I think an important element of Fromkin's historical narrative involves the role of hubris and fantasy in how Europeans pursued the shaping of nations in the Middle East. Fromkin, in the Introduction, allows us to ponder how we might have done it differently had we the opportunity. What he doesn't explore, at least not yet, is the delusion that fills some men's minds that they have the wisdom and power to create nations at all.

It looks like he is making a powerful case for the ridiculousness of nation-building...the idea that a few men have the ability to shape whole populations and societies into artificial boundaries and forced borders, without the participation of the vast majority of people: their wishes, desires, expectations, experiences, etc. simply left out of the equation.

Furthermore, understanding the deeply racist, elitist, imperialist nature of the "Great Game" paradigm mobilizing these key players...the vast majority are dismissed with disdain and disgust, as though they were children, sub-human, even animals.

Therefore, I'm interested in exploring the elements of hubris and delusion in the minds of these men as they plotted the destiny of millions...and then extrapolate how this same sort of activity shaped the making of borders across the Atlantic in North and South America. And, perhaps, how this insanity is still alive and well today.

Edited by: Dissident Heart at: 6/30/06 12:20 pm

I don't think in this book that Fromkin is going to make a blanket case for the "ridiculousness of nationbuilding", but the book should provide plenty of material for anyone who wishes to make that case.

I don't want to get ahead of other readers, but in Part Two Fromkin spends a considerable amount of time looking at the influencial views put forward by Kitchener in London and his support staff still in Egypt. What Fromkin emphasizes is the lack of a broad understanding by these supposed experts of the Mideast region. Their lack of understanding was understandable given the lack of understanding of the Islamic world by the European community at the time. Unfortunately they then began a campaign in pursuit of a major expansion of the British Empire based on this lack of understanding. To Fromkin (although i'm a bit skeptical of this argument) this then goes a long way toward explaining the mess that the Mideast was in at the time of the writing of this book.

J Seabolt: What Fromkin emphasizes is the lack of a broad understanding by these supposed experts of the Mideast region. Their lack of understanding was understandable given the lack of understanding of the Islamic world by the European community at the time.

I think there are different ways to make sense of the term understanding in the sense you've applied it. I think Fromkin is providing ample evidence that even if European understanding was substantially increased, harm and mayhem was unavoidable. The crucial reason was because the goal of understanding was not simply disinterested knowledge, objective scholarship, or increased wisdom about the region. Instead, the goal of understanding was intelligence gathering to better conquer and contain a hostile enemy. Edward Said describes it like this:

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...there is a difference between knowledge of other peoples and other times that is the result of understanding, compassion, careful study and analysis for their own sakes, and on the other hand knowledge that is part of an overall campaign of self-affirmation. There is, after all, a profound difference between the will to understand for purposes of co-existence and enlargement of horizons, and the will to dominate for the purposes of control.

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So, even if Kichener and Crew had better intelligence, more seasoned and spansive understanding of the Middle East and Orient, their objective was predatory at root. It was this malicious intent that explains the lion's share of the mess you refer to.

No doubt, there was plenty of malice on all sides; and it looks like Fromkin will take care to identify the culprits both East and West of Suez. But, this book is primarily about those European players who had seats at the table making decisions. And these decisions were geared for plunder (and protection against rival plunderers)- no matter the accuracy of understanding.

JSeabolt: Unfortunately they then began a campaign in pursuit of a major expansion of the British Empire based on this lack of understanding.

Are you saying that with better intelligence the British Empire would have produced a more fortunate set of outcomes in their Middle Eastern expansion? I think this is part of my challenge for Fromkin: even with the best of information, bureaucratic efficiency and noble intentions...Nation building by a few for the many is doomed from the beginning. I have the sneaky suspicion that Fromkin thinks the Europeans could have done a better job if they had just had more humanitarian impulse and better communication skills.

Welcome aboard by the way!

I think an important element of Fromkin's historical narrative involves the role of hubris and fantasy in how Europeans pursued the shaping of nations in the Middle East.

What's the alternative? England, France, and their allies had to decide what to do now that the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire, and others had collapsed. While the victorious nations could have backed off an let events unfold, you'd expect them to attempt to establish a framework that supports their interests.

I'm not defending imperialism or the decisions made by England and France. Though you could characterize the drawing of national borders as arrogant, a more passive response would be historically unprecedented.

