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New Dawkins book: "The God Delusion"
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- The Pope of Literature
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Re: Blessing the Pudding
Frank 013: I do not have to provide criteria for anything; that is up to the believers to do that; and since even they can't why should I bother?That's a stock response whenever an atheist is confronted by a theist who tries, in the course of "witnessing", to confound the atheist by making him explain how x is possible without a God. But it isn't really applicable here. We're talking about a claim made by Fiske and supported by you. Your positive claim (that atheism is more reasonable), therefore the burden falls on you.And honestly, I'm not sure who made up these rules for "burden of proof". They make sense in a courtroom environment, where due process depends upon an explicit set of obligation, but they aren't, so far as I know, intrinsically valid in all contexts.me: I'm not so sure that humans make their beliefs entirely based on what they observe. How, then, do you explain our belief in justice, or love, or reason?Frank: Have you never observed these things, or were you born with these concepts inherently.I'd say neither. Just taking justice as one example, it isn't a physical object, so I can't say that I've ever observed it. Nor is it 100% consistent as a kind of behavior -- on the one hand, because behavior which is just in one instance may not be just in another, with no clear way of determining what causes the change, and on the other, because what we mean by justice seems subject to personal interpretation. It seems to me that our knowledge of justice is socially ingrained, and that we believe in it with neither evidence nor criticism; and further, than, in just that sense, it's the sort of thing that would come under fire in a place like BookTalk if it were explicitly tied to religion. Which brings me back to a different form of the original question: do we abandon notions like justice, or do we modify our assumptions about the relationship between observation and belief?No decision is arbitrary when your life is on the line; so this example is not suitable.Are situations that threaten the decision-maker's mortality the only exception to the rule? And how do we determine what the exceptions are?FiskeMiles: First, I want to apologize for impugning your motives with regard to denying my original assertion that atheism is the only logical position.No prob. Sometimes we slip up. I do it, too.This obviously excludes you from the atheist camp, and since you have also made several assertions critical of agnostic positions, that leaves one available option.You could have just asked. Yeah, I'm a theist. But that in itself ought to imply very little to you.For example, I located a copy of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at a local Half Price store and have added it to my growing philosophy library.Let me know what you think. In fact, if you want to start a thread in the "additional non-fiction" forum (whatever it's called now), I'd love to discuss the book.I would not categorize as an atheist someone who thinks God (or the supernatural) exists but isn't certain. I would say instead that he or she is a weak or agnostic theist.Well, just from the viewpoint of a theist who takes inquiry very seriously -- and who, if he were an atheist, would eschew the weak/strong dichotomy -- I'd prefer to avoid applying the same dichotomy to theism. What I'd say in the case of a person who affirms the existence of a God or gods, but isn't certain, is that they're an epistemicly modest theist. Which is a pretty fair description of yours truly.I find it antagonistic and unfortunate, though it pales when compared with Christian fundamentalist rhetoric.Very true. It's hard to beat "you're going to suffer for eternity" for antagonistic value. What concerns me isn't so much Dawkins language itself, as the part it appears to be playing in a trend. I think we're going to be seeing more and more overt anti-theistic hostility in the near future. It doesn't seem at all implausible to me that it could even take a turn towards the sort of implicitly (or even explicitly) violent rhetoric that you see in more radical, chauvinist groups. That's no criticism of atheism as a rational position, but if you look at radicalism in other groups, it's clear that the radical element often finds a way of taking precedent over the rational position. It wouldn't surprise me if, to their own horror, authors like Dawkins, Harris and Dennett were to one day find themselves playing a role akin to that of Nietzsche -- the well-intentioned radical whose fearless writings were all too conformable to the agendas of fanatics.I think we might start by agreeing on what constitutes a reasonable world view.Maybe, but I think a very large part of our disagreement starts with problems inherent in the term "reasonable."The first thing I would suggest, I suppose this would constitute a premise (no training in formal logic, I'm afraid), is that any reasonable world view must be consistent with the available, verifiable evidence.I'm afraid that puts us back into a position where it's necessary to examine what we mean by evidence. If there were evidence of the supernatural, would we expect it to be available or verifiable, particularly given that all our means for verifying evidence are naturalistic?I don't think this rules out the possibility of a reasonable theistic world view, but it obviously casts certain theistic positions (Young Earth Creationists, for example) into the unreasonable category.I'd say so. The YECs could throw out some complications, I'm sure, but at least in as much as we take "reasonable" to mean "what most people would likely conclude if they considered all of the available arguments", then yeah, we'd probably be safe