Part I: Morally Evolved (Pages 1 - 58)

DWill · Wed Jun 17, 2009 8:30 am


	tarav wrote: It seems to me de Waal contradicts himself with respect to emotions and morality. He argues that morality is exhibited by individuals who can be disinterested and impartial. Those words seem to convey a lack of emotion to me. Those words seem to convey rational thought. However, earlier in the chapter, de Waal seems to lament the idea that other scientists equate morality with rationality and detachment.

My comment on your interesting question is that De Waal does say that morality requires the cognitive capacity that only humans have. The contradiction with his lament about the scientists might be explained by his citation of Antonio D'Amasio (p. 38), whose work shows that even in rational decision-making, we must have an emotional investment or else we just have no "reason" to make a choice at all. So, no, we can't be entirely rational and would not want to be. Some scientists assume that we are these entirely rational agents.

I want to stick in another comment about De Waal's Veneer Theory. Maybe this is not entirely a fair judgment, but I do see De Wall putting up a straw man here. It is apparently De Waal himself who names Veneer Theory. Then he attacks the theory (chart on p. 22) as not in fact a theory at all! If I am mistaken about the origin of Veneer Theory, someone please let me know. De Waal also acknowledges a tradition running from Aristotle through Westermarck of humans as primarily social creatures, contrary to what VT says. He is saying little new, perhaps, only observing that some modern commentators have gone off in the other direction of viewing humans as by nature selfish and isolated. The key point here might be the extent to which these other scientists actually articulate this view, vs. the impression De Wall gets from their writing.

I can't see a strong reason to object to T.H. Huxley's view. I haven't read the context of his remarks and probably should. But just on the face of it, I can see no contradiction between believing in Darwin's theory and also believing that humans must be vigilant lest our aggressive, selfish, or self-deceiving tendencies overtake us. There is a large amount of empirical evidence of humans screwing up to support such a view, after all. What is wrong with viewing us as gardeners as Huxley does? It seems like simple prudence not to be overconfident in any innate goodness we have. Where exactly is the "veneer" in his view, anyway? De Waal tells us that Huxley's view goes way back to the Garden of Eden myth, which I'm sure is true, but by this does he mean to discredit it? I would say that the mythic origin of the view tends to back up its truth. De Waal seems to want to promote too simple a view of our nature, that we are "good by nature." But the facts don't support such a simple view, unfortunately.

tarav · Wed Jun 17, 2009 5:59 pm

I agree with the Suzannes in that happiness is key! I am still interested in the idea that women who are married have less of an increase in life expectancy than married men. Are women generally not as happy in marriages as men? Why? Thank you, Suzanne for the link. It is interesting that the livescience.com article said,
[quote]The researchers speculated that married men live longer because they adopt healthier lifestyles and take fewer risks. Married woman, on the other hand, probably live longer because of the improved financial well-being that comes with marriage.[quote]
I wish there would've been some speculation as to why there is a difference between the sexes.
Also, thank you to Will and Robert for their responses on emotions and rationality.

Grim · Mon Jun 22, 2009 12:38 am

The differences between apes and man seem...inconsolable.

The lessons to be learned from the apes are not inconceivable in other creative disciplines of thought.

De Waal goes so far as to suggest that primatologists are suited to be moral or ethical theorists a priori. Twice! This is absurd.

The lives and social interactions of monkeys seem to exemplify best our childern rather than our organized civiliztion.

Can we talk about morals in any sense other than anthropomorphically? Can we even hope to realistically understand the happiness of another species much less its sense of tolerance or impartialty in a meaningful sense? Without anthropormorphism?

Does de Waal really present meaningful considerations in respect to moral philosophy and eithcs? If so what are they?

Is this Vaneer Theory really describing an influence which lays overtop of our physical consciousness, or underneath? (i.e Are we human people in an overtopping culture trapped under modern reason, or are we people made reasonable within a mixture of culture/morality in us as a foundation?) Do monkeys act different (morally or however) in captivity, or after being trained?

Is de Waal's argument capable of refuting any serious contemporary moral philosophers, in an way other than as a type of Footnote Theory (FT)? If not the title of this book is seriously misleading.

Exactly which philosophers are de Waal's thoughts connecting to?

[hr]

Still on vacation :bananadance2:

....actually wasn't able to read seriously much of the book yet!!

