernicus and Kepler geocentrism seemed the most elegant explanation despite its anomalies.

This strikes me as a good comparison to keep in mind. Design by God was being treated as a mechanism, an answer to "how". This is, to me, a really fundamental confusion.

My position, (somewhat vaguely at this point,) is that the true matter of concern for religious issues simply cannot be analyzed as mechanism. No description or explanation of its mechanism can be of any use in addressing any such issue. A very rough analogy would be a statement such as "any principle for evaluating the quality of poetry is of no use in creating true poetry."

Robert Tulip wrote:

Harry Marks wrote: I am more interested in the general subject of the relation between mind and purpose.

Me too. The traditional theory of purpose was that God created the world intentionally and deliberately for the purpose of his greater glory.
A purpose is a deliberate intention. It seems to me, the core of Darwin’s Dangerous Idea is the removal of personal divine intent from any theory of cosmic purpose.

I would parse the matter slightly differently. I would say that if there is some entity behind the nature of the cosmos and providing a purpose for it, that entity is of no use to us either in understanding such a purpose or in addressing spiritual issues. That is, all of the philosophizing or claims of revelation which we have to date do not provide us with any knowledge [key word, here, knowledge] of such an entity that is helpful in understanding our purpose or addressing spiritual issues in general.

Robert Tulip wrote:It means that if we wish to salvage any concept of divinity, we have to remove from it the attributes of personal intent, which means removing the idea that a divinity can be an entity.

I look in a very different direction. I think the understandings we have come to about spirit, in the last two hundred years, are very helpful in identifying the functions, both mechanical and internal, of traditional ideas about divinity. I think we should follow those clues to better refine our interpretations about religious issues.

Robert Tulip wrote:For humanity, achieving our purpose might mean expanding to colonise the galaxy over the next billion years.

Maybe, but I tend to think achieving our purpose is more likely to be attainment of a social state in which concern for other humans is perceived to be the proper goal and fulfillment of life, with the ability to provide a complete explanation as to why that makes sense.

Robert Tulip wrote: We cannot rule out that achieving an intelligence that can reflect natural law in symbolic language is somehow an inherent purpose of the existence of the universe. That is how I understand the Biblical idea that man is made in the image of God.

An interesting proposition to have on the table.

Harry Marks wrote: I've thought the same myself. Robert gives a good response, about grandparent wisdom being valuable and so evolution delaying the removal from the stage. But I would observe that what looks like a "why" question (why am I still here?) is really a "how" question (how does survival of the old improve their reproductive fitness?).

It's good to keep that distinction clear, because when we get to social processes, whys are not mainly disguised hows. And the fact that my wife and I are of value to each other is sufficient reason to prefer that neither of us take a bunch of sleeping pills. Why? Because another person, who cares, would be hurt by that (not to mention life has more adventures to offer, still).

Robert's observation is cheering, but I wonder if evolution should be thanked. In the strict way in which Dennett seems to want us to look at evolution, can we say that grandparenting was selected? Our lifespans make grandparenting possible (and I wonder how much of it was done in homo sapiens' early days), but our primate ancestors had long lives, too, yet no grandparenting. In other words, can our functioning as grandparents be simply a condition at which we arrived, or what in evolution is called a spandrel?

Harry Marks wrote:

DWill wrote:This will be a trick, indeed, since Dennett tells us that up until now, even religious attempts to answer the why of life have substituted the how, in the form of various cosmogonies.

Do you really think so? Do you think that Calvin's declaration that the chief end of man is to give glory to God is a cosmogony? I rather think it is like Socrates arguing that we are seeking the good. And declaring that the unexamined life is not worth living. And surely you would not consider either of those to be a cosmogony.

No, I don't think the ends you cite are cosmogonies, but would Dennett give credence to them as satisfying answers to the why? Do you read him as shooting for a new level of explanation?