in calling the YEC position unreasonable.The catch, from my point of view, is how do we categorize the YEC position. Because: it does not seem to have any direct, necessary connection to the religious beliefs of those who profess it. Eugenie Scott, in the chat last week, said she thinks that Biblical literalists maintain Creationist points of view in part because they see it as necessary to their faith to maintain the absolute infallibility of the text. But the YEC position is Biblical only by inference -- even from a literalist point of view, it isn't necessary to settle on the Young Earth position. It looks to me as though the YECs aren't defending Christian literalism by their insistence on the youth of the earth, but rather something else. Even if you talked them out of the position that the earth is less than 10,000 years old, they'd have no particular reason to abandon theism.None of which I say to defend theism from guilt by association. Religious belief obviously plays a part in YEC, but I think the relationship between a person's religious beliefs, their political and social convictions, and their involvement with something like YEC is far more complicated than most people assume. P3: A reasonable world view must not require actions in response to or decisions based on truth claims that cannot be objectively verified.I think this one is problematic not only for theism, but for any world view. If we stick to this premise, no world view can be considered reasonable. The reason is, I suspect that there is no way to objectively verify the truth of any given claim -- the best we can manage is consensus, but even that is simply the aggregate of subjective affirmation, neither objective nor, in the strict sense, verification.Considering that I am a part of the natural world, my interaction with it can be accurately and objectively described and examined in countless ways.That's doubtful. Though I disagree with them in the main, I tend to agree with the pragmatists that one's relationship to the natural world is always the result of a subjective description, and that subjective descriptions can be equally accurate (which is to say, that accuracy is only a matter of comparison between presented descriptions) while simultaneously contradicting one another. Follow that line back far enough, and you might strike upon the ambiguity at the heart of a notion like "the natural world".What I should have said is that no theistic world view can be rational.Tack on the modifier "completely" before the word "rational", and I find no explicit fault in that statement. I'd also hasten to add that the same goes for all world views -- theistic, atheistic, and otherwise.P1: A rational assertion must be demonstrably true.I'm afraid you're going to have to start here, by breaking this statement down into its own argument. I don't see any reason why a rational assertion should have to be demonstrably true. In fact, I'd say that, if we held to this premise, it would preclude almost all assertions. But the logical conclusion is beside the point; it's the premise that's in question here.Philosophically speaking, a rational claim must only be demonstrably logical -- that is, consistent according to the grammar laid out by the discipline of logic. Thus, it's rational to say, if A then B; A; therefore B. The rationality of such a statement is in no way damaged if it turns out that ~A. So your P1 requires either some substantiation (ie. a retrograde argument explaining why we should take P1 as given), some clarification (if I've misunderstood what you meant), or some modification (eg. "must be demonstrably true" in order for what? Not in order for it to be rational, so presumably for some other reason.)If it turns out that P1, because that's simply how it is -- in other words, P1, because P1, then it looks as though your criteria for rationality is, itself, a-rational. Which would seem to be a tremendous step backwards.A more accurate definition of naturalism, or, if you like, a rational definition of naturalism, is founded on the idea that the natural world is a closed system -- nothing external to it interacts with it.Well, I didn't bring up the argument that naturalism is, itself, not rational, but I will point out that the "closed system" definition of naturalism doesn't protect it from that charge. You still haven't offered a rational argument for why the natural world should be regarded as a closed system, nor that it is actually thus, so there's no particular reason to suppose that definition is grounded in reason. Rather, the way you've presented it is axiomatic -- that is, a-rational.Frank 013: It is still more logical to conclude no belief than to conclude belief in the light of no confirmable evidence.Not if nothing could conceivable serve as evidence; in that case, neither belief would be more reasonable, because no rational argument could arrive at one conclusion or the other. But then, maybe you'll be more open to Fiske's confirmation on that point.FiskeMiles: The point Mad argues, I think correctly, is that verifiable or empirical evidence cannot be applied to anything that is not part of the natural world because verifiable evidence must be tied to our sense perceptions in an objective way.According to the standards of methodological naturalism: yes. I'm glad we see eye to eye on that point, at least.After all, any assertions they make concerning the supernatural are automatically illogical. Therefore, any actions or decisions they base on theistic assertions are automatically illogical as well.Both of those points stand if, and only if, you can demonstrate that theistic belief is illogical. But that hinges on your first premise, which is, as I've pointed out, unsupported and potentially fallacious.And, more to the point, demonstrates that the existence or non-existence of the supernatural world is rationally irrelevant.How exactly does it do that?