:book:

DWill · Mon Jun 22, 2009 7:35 am


	Grim wrote: The lives and social interactions of monkeys seem to exemplify best our childern rather than our organized civiliztion.

Well, it's a building blocks approach he's promoting. We can see the beginning elements of our complex civilization in the social systems of primates. He believes the differences between us are explained in terms of our levels of development, and that in other primates we see a basic similarity in the importance of reciprocity to their societies.


	Quote: Can we talk about morals in any sense other than anthropomorphically? Can we even hope to realistically understand the happiness of another species much less its sense of tolerance or impartialty in a meaningful sense? Without anthropormorphism?

If we're going to talk about the morality of animals, I think you're correct that we'll have to be talking anthropomorphically. But I don't see de Waal saying that animals have morality, only that we humans would not have morality without the building blocks that we also see in other primates.


	Quote: Does de Waal really present meaningful considerations in respect to moral philosophy and eithcs? If so what are they?

This is a good question--the "so what?" factor. I think that in his main essay de Waal is mostly concerned with showing the inadequacy of veneer theory. He does say, though, that from studying primates and their proto-morality, we can correct our perspective on the nature or source of our own ethics. "[W]e are standing at the threshold of a much larger shift in theorizing that will end up positioning morality firmly within the emotional core of human nature" (p. 56). He wants to put rationality in a distant second place when it comes to influence on our ethics.


	Quote: Is this Vaneer Theory really describing an influence which lays overtop of our physical consciousness, or underneath? (i.e Are we human people in an overtopping culture trapped under modern reason, or are we people made reasonable within a mixture of culture/morality in us as a foundation?) Do monkeys act different (morally or however) in captivity, or after being trained?

Maybe, after your vacation, you'll find these questions cleared up by the commentators on de Waal's essay. The thrust of their argument seems to be that veneer theory is not very plausible in itself, and not really held by actual theorists. Therefore, we don't have to be concerned with questions like the ones you ask.


	Quote: Is de Waal's argument capable of refuting any serious contemporary moral philosophers, in an way other than as a type of Footnote Theory (FT)? If not the title of this book is seriously misleading.

I suppose that his claim that emotion is more important than rationality, could be considered a refutaion to some moral theorists. The title of the book still might be misleading, or at least ambiguous. Publishers like to be provocative to spur sales. But I think it's reasonable to say that we can learn something about our ethics by studying primates, if not learn FROM the ethics of primates.

Robert Tulip · Mon Jun 22, 2009 2:06 pm


	DWill wrote: de Waal is mostly concerned with showing the inadequacy of veneer theory. He does say, though, that from studying primates and their proto-morality, we can correct our perspective on the nature or source of our own ethics. "[W]e are standing at the threshold of a much larger shift in theorizing that will end up positioning morality firmly within the emotional core of human nature" (p. 56). He wants to put rationality in a distant second place when it comes to influence on our ethics.

De Waal makes a great point that empathy has not been adequately studied by psychology or primatology because it does not fit easily into the model of intelligence that focusses on calculative tasks and tool use. This modern model of intelligence has claimed a monopoly on rationality, ignoring emotion to the detriment of rounded understanding. Rational calculation is only a part of moral decisions. I like the idea of positioning morality within the emotional core of human nature, with the proviso that this emotional core is moral only in so far as it is rational.

A problem I have with de Waal's scheme here is that he does not adequately clarify the purpose of ethics. Ape ethics seem effective regarding social harmony, but there are higher objectives to improve the world and generate the most productive consequences in which the social harmony of the ethics of empathy only plays a part. I think it is dangerous to put rationality in 'a distant second place' to emotion, as that relativises morality by removing any objective criteria for judgement of emotional passions. De Waal makes a good point that rationality has been inadequately understood and used, but surely that is grounds for rational critique, not for the abandonment of higher moral ideals which take the form of a veneer?

Suzanne · Mon Jun 22, 2009 5:44 pm

Grim wrote:


	Quote: Still on vacation ....actually wasn't able to read seriously much of the book yet!!

Still on vacation?

I want what you have! :razz2:

MaryLupin · Mon Jun 22, 2009 6:31 pm


	Grim wrote: I would think of de Waal as directly challenging Hobbes and Rousseau. But it is also important to rememeber that these names have been dead...for a while. They can't defend themselves and we shouldn't expect it of ourselves to be able to relate to the atmosphere of their times as little we can expect that they would be able to visualize our own.