Dissident Heart:

Thanks for the link to Said. I've read Orientalism, and I noticed that Fromkin lists it in his bibliography.

What Fromkin is describing in this book is the process of empire expansion, so from that standpoint it is unsurprising that later problems with nation building occurred. I think this fits with your comments, but is a different way of looking at it. I'm now about 230 pages into this thing, so I don't know where Fromkin is going with his argument, but judging from his comments in the Introduction I think he is going to make some sort of case that things could have been handled differently in a way that would have improved the situation in the Mideast later in the century.

To be a bit more specific about Fromkin's argument, he has made the case that Kitchener's Cairo Crew misunderstood the nature of the Caliphate, believing that it was strictly a religious office that could be split from worldly affairs. Fromkin also mentions that the Cairo Crew badly misunderstood the nature of the Arab's attachment to the Ottoman empire and believed that this attachment could be easily transfered to the British. According to Fromkin the Arabs accepted Ottoman rule because they were Moslems, but objected mightily to suggestions that Christian British would govern them. Now I don't know where Fromkin is going with this, or whether these specific points will have any impact by the time 1922 rolls around, but that is the kinds of things that he is saying so far.

Dissident Heart: Are you saying that with better intelligence the British Empire would have produced a more fortunate set of outcomes in their Middle Eastern expansion?

Don't know. Should know more in about 350 pages.

One thing that strikes me about this whole topic and the way Fromkin approaches it is that it is based on a counterfactual or a What If. What if we rewind history back to 1922 then change the initial conditions then replay it? Will it be better or worse or about the same? Just an observation.

Oh, and thanks for the welcome.

JtA: What's the alternative?

Alternatives abound then as they do now. For one, we must challenge the assumption that the Europeans had any right to interfer, intrude, invade and demand any course of action in the region. This should be even further qualified: those few European men, not all Europeans- considering the vast overwhelming majority had simply no voice in any of this process. Obviously, the peoples of Europe had every reason to be concerned with the consequences of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. One alternative was greater participation of those millions involved- on all sides. And this could have taken many courses. Part of the delusion I refer to in my opening post is the notion that only a few elite men are capable to decide for all others.

JtA: While the victorious nations could have backed off an let events unfold, you'd expect them to attempt to establish a framework that supports their interests.

When you say "their interests", you are speaking about the interests of a tiny percentage of the population of Europe; and I would expect them to act in ways that solidified and expanded those interests. The mass of Europeans were not "victorious", in the least. They shared very little in any spoils that arose in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

These masses of people, who gained very little in the Great Game or the fetish of Flags, Princes, Parliaments or Emperors...these masses could have organized across national borders and formed a solidarity of working class men and women who had for too long been kept silent in the war games of their lords, mullahs and masters.

So, I think it important to remember the great revolutionary swelling that was then underway in Europe and America...a Socialist vision of international worker solidarity: an alternative I have yet to see Fromkin address.

Fromkin indicates early in the book that by the end of the history, the plans that were originally made by Britain had both the populace and the major players uncomfortable and unwilling to follow through with the plans. So if it was National Delusion, it seems that by the end of this history, the Delusion is seen for what it is at the point of no return. Europe was often times successful at drawing lines on maps else where during the colonization of the world, but I suspect few of those original colonial lines are still the same today as when they were drawn any where in the world.

JSeabolt: I think he is going to make some sort of case that things could have been handled differently in a way that would have improved the situation in the Mideast later in the century.

I agree, but I think he is making the case for something far more radical than he intended....more reading will make that clearer. I see him providing ample evidence for the impossibility of nation building by outside interests. The more radical case I see him building (whether he intends to or not) is the impossibility of nation building, period. In any case, I think his narrative describes the dangers in submitting to the whim and wisdom of our betters in such cases.

I've really enjoyed his chapter The Middle East Before The War and how the Ottoman Empire structured itself. Even under one Sultan, seen in the long line of Caliphates and Muslim leadership, there was a great deal of independence among communities, clans, regions and ethnic groups. Another element in this complexity would involve the number of persons speaking Turkish, Slavic, Kurdish, Armenian, Greek, and Arabic (which Fromkin omits from his list)...as well as the varieties of religions including Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Armenian, Gregorian, Jewish, Protestant, Maronite, Samaritan, Nestorian, Christian, Syrian United Orthodox, and Monophysite...as well as the more commonly understood contemporary distinctions between Shiite and Sunni Islam.