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Re: Blessing the Pudding
FiskeQuote:The only logical position is to make no assertion regarding the supernatural.That is pretty much what atheism is. MadQuote:We're talking about a claim made by Fiske and supported by you. Your positive claim (that atheism is more reasonable), therefore the burden falls on you.Atheism is non belief in gods there is no positive claim here whatsoever, it is simply the dismissal of someone else's claim.Later
Re: Blessing the Pudding
Frank:Quote:Atheism is non belief in gods there is no positive claim here whatsoever, it is simply the dismissal of someone else's claim.But when you say "dismissal" are you saying that the theist's assertion of the existence of a supernatural world is incorrect (ie. that the supernatural world does not exist) or are you saying that you assert no position with regard to the existence or non-existence of the supernatural world?Fiske
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Re: Blessing the Pudding
Fiske: The only logical position is to make no assertion regarding the supernatural.Frank: That is pretty much what atheism is.I don't see it as the sort of thing that you can definitively parse down that much. When some people call themselves atheists, they mean that they believe there is no god or gods. Some people use the same term (often in reference to a person who hasn't self-applied it) to mean lack of belief one way or the other.And ultimately, I think the distinction is being invoked here mostly as a rhetorical dodge. Fiske may have completely suspended judgment as to whether or not there is a deity, but if so, he's just about the only person posting to BookTalk who has. I've seen quite a few regulars around here declare pure and simple, "There is no god," and for them, that's where the conversation ends. You yourself have said that it's more rational to assume, given the lack of evidence, that there is no God. So your defense of "suspended belief" atheism may be noble, but it isn't broadly applicable around BookTalk.Atheism is non belief in gods there is no positive claim here whatsoever, it is simply the dismissal of someone else's claim.I'm not talking about atheism. I've made it very explicit that I'm talking about the specific claim that atheism is more rational than any other world view. Which is a positive claim. To insist otherwise is to stretch the meaning of the term beyond any use.Dismissing theism out of hand is a right I'd never begrudge you. No line of argument is implied there, and your reasons, such as they are, are your business until you feel compelled to say otherwise. But when you dismiss theism because it's "less rational" than atheism, you imply in that assertion a logical argument. We could sum it up this way:P1: People should take only the most rational position;P2: Atheism is more rational than theism;C: Ergo, people should take the atheist position.All I've asked all along is that you defend P2. And I wouldn't have involved you at all had you not leapt to its defense. You've asserted it and reasserted it at least a half dozen times now, so to turn around and say that you're making no positive claim is a dodge, pure and simple.
Re: Blessing the Pudding
Dear Mad:I can't do justice to your reply in the time I currently have available, but here are a few things.First, I think we agree on far more than we disagree on as a result of sharing what I would say is an agnostic attitude about the supernatural -- I think your term is epistemically modest. Here is an interesting resource on agnosticism that provides a lot of solid information and food for thought:atheism.about.com/od/abou...ticism.htmI've also been reading articles on the naturalism.org website, which I think is an outstanding resource. Here is a link to an article titled "Relativism and the Limits of Rationality" which bears directly on what we have been discussing. Tom Clark, the author, discusses what he describes as "pre-rational" assumptions that underlie any world view and cannot be rationally justified. I think this is very close to what you mean by a-rational assumptions.www.naturalism.org/relativi.htmOne of Clark's conclusions is that relativism is an unavoidable consequence of naturalism. He suggests that arguments concerning the "rationality" of other world views derive from a desire for absolute truths and are based on an unreasonable assertion of the superiority of one's own pre-rational assumptions.Clark closes by arguing for tolerance, observing that when faced with fundamentalist extremism, moderates (no matter what their world view) must recognize each other as allies. He also points out the fundamental insecurity that tolerance entails.Interesting stuff.Fiske
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Re: Blessing the Pudding
I've downloaded the 2nd article and plan to read it later on tonight. Based on your paraphrase, it sounds very similar to my own viewpoint on the subject. Thanks for the link.