I think this is an important thing to keep in mind when talking about a long-standing "conversation" - and the one about human essential nature is one of some duration. What I see theorists like de Waal doing is sliding the terms of the conversation a bit sideways. As you said it may no longer be about whether our natures are good or bad - it may even not be about our "essential" nature since defining our "essence" presumes things about the production of behaviour that are based on assumptions that are sometimes long out of date or simply incorrect.

More than anything I admire the kind of work done by theorists like de Waal because it doesn't just continue the conversation but forces us to look at our assumptions and redefine our terms.

MaryLupin · Mon Jun 22, 2009 6:49 pm


	Suzanne E. Smith wrote: I think de Waal is trying to show, based on his studies of monkeys and apes, that human morality is not strictly a choice (and that humans have to work hard to make the right choice--veneer theory), but that present day human morality has its origins from the evolution of the socialization of the great apes in particular, who are able to show empathy, sympathy, compassion, helping, fairness, and group loyalty. These traits became embedded in our personalities during evolution and he believes that the exhibition of these traits is not superficial (a veneer).

I would agree that de Waal sees our morality as an evolutionary product that stems directly from our earlier primate states. This implies that many of our behaviours are a product of our biology. So, for example, we have no choice about the fact that we react to authority. I don't think de Waal would say that this means we don't have a choice about what behaviour we enact. I also agree with you that he thinks that our "positive" traits (like empathy agression compassion) are as much a part of us as our "negative" traits (like agression and intolerance for outsiders). Typically in some strands of European philosophy the negative traits are seen as predominant and the positive ones have been seen as coming from some outside force (like religion or a social contract). It is this typical approach that I think de Waal is trying to blow up.


	Suzanne E. Smith wrote: Huxley was actually the original inventor of the veneer theory, and I guess you would have to say that he and Hobbes both believe humans to be antisocial creatures. Rawls believes that we became social only because there was benefit/protection in the community (selfish reasons you could argue). I think all three of these philosophers are arguing the same thing.

Agreed.

Suzanne E. Smith wrote:


	Quote: From Mary Lupin: 3. And if not, is de Waal really arguing against what they said or against the cultural presuppositions that gave rise to their various theories?

I think de Waal is definitely arguing against what they said. Please see the Table on page 22 of the book.

Sorry if my question didn't make my point. What I was saying is a bit like what Grim pointed out in the post just before yours. ..that what de Waal is arguing for is in someways so radically different because of different assumptions and different cultural ways that they may not really be arguing the same thing anymore.

For example, most of these theorists probably assumed that there was a discoverable, discrete essential nature. A religious person might call this a soul. Another might call it a self. But there is an assumption that there is an "it" to discover - something unitary, present and essential. If this is not the case, and these earlier theorists are assuming its presence, does that not change the terms of the argument radically?

MaryLupin · Mon Jun 22, 2009 7:12 pm


	DWill wrote: Maybe this is not entirely a fair judgment, but I do see De Wall putting up a straw man here...The key point here might be the extent to which these other scientists actually articulate this view, vs. the impression De Wall gets from their writing.

I find this a very interesting thing. I agree with you that this certainly seems to be what de Waal is doing and it makes me wonder why. I would like to ask him about it during the chat if I can find a way to phrase it without being offensive. I assume de Waal has the historical background to see that this is not really a fair summary of the various positions and wonder if he is using it as a rhetorical device to generate the premise for the book. I also wonder if there is some argument-counter-argument history that came out in the literature after his book Good Natured came out that would explain it.


	DWill wrote: ...I can see no contradiction between believing in Darwin's theory and also believing that humans must be vigilant lest our aggressive, selfish, or self-deceiving tendencies overtake us. There is a large amount of empirical evidence of humans screwing up to support such a view, after all.

I don't think there is a contradiction either. I do think we need to explore our moral tendencies more thoroughly though. What I mean by that is that we say things like "humans are compassionate...", "humans are aggressive." What we should say is something more like "when in relationship with close kin humans tend to express compassion toward..." or "when in relationship with unrelated, unknown persons humans tend to express a limited form of compassion. These limitations are often marked by the short duration of effort, the ease with which the distress is forgotten..."

