Interbane wrote:The question is whether or not we can go from an is to an ought. And the answer is that we can, if we have a goal.
But what does that actually mean? In terms of the agenda of this thread, the relation between faith and reason, this is-ought question devolves to asking if we can logically derive values from facts. The point is that we can’t, and have to bring to bear something additional to the facts, something from the domain of faith, if we want to assert that any factual statements entail a moral decision.
When we consider a factual situation with moral weight, such as the fact that someone has done a crime, we never say the crime alone causes the punishment. The judgement involves a social and cultural decision about how serious the crime is, a decision that is never directly entailed by the fact alone but comes as you say from the realm of social goals. This realm of culture is constructed, in a way that has the nature of faith.
People want to say the situation alone provides a compelling logical basis for a response, and that desire is the basis for religious codes which assert divine blessing for moral beliefs. But the secular world cannot escape this faith dimension so easily, because secular myths such as universal human rights are just as faith based as any religion.
People would like to say that rights are universal and inalienable in terms of an absolute morality, but as you point out, there has to be something added to the facts, namely our moral judgment of our goals. Facts alone do not entail values. Our goals equate to our values and principles. Goals are normative, establishing our moral norms, which are conceptually different as a general category from any descriptive factual statement.
Interbane wrote:That we decide our goals upon pure value does not mean we only have faith. It's a matter of consensus of values. You can argue that consensus has been corrupt in the past, and falls victim to the ad populum fallacy. But how is faith any better?
I am trying to define a general conceptual understanding of a theory of value. My point is that our values don’t come from just the collection of facts, but as you say, from the goals we share about the type of world or life we want to make. What is universal about such goals is that they have the character of faith.
The question then is why we think one hoped for world or life is better than the alternative. We might say because the preferred future will maximize happiness or wealth or peace or some other value that we hold dear. But in all these cases what our values hold in common is that they rest upon conceptual moral principles and beliefs.
When we apply such beliefs in practice, reflecting social consensus such as a belief in the principle of rule of law, this practical certainty has the structure of a religious faith, even where a secular community sees that its goals do not have a religious basis. I am trying to show that the nature of faith against general principles does not simply fit in conventional labels. There are some universal phenomena of faith which apply equally in religious and secular contexts in terms of how they motivate our moral values.
Interbane wrote: At least consensus necessarily maximizes happiness.
Far from it. Russia had a consensus about communism that maximized suffering. Often our faith can be evil.
Interbane wrote: Although I understand the weakness in that argument, I do believe out consensus has grown progressively more in tune with an ideal morality as our species has become more educated.
That assessment is like saying turkeys have a consensus on the morality of trusting farmers to feed and care for them. Turkey morals work perfectly well until the day before Thanksgiving. Our turkey morality is causing the sixth world extinction event, and we should really be lifting our moral gaze higher. Humans have a better ability to predict the future than turkeys do, despite appearances.
Interbane wrote: So there is progress, and appeals to rotten consensus in history may not hold as strongly.
Yes there is progress in caring for the weak, probably driven more by economic growth and ability to pay for unproductive members of society. Even today, poor societies that cannot fund good health and welfare systems quietly practice euthanasia and infanticide.
Interbane wrote:
A goal is subject to change. An axiom is less flexible. The greatest error of our species, categorically, is being too certain. The difference is large when you consider this.
That is why I suggest that we should be very conservative, simple and basic in defining moral axioms. For example, from my point of view it is reasonable to say that measures which will enable humans to avoid extinction are moral, at a universal axiomatic level, since all humans should agree that human extinction would be a bad thing.
Interbane wrote:
If causation holds in every instance we explore it, then the conclusion isn't one of faith, but of logic. Inductive logic. There is a difference. When an exception is verified, induction will be flexible, but faith will not. The distinction here isn't black and white, but varying shades of gray.
The beliefs that causality is universal and that no uncaused events occur add to the logic of induction by asserting a fact about the nature of reality rather than just a confidence about testable models.
Interbane wrote:
You're speaking of epistemic justification here. Any social justification is secondary. The universality of causation and any appeal to a rational worldview is epistemic. These deal with propositions that can be shown true or false. The truth of which is independent of morality on the most basic level.
Actually I disagree with all your statements here. In assessing the relation between faith and reason, a purely scientific worldview can totally ignore all faith, in a pure factual worldview with no faith. That is epistemic. Only if we have any concern about what is important, valuable and useful – ie the social justification of belief – do we need to go beyond the nihilistic solipsism of pure epistemics. We cannot show that causation is universal, any more than we can show that parallel lines never meet. Our practical reliance on causality is a matter of induction. Our belief that causality is universal can only be a matter of faith in a proposition we consider to be a self-evident axiom.
Interbane wrote:
Some faith is necessary. But I think perhaps you're having a knee jerk reaction to the rationalists knee jerk reaction. You overcorrect as I see it.
Again, no, my view is not a kneejerk reaction. There is a scientific atheist worldview which holds the opinion that faith is intrinsically false, blind and malignant, as a general inference from the error of traditional religion. It is like induction: philosophers say that when they examine a range of examples of faith, and find that none of them stand up to scrutiny against evidence, they infer that all faith is wrong. However, that general inference is wrong. People hold very simple obvious generally shared beliefs, such as that the universe exists and obeys consistent physical laws which can be discovered by logic and evidence. The belief that such simple ideas are absolutely true is a matter of faith. Science has no absolutes. If we think any universal proposition is absolutely true then our opinion is strictly a matter of faith.