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Re: Blessing the Pudding
Frank 013: I am saying that theists can't really know, so their assertion is not logical or really worth considering until some evidence can be collected.I think most Theists will agree that there is a great deal they don't know about God...as well as just about everything else. Well, except for this tiny corner of existence we call Earth...(I am reminded of that fabulous Cosmic Calendar that Carl Sagan used to capture the history of everything (15 Billion years of everything!) in Cosmos...everything begins on Jan. 1 and our Solar System doesn't show up until September, the Dionsaurs on Dec. 26th, and Humans appear at 11 P.M. on December 31, and all recorded history occupies the last ten seconds of the year.)There's a whole lot that none of us know: it seems eminently reasonable to 'fess up to the amount of imagination, hope and faith we all bring to everything...it seems logical, that in the face of so much that is unknown, we will utilize our capacities to imagine and hope when making our way through everything.What seems irrational and illogical, but understandable nonetheless, are those who claim their description of everything is wholly reasonable and completely logical.
Re: Blessing the Pudding
Dear Mad:Quote:I hope you're withdrawing it because you see the logic behind my arguments (or at least the arguments you've linked to), and not simply because I'm being a pain in the ass about it.Have you been more of a pain in the ass than I have been? I think the argument that any world view is premised on an a-rational belief or beliefs is correct and that the reasonableness or rationality of a particular world view is therefore subjective in some respects. But this doesn't mean that any assertion one cares to make about the natural world, for example, can be reasonably (or rationally) justified by an appeal to an a-rational premise.Take Young Earth Creationists, for example. I personally know some, including one who is a triple board certified neuropathologist and the head of pathology at a major public hospital. A YEC might argue that their world view is primarily based on faith in the existence of God. Nothing is prior to this in their belief and they don't require any proof that God exists. Fine, I have no argument against that, and, personally, it's a position I respect even if I don't believe the same thing.Next a YEC might argue they believe the Bible is the revealed word of God and absolutely true. I think this carries them into somewhat murky water as a result of problems with interpretation. Literal interpretations of the Bible tend to be simplistic and not internally consistent. But, I still don't have a problem with this assertion per se because it is not making an empirical claim.When, however, a YEC asserts that the Earth is only 6,000 (or 10,000) years old, or makes any claim that is contradicted by empirical evidence, I believe the claim is irrational because it contradicts knowledge that is not, itself, subjective. Empirical claims must be based on empirical evidence to carry any logical force.My own world view is based on the belief that the universe is governed by principles which can be understood through empirical observation and testing. Such knowledge is not necessarily absolute, because it is limited by our sense perceptions, but I believe it comes closer than anything else available to us. My beliefs can be fairly accurately described as metaphysical naturalism.My objection to the YEC claim regarding the age of the Earth does not result from my a-rational belief in the primacy of empirical knowledge, however. It results from the fact that the claim violates the logic on which empirical knowledge itself is based.I withdrew my assertion that atheism is more rational than theism because I recognized the assertion DOES result from my a-rational belief in the primacy of empirical knowledge. I think this is reasonably clear without further explanation.Quote:I'm not looking to make you a theist, so I don't find this particularly bothersome.Same back at ya'.Quote: The same argument as before applies. The category of natural processes or causes changes according to what we observe. Therefore, even if some supernatural agent were to act in the natural world, we would likely parse it as a natural event, simply expanding our categories of what constituted a natural process or cause.If there is a misunderstanding between us, I think this is where it lies. Given my a-rational premise regarding the primacy of empirical knowledge, my position on this is perfectly consistent and logical. As long as an event can be parsed as natural, I literally do not care if it is ultimately caused by a supernatural agent. I say this because no empirical evidence could demonstrate the supernatural agency, and I believe that other sources of knowledge are less reliable. In other words, I simply will not take the existence of the supernatural world on faith.This is not a dogmatic or strong position. I would describe my belief system as both atheist and agnostic. The reason for this is that I do not insist that the supernatural cannot exist and I have established what it would take for me to change my mind. You say we would "likely" parse supernatural action as natural but you can't prove we would necessarily parse it as natural. Why? Because the action would not necessarily be consistent with any patterned or regular process subject to empirical observation. The Cecil B. Demille version of the parting of the Red Sea is an example. I accept that a supernatural agent would not necessarily have to interact in the natural world in this way. Moses, might, for example, have been familiar with tidal systems in an area (through which he previously fled from Egypt, say) and might have used this knowledge to elude the Egyptian army. A supernatural agent might have arranged for this circumstance. That's what faith is all about, right? But I don't have any faith, so I don't believe it.Quote:What I'm getting at is that methodological naturalism is so elastic a methodology that, when applied to the question of whether there is anything other than the natural world, it will always answer in the negative.Perhaps, but methodological naturalism is only valid so long as it works. And, so far, it has been working darn well. Methodological naturalism would not work to explain the CBD version of the Red Sea parting, or a Steven Spielberg poltergeist, etc. In such a case, I would willing give up metaphysical naturalism.I realize that my explanation of what it would take to for me to accept the existence of the supernatural isn't convincing to you, but I have offered one nevertheless. Here's my question: what would it take for you to accept the non-existence of the supernatural?Fiske