Harry Marks wrote: Sorry for being less than clear. I am mainly trying to lay the groundwork for interesting discussion that I hope arises later. Perhaps you were referring to my final remark about scientists restricting their discussion of religion to its usefulness or accuracy in explaining natural phenomena such as adaptations within species. What I was hinting at was that religion is densely involved with telos. And its purpose is almost never to explain natural phenomena. It purposes are virtually all social, psychological and spiritual. So addressing it as "bad science" is correct, but missing most of the point.

No apology needed. It's unfamiliarity with terms, such as 'simulacra,' that accounts for my reaching. And I still need to suss out whether Dennett cares at all about the social purposes of religion, although he recognizes they are important to people and will persist.

I might as well quote Dennett in this early part of the book, to show what makes me wonder at his direction, and whether it is radical or not.

Darwin's dangerous idea cuts much deeper into the fabric of our most fundamental
beliefs than many of its sophisticated apologists have yet admitted, even to
themselves.

That idea, which is about as secure as any in science, really does have far-reaching
implications for our vision of what the meaning of life is or could be.

One of the precious things that is at stake is a vision of what it means to ask, and answer, the
question "Why?" Darwin's new perspective turns several traditional assumptions
upside down, undermining our standard ideas about what ought to count
as satisfying answers to this ancient and inescapable question.

In a single stroke, the idea of evolution by
natural selection unifies the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the
realm of space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law. But
it is not just a wonderful scientific idea. It is a dangerous idea. My admiration
for Darwin's magnificent idea is unbounded, but I, too, cherish many of the
ideas and ideals that it seems to challenge, and want to protect them. For
instance, I want to protect the campfire song, and what is beautiful and true
in it, for my little grandson and his friends, and for their children when they
grow up. There are many more magnificent ideas that are also jeopardized,
it seems, by Darwin's idea, and they, too, may need protection. The only
good way to do this—the only way that has a chance in the long run—is to
cut through the smokescreens and look at the idea as unflinchingly, as
dispassionately, as possible.

Our examination will take a certain amount of nerve.
Feelings may get hurt. Writers on evolution usually steer clear of this apparent
clash between science and religion. Fools rush in, Alexander Pope
said, where angels fear to tread. Do you want to follow me? Don't you really
want to know what survives this confrontation? What if it turns out that the
sweet vision—or a better one—survives intact, strengthened and deepened
by the encounter?

DWill wrote:

Harry Marks wrote: I would observe that what looks like a "why" question (why am I still here?) is really a "how" question (how does survival of the old improve their reproductive fitness?).

Robert's observation is cheering, but I wonder if evolution should be thanked. In the strict way in which Dennett seems to want us to look at evolution, can we say that grandparenting was selected? Our lifespans make grandparenting possible (and I wonder how much of it was done in homo sapiens' early days), but our primate ancestors had long lives, too, yet no grandparenting. In other words, can our functioning as grandparents be simply a condition at which we arrived, or what in evolution is called a spandrel?

I was unaware that our primate ancestors had long lives. How do we know they did no grandparenting? I saw some research which found that presence of grandmothers improved survival of infants. Interestingly, there was no corresponding benefit from grandfathers. On the other hand, men have their own ways of improving reproductive fitness in older years.

The real key may be explaining menopause, which recent results found was triggered in whales by swimming around with younger females who reach sexual maturity.

DWill wrote:No, I don't think the ends you cite are cosmogonies, but would Dennett give credence to them as satisfying answers to the why? Do you read him as shooting for a new level of explanation?

I am happy to wait and see. But I am skeptical of substituting "explanation" for "deliberation" in answering "why?" questions.

DWill wrote: I still need to suss out whether Dennett cares at all about the social purposes of religion, although he recognizes they are important to people and will persist.

One of the precious things that is at stake is a vision of what it means to ask, and answer, the question "Why?" Darwin's new perspective turns several traditional assumptions upside down, undermining our standard ideas about what ought to count
as satisfying answers to this ancient and inescapable question.

In a single stroke, the idea of evolution by
natural selection unifies the realm of life, meaning, and purpose with the realm of space and time, cause and effect, mechanism and physical law. But it is not just a wonderful scientific idea. It is a dangerous idea. My admiration for Darwin's magnificent idea is unbounded, but I, too, cherish many of the ideas and ideals that it seems to challenge, and want to protect them.