DWill · Mon Jun 22, 2009 7:51 pm


	MaryLupin wrote: I find this a very interesting thing. I agree with you that this certainly seems to be what de Waal is doing and it makes me wonder why. I would like to ask him about it during the chat if I can find a way to phrase it without being offensive. I assume de Waal has the historical background to see that this is not really a fair summary of the various positions and wonder if he is using it as a rhetorical device to generate the premise for the book. I also wonder if there is some argument-counter-argument history that came out in the literature after his book Good Natured came out that would explain it.

When I came to the Peter Singer essay, I wondered why I hadn't thought of the simple refutation of VT that he gives. Singer says that VT has two parts: positing that nonhuman animals follow only selfish instincts that will help them survive, while humans have overlaid a veneer of moraility over this selfish core, a veneer that mainly masks the still-selfish motive of our actions. That other animals have social emotions, including the makings of empathy and altruism--a fact that at this point can hardly be denied--invalidates a premise of VT.


	Quote: I don't think there is a contradiction either. I do think we need to explore our moral tendencies more thoroughly though. What I mean by that is that we say things like "humans are compassionate...", "humans are aggressive." What we should say is something more like "when in relationship with close kin humans tend to express compassion toward..." or "when in relationship with unrelated, unknown persons humans tend to express a limited form of compassion. These limitations are often marked by the short duration of effort, the ease with which the distress is forgotten..."

I also like Singer's claim that de Waal distorts what Huxley might have meant. Humans have developed the ability to act as gardeners of their own intentions and thoughts, sometimes using notions of morality to root out the strong impulse to satisfy desires. Nice point about specifying in which situations we tend to be most successful in acting morally. This strategy will let us avoid having to try to answer the question, "Are we basically good or irredeemably selfish."

Grim · Tue Jun 23, 2009 2:01 am


	MaryLupin wrote: For example, most of these theorists probably assumed that there was a discoverable, discrete essential nature. A religious person might call this a soul. Another might call it a self. But there is an assumption that there is an "it" to discover - something unitary, present and essential. If this is not the case, and these earlier theorists are assuming its presence, does that not change the terms of the argument radically?

But isn't de Waal then simply suggesting what amounts to a counter idealism to these things? The innocent ape (trained yet still "wild" enough to count) able to take the hand of modern man and create some type of compromising yet non-bestial unity.

To quote Nietzsche On the Genealogy of Morals:

"...so that this hypothesis, and after a fashion that is at least entertaining, the Darwinian beast and the ultramodern unassuming moral milksop who "no longer bites" politely link hands, the latter wearing an expression of a certain good-natured and refined indolence, with which is mingled even a grain of pessimism and weariness, as if all these things - the problems of morality - were really not worth taking quite so seriously. But to me, on the contrary, there seems to be nothing more worth taking seriously..."

Is Nietzsche's one of the philosophers the books title alludes to? Why/why not?

What benefits are there to debating the nature of terms as potentially essential mental faculties in other species when we can be certain that these abstract properties do exist in humans - even human childern?

:book:

Dissident Heart · Tue Jun 23, 2009 11:54 am

Nietzsche's notion of morality rests upon his understanding of the 'will to power'...which is not merely domination and exploitation and the drive to master...but, more importantly, a unfathomable flow of multiple drives and energies: pushing, surging, moving, overtaking, falling beneath, mixing, pulsing, exploding, expanding, turning in upon itself and flowing outward...this will to power is an exhuberant force of tidal ebbs and flows where each existing "this" or "that" is actually an intermittant combination of drives and forces, transforming from one compostion and on its way to something else.

At the human level, there is a linguistic maneuver which labels these combinations of drives into categories and ideas: what is essentially a poetic effort becomes a dogmatic assertion: "these combinations of drives here, they are x and always x....those combinations of drives there are y and always y"...all the while all and every combination of drives is shifting, surging, changing and transforming, becoming something new. It is morality that says: "There will be no change in this case, becoming will solidify and harden into being: thou shalt and it must."

Grim · Tue Jun 23, 2009 12:20 pm

Will to power was not the point. Succient summary though, if a bit obscure.

:book:

Grim · Tue Jun 23, 2009 3:40 pm


	DWill wrote: I suppose that his claim that emotion is more important than rationality, could be considered a refutaion to some moral theorists. The title of the book still might be misleading, or at least ambiguous. Publishers like to be provocative to spur sales. But I think it's reasonable to say that we can learn something about our ethics by studying primates, if not learn FROM the ethics of primates.