Re: Blessing the Pudding
Dear Mad:I think an additional comment about your assertions regarding methodological naturalism is called for.I define a supernatural event as an event that cannot be explained through natural processes. Furthermore, it seems to me this is how most people understand it.You say this definition is unreasonable because any event we perceive can be explained through natural processes. I certainly agree with the latter half of your assertion -- that any event we perceive can be explained by natural processes. That's why I'm an atheist.It seems to me you find this unreasonable because of your own a-rational premise that the supernatural world exists. That being the case, the fact that all events we perceive can be explained by natural processes simply must mean we are not correctly perceiving supernatural events. Or are not capable of perceiving them. Whatever. A particular problem for theists with the common definition of the supernatural is that it rules out personal feelings about the existence of the supernatural as proof because they can be accounted for by natural processes.Actually, my last statement is not true of all theists, but only of theists who are looking for proof regarding the supernatural. In other words, theists who are not willing to take the existence of the supernatural on faith. From my own personal experience, I have a pretty good idea where that orientation can lead... Here's a second question: how would you define a supernatural event?Fiske Edited by: FiskeMiles at: 12/19/06 11:21 am
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Re: Everything (All of It)
me: That call for evidence is going to raise problems every time. We can't expect their to be evidence -- by definition -- so the call for evidence is, itself, irrational.Frank: Why?Sigh. That's a point I've tried to explain in every third post of the second half of this thread. And I've tried to get you to suss it out on you own by considering what sort of evidence you would really consider plausible. But it strikes me that you're more likely to consider the opinion when it comes from the pen of someone who is, apparantly, an atheist, so maybe you're better off checking out the link Fiske provided to the article on relativism.In the meantime, to paraphrase my original argument, we wouldn't expect there to be any evidence that is unambiguously relavent to the existence of the supernatural because our criteria for evidence insists that all evidence be naturalistic. Unless you can think of some reason why naturalistic phenomenon would indicate the existence of the supernatural, or you can think of a criteria that would allow us to consider non-naturalistic evidence, then it remain illogical to expect there to be any unambiguous evidence for the supernatural because our definition of evidence precludes it.How would you determine the validity of outrageous or unconformable claims?Subjectively.me: The non-theist is acquainted with the theistic debate, has given actual thought to the question, and has decided to form no belief one way or the other. Why is that more reasonable?Frank: Because it leaves the door open to any future evidence (which may or may not become available), and modification of their position, firm belief right or wrong generally does not allow for change, pride often gets in the way.Not if the atheist is consistent. As I've pointed out above, it may appear that the atheist is leaving the door open for future evidence, but so long as they insist on a naturalistic criteria for evidence, they are, rationally speaking, doing no such thing. So if the atheist's decision to suspend judgment is predicated on the possibility of future evidence, that predication is illogical. Again: why is that more reasonable?me: It's quite a-logical, in fact, or pre-logical if you prefer -- and nearly answer that you give to above question is likely to involve induction, even if not explicitly.FranK: Well if I read you correctly you would argue that every concept including the knowledge of our own existence involves induction, I do not hold to that concept, because it dissolves everything into a-logical assumptions and that is an inane starting point, nothing meaningful can be uncovered in such a debate.Fine; but ask yourself: is your disagreement premised on a logical consideration of the argument, or is it reflective of a desire to maintain some kind of epistemic absolute? It looks to me as though what you want is some practical basis for justifying your own position, and you're willing to reject out of hand logical arguments without logical refutation. If so, I don't see how your position is much more than a secular paraphrase of Karamazov's thesis: if there is no Ultimate Reason, then all beliefs are premitted. (Incidentally, you might want to start reading pragmattist philosophy; seems right up your alley.)If you want to say that on a philosophical level atheism and theism are on equal grounds I might agree. But when these concepts are grounded in the real world atheism has the clear advantage.Again, if you want to convince me, demonstrate it. If it's so clear that atheism has the practical advantage in some "real world" distinct from philosophy, point to those advantages and show me.So you state that if we discovered a means to detect ghosts, (for example) than ghosts would automatically become natural phenomena?We would start thinking of ghosts as a natural phenomenon, yes. It's arbitrary to think of them as "becoming" a natural phenomenon, because the natural/supernatural dichotomy is itself an artificial construct.