"Unifies" is a pretty strong term. I will reserve judgment till I see his argument.

DWill wrote: I wonder if evolution should be thanked. In the strict way in which Dennett seems to want us to look at evolution, can we say that grandparenting was selected? Our lifespans make grandparenting possible (and I wonder how much of it was done in homo sapiens' early days), but our primate ancestors had long lives, too, yet no grandparenting. In other words, can our functioning as grandparents be simply a condition at which we arrived, or what in evolution is called a spandrel?

As ever, there is a good wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grandmother_hypothesis
It seems reasonable that human intelligence, with big brains and slow maturity, creates a niche whereby infants who have living grandmothers are more likely to reproduce. Human intelligence is the decisive difference from animals in terms of why the benefit of grandparent care affects longevity. Animals tend to have quicker maturation, reducing the need for grandparenting, and suggesting that animal genetic energy is more productively devoted to direct breeding.

DWill wrote:Do you think that Calvin's declaration that the chief end of man is to give glory to God is a cosmogony?

I think it is a cosmogony, a theory of the origin of the universe, in that Calvin’s catechism assumes a number of definite attributes to reality and our origins. Firstly, Calvin assumes that the universe was deliberately created by God for his greater glory, which means that God is a unified intelligence, a directly cosmogonic claim. In the Christian orthodox schema, God is imagined as outside the physical universe, whereas the scientific cosmogony is agnostic on this point, but tends more to the pantheist view that sees divinity as an inherent property of matter, not a different quality that supervenes upon matter. Further, the Christian cosmogony, in viewing God as personal and intentional, assumes that God has the power to intervene in the world, for example in the life of Jesus Christ, in what is termed special revelation where miracles become possible. Revising the ‘glory of God’ idea to make it compatible with evolution does seem to involve a marked difference in thinking.

It is noteworthy that the concept of glory has been the object of mockery, especially with Humpty Dumpty’s definition of glory as ‘a nice knock-down argument’. Indeed, glory is such a vague and metaphysical concept that Lewis Carroll had a good point in using it as his primary exhibit for the egghead argument that words can mean whatever we want.

Robert, Harry asked me the question about Calvin. You had cited that as an example of answering the why question. I think that invites only another such why question, so is not really an answer, in Dennett's view. He says that through Darwin we can find the telos without having to settle for mysteries.

Robert Tulip wrote:

Harry Marks wrote:Do you think that Calvin's declaration that the chief end of man is to give glory to God is a cosmogony?

I think it is a cosmogony, a theory of the origin of the universe, in that Calvin’s catechism assumes a number of definite attributes to reality and our origins.

This is going to sound like splitting hairs, but I disagree. To me, a cosmogony must be an explanation of origins - an account of cause and effect. It may be true that the doctrine of man's purpose was justified by a cosmogony, but that doesn't mean it is one.

The statement on the face of it gets us into what it means to give glory to God. Maybe it also gets us into the reason why that is our chief end, but it seems to me to have stepped beyond an assertion that "because God created us for his glory, that is our purpose and function." Even if that is intrinsic to the statement, in my view, the statement is more a theology (analysis of the nature of God) than a cosmogony (account of the causation of all).

Robert Tulip wrote:Firstly, Calvin assumes that the universe was deliberately created by God for his greater glory, which means that God is a unified intelligence, a directly cosmogonic claim. In the Christian orthodox schema, God is imagined as outside the physical universe, whereas the scientific cosmogony is agnostic on this point,

Well, people who are hung up on religion tend to see every statement about God through the lens that fascinates them. I am sure I am no exception. But an implicit cosmogony does not seem to me to make a statement into a cosmogony.

The assertion that DWill and I were discussing was, basically, that statements of purpose or telos reduced to cosmogony, before Darwin. That is, all "why's" were "hows". Since I am interested in the development of religious accounts of life's purpose, I tend to focus on the "what is fulfilling?" parts of the statements of purpose, and to see social function of defining values rather than pseudo-scientific function in them.