True. This is definatly an impetus for thought. I get a little fustrated however in that the scope and topic are narrow and yet de Waal seems to feel that any small allowance granting relationship between man and ape equates to licence for serious moral commentary. I'm having trouble figuring out why his work and the work of primatologists is all that important in the sense of human moral understanding. Of course it could be said that one knows least about himself, but, we have spent decades studying other humans, we do know a lot about ourselves. To say that looking to another species for understanding is efficient seems counterintuitive. I feel that the somewhat off-handed dismissal of the importance of anthropomorphic language and perspective is a serious mistake. As if it is ok because we both have opposable thumbs. But really don't the similarities seem to stop there? We are not really all that similar to apes: we don't live like them, we don't really look like them, we don't interact like them in any other manner than very generally. How much difference is enough to matter because it seems that similarities are all too easy to create - they are seemingly wherever you want to find them really.

In terms of emotion and rationality of morality. It would seem to depend on what type of morality you are discussing. In a normative sense emotion would not be as important, in a practical sense very. But moral relativism is, by de Waal's own decision, off-topic here and, I would definatly argue that this emotional-practical/rational-normative distinction does create a relativism.

:book:

DWill · Tue Jun 23, 2009 4:18 pm


	Interbane wrote: Empathy is what drives our quest for morals, it is the impetus as I've said. What I meant when I said that reasoning is the spark, is that empathy cannot consider things such as the nuances of tipping your waitress. Not only can it not consider it, but it is not a consideration at all unless some things are first understood. Once it is understood (either through teaching or deliberation) that tipping is a moral act, then our empathy is what drives us to obey that moral. I chose 'tipping the waitress' as the example, but there are surely better examples if you have problems with it. This is similar to the chicken and the egg. However, the way I think of it is that empathy doesn't come before reasoning when considering what is good for society. You could ask, "what would motivate us to answer such a question in the first place?", but I again think the answer is reasoning. It must be understood that what is good for others is in turn good for us. The problem with my reasoning here is that empathy is actually the catalyst when the 'others' are part of your 'in-group', such as family members and close friends. Reasoning is relegated to a catalyst only for 'out-group' considerations, yet that is the majority of the discussion here I think. All this says nothing about the importance of either factor. Empathy is far more important and is required for morality, where reasoning is only required for larger groups where moral behavior has no survival benefit. Without the survival benefit, there is no reason to act morally regardless of empathy, but that's another discussion entirely. In a nutshell, reasoning 'initiates', and empathy 'drives', but only when considering 'out-groups'.

(Interbane posted this is another thread, but it parallels our discussion of the book, so I've quoted him and will reply here.)
I think the waitress example is a good one because it shows that humans have a greater means of responding empathetically due to our ability to bring in considerations that are not intrinsic to the situation before us. If we know that a waitress gets sub-minimum wage and can't make it without tips (extrinsic knowledge), our tipping can be an occasion for expressing empathy (even though most probably do it out of custom). Our higher cognitive powers mean that we can discover more opportunities for empathy, and they might even be the reason that we can show true empathy in the first place. Adam Smith defined empathy (or maybe it was sympathy) as the ability to"take another's part in fancy." If the great apes can do this as well, as de Waal relates, they probably do so in a rudimentary way, or maybe the ability is relatively rare in chimps, vs. universal in humans.

I still prefer to view empathy as the spark, with conscious reasoning often not being needed. De Waal also discusses the largely automatic nature of empathy, and our tendency to invent rationales for our empathic responses after the fact (e.g., "I just knew I had to do something.")

Is there a difference worth discussing between our actual empathic responses and our articulations of what it is to be moral? It is very clear that no other animal can articulate moral reasoning. But it seems that that could be seen as a cheap trick in some ways. What about walking the talk? I can see how I'm edging toward the idea of a veneer, that is of moral posturing without any actions performed toward others.

I think this posturing may be what we see in talk about doing well by others outside our group. It's not that we're relying more on reason in this situation, in my view, but that we're "not really feeling it." Proximity seems so important to the true display of empathy. I can say I empathize with the plight of the refugees in Darfur, but do I feel empathy in fact? The problem with out groups is that they're not in proximity. If we have any real contacts with "out" people," this alone often brings them "in" and allows us to empathize with them.

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