Socrates/Plato makes that pretty explicit. "The unexamined life is not worth living" is very directly a statement of values.

Robert Tulip wrote:Revising the ‘glory of God’ idea to make it compatible with evolution does seem to involve a marked difference in thinking.

A difference in mode of reasoning, perhaps, but maybe not in content. If we see God as "the principle of the Good" as, one could argue, process theologians do, rather than "the creator of all that is", then the glory of God is explicitly a values issue. Furthermore, interlacing it with evolutionary understanding becomes an intriguing intellectual issue.

I had noted in the preface Dennett's mention of Stuart Kauffman, known as a complexity theorist. This reminded me of my flirtation with Kauffman through his 2008 book Reinventing the Sacred. I found Kauffman's ringing endorsement of purpose, agency, and "doings" (as opposed to just happenings) in the universe, inspiring. Dennett (1995) would have been reacting to Kauffman's earlier work, of course, but I would assume that the book I read was an elaboration of the earlier ideas. I did not go really far with Kauffman at the time, unfortunately. Dennett includes Kauffman with those authors whose books were "the most difficult I have ever read" (p. 12). If Dennett had problems with him, imagine mine.

I had almost all of Kauffman's preface underlined. Whereas Dennett gives us mainly a defense of reductionism, Kauffman wants to bring out its inadequacies:

"In this book I will demonstrate the inadequacy of reductionism. Even major physicists now doubt its full legitimacy. I shall show that biology and its evolution cannot be reduced to physics alone but stand in their own right. Life, and with it agency, came naturally to exist in the universe. With agency came values, meaning, and doing, all of which are as real in the universe as particles in motion. 'Real' here has a particular meaning: while life, agency, value, and doing presumably have physical explanations in any specific organism, the evolutionary emergence of these cannot be derived from or reduced to physics alone. Thus, life, agency, value, and doing are real in the universe. This stance is called emergence. Weinberg not withstanding, there are explanatory arrows in the universe that do not point downward. A couple in love walking along the banks of the Seine are, in real fact, a couple in love walking along the banks of the Seine, not mere particles in motion. More, all this came to exist without our need to call upon a Creator God" (p. x).

Although I'm not sure on this point, it seems that Kauffman might be thinking differently from Harry and Robert, in that purpose is not something that can be merely grafted onto evolution in a non-contradictory but non-essential manner, but is a product of it, in some way that I can't conceive without going toward mystery.

Dennett devotes considerable space to Kauffman later in the book. Maybe after that I will be ready to try Kauffman again.

Harry Marks wrote:It may be true that the doctrine of man's purpose was justified by a cosmogony, but that doesn't mean it is one.

Christians believe that the meaning and purpose of life are a direct result of the facts of our origins in the actions of God. This direct entailment is more than what you call a justification. It means the theory of origins contains the whole sense of divine purpose or teleology, with God making the universe for the purpose of being glorified by humanity. The cosmogony and teleology are intimately bound together in the religious view.

Harry Marks wrote: If we see God as "the principle of the Good" as, one could argue, process theologians do, rather than "the creator of all that is", then the glory of God is explicitly a values issue. Furthermore, interlacing it with evolutionary understanding becomes an intriguing intellectual issue.

Yes, enmeshing theology with evolution is a good way to approach ontology, the study of what exists. My view is that evolution is primary, so any coherent concepts about God must derive from and be entirely compatible with scientific knowledge about evolution. The stable patterns that enable evolution can be seen as good, providing the niche within which any concept of the divine can have meaning.

Robert Tulip wrote:

Harry Marks wrote:It may be true that the doctrine of man's purpose was justified by a cosmogony, but that doesn't mean it is one.

Christians believe that the meaning and purpose of life are a direct result of the facts of our origins in the actions of God. This direct entailment is more than what you call a justification. It means the theory of origins contains the whole sense of divine purpose or teleology, with God making the universe for the purpose of being glorified by humanity. The cosmogony and teleology are intimately bound together in the religious view.

Well, obviously I think the intimacy of that binding together is very suspect. The point I was making was that cosmogony and purpose are quite separable intellectually, that is, one can consider each issue separately and an account of the "how" of creation is simply not the same thing as an account of the "what for" of our purpose. But I take it much further in simply ignoring the doctrine of creation, as well as providence.

I believe the factual truth of what we call God is found in the caring about purpose that comes with a social, self-conscious existence. It makes sense to find creation and providence to be stories that capture the essential transcendence of "the ground of being," i.e. the process of self-aware existence which is inescapably prior to any subject/object split. As such we are not meant to "understand" them or to treat them as "data" in any sense. Thus, for purposes of analytical discussions, they are self-excluded: no honest response to creation and providence can treat them as part of an analysis.

Fortunately for Christian practice and self-understanding, we can still get by just fine with an understanding of purpose which is a priori, that is, not pinned to any account of "why" it is our purpose (or "how" it came to be our purpose). The idea of the good is as pure as the idea of the logical, or the idea of beauty, and we can always do the analysis of it from first principles while still remaining totally within a context of faithful response to God.

Robert Tulip wrote:

Harry Marks wrote: If we see God as "the principle of the Good" ... rather than "the creator of all that is", then the glory of God is explicitly a values issue. Furthermore, interlacing it with evolutionary understanding becomes an intriguing intellectual issue.

Yes, enmeshing theology with evolution is a good way to approach ontology, the study of what exists. My view is that evolution is primary, so any coherent concepts about God must derive from and be entirely compatible with scientific knowledge about evolution. The stable patterns that enable evolution can be seen as good, providing the niche within which any concept of the divine can have meaning.

I'm sorry to say I find that view repugnant. I have no problem with arguing that concepts about God must be compatible with science, including evolution. But the meaning of God does not derive from the process of evolution. It may have roots in it, like mathematics or logic do, but it is like an epiphyte (such as an orchid) in not drawing its sustenance from its substrate.

I would rather take a poetical view and argue that midway in the journey of life (not a time related to years of age, Dante notwithstanding) we find ourselves in a dark wood. The discernment of the best path from the obscurity in which we find ourselves is, in my view, the very nature and purpose of human life.

DWill wrote:I had noted in the preface Dennett's mention of Stuart Kauffman, known as a complexity theorist. This reminded me of my flirtation with Kauffman through his 2008 book Reinventing the Sacred. I found Kauffman's ringing endorsement of purpose, agency, and "doings" (as opposed to just happenings) in the universe, inspiring.

Thanks for underlining this. It sounds like I may enjoy going to that material to fill gaps in my understanding. Yes, I quite agree that "doings" are not just "happenings" and that is the essential quality of awareness from an existential perspective.

DWill wrote:I had almost all of Kauffman's preface underlined. Whereas Dennett gives us mainly a defense of reductionism, Kauffman wants to bring out its inadequacies:

"In this book I will demonstrate the inadequacy of reductionism. Even major physicists now doubt its full legitimacy. I shall show that biology and its evolution cannot be reduced to physics alone but stand in their own right. ...This stance is called emergence."

Dennett grows strangely rhapsodic when, in (I believe) section 3 he begins to address reductionism. Good reductionism is contrasted with evil reductionism in a metaphor which can only be accepted as poetic license. His distinctions struck me as valid and important, and whetted my appetite for more on the subject.

DWill wrote:Although I'm not sure on this point, it seems that Kauffman might be thinking differently from Harry and Robert, in that purpose is not something that can be merely grafted onto evolution in a non-contradictory but non-essential manner, but is a product of it, in some way that I can't conceive without going toward mystery.

Well, I am open to persuasion on the point, but it seems to me that emergence implies that purpose must be consistent with biology, and its controlling processes of evolution, but may not be a "product" of it in the sense that laws of evolution shed any light on the dynamics of purpose. Is the content of our mathematics controlled by the way that we evolved to be smart? I don't think so.