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Dissident Heart: Are you saying that with better intelligence the British Empire would have produced a more fortunate set of outcomes in their Middle Eastern expansion?
JSeabolt: Don't know. Should know more in about 350 pages.

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It seems I was searching for more of a response in principle, i.e., no matter the quality of intelligence gathered, Imperial expansionism in principle is not a justifiable means to an end.

I'll get back to this topic later on, but for the moment I wanted to look at this one comment and the implications that arise therefrom:

Dissident Heart: For one, we must challenge the assumption that the Europeans had any right to interfer, intrude, invade and demand any course of action in the region. This should be even further qualified: those few European men, not all Europeans- considering the vast overwhelming majority had simply no voice in any of this process.

Do you think that the ovewhelming majority of Europeans would have voted for non-intervention, knowing the possibility that Russia might choose to absorb the Middle East and use it to hold power over the rest of Europe. I don't think this is the tyrrany of a few policy makers over the rest of the Continent. Knowing that a vacuum of power could easily be filled by one's enemy is enough to settle the matter for most men, and I see no reason to suppose that your average European wouldn't have made essentially the same decisions as Churchill et al. Nor do I think it would necessarily have been good for them to have chosen to leave the Middle East alone.

Just to give a (vaguely) related example, imagine that Khazakistan were to decentralize and lose civic control. Several nations might jockey to intervene and take control of the country. We could declare our intention to preserve Khazakistan as its own sovreign nation, but knowing that, as a former production center for the USSR, Khazakistan has one of the largest per capita storehouses of nuclear weapons, we might do better to be a little more involved in determining who can and cannot wield influence there.

Dissident Heart:
I see him providing ample evidence for the impossibility of nation building by outside interests.

Considering that the British empire held onto India, among other places, for centuries, I doubt that Fromkin would make that case.

One major development of the 20th century was the decline of imperialism. In the modern world, nation building is extremely difficult, if not impossible, as the US is experiencing in Iraq today. That broader trend first became apparent in the events the book discusses.

Fromkin spends the book describing what actually happened, instead of pondering various "what if" scenarios. Still, you can't help wondering what might have transpired had the decision makers been better informed and more competent.

MA: Do you think that the ovewhelming majority of Europeans would have voted for non-intervention, knowing the possibility that Russia might choose to absorb the Middle East and use it to hold power over the rest of Europe.

We'll never know what the majority of Europeans wanted, if we limit ourselves to Fromkin's text. We will find that those decision makers weren't concerned about the views of the vast majority either. I've not argued for non-intervention. I've argued against these few men deciding as they did, in principle and in deed. There were many ways to address the collapse of the Ottoman Empire that did not require the dictatorship of this tiny minority.

MA: Knowing that a vacuum of power could easily be filled by one's enemy is enough to settle the matter for most men, and I see no reason to suppose that your average European wouldn't have made essentially the same decisions as Churchill et al.

Then I suggest you revisit the terrible class conflicts that ravaged European civilization where the vast majority of the population did not share with Churchill et al. much of anything. Europe experienced violent class disruption, and revolution through a great deal of the 18th and 19th centuries. These conflicts reflected profound disagreement in political, social, economic and foreign policy issues. I see no reason to believe these violently conflicting classes would agree upon how to address the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

MA: Nor do I think it would necessarily have been good for them to have chosen to leave the Middle East alone.

I suppose we could do worse than following the hippocratic oath First, Do No Harm. Since Fromkin has, as I see it, shown that predation and national self-interest motivated these prime agents, harm was a given.

I agree that international geopolitical decision making is difficult stuff, and choices must be made. I think there were many alternatives for engaging the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. I don't agree with the either/or scenario: either Imperial Expansion or Left Alone.

JtA: Considering that the British empire held onto India, among other places, for centuries, I doubt that Fromkin would make that case.

Fromkin, I think, would make the case that much of the same class arrogance, racism, and bureaucratic incompetency plagued the assault on India that was the Britsh Empire. Duration of imperial control and colonial status is no indication of successful state building.

JtA: In the modern world, nation building is extremely difficult, if not impossible, as the US is experiencing in Iraq today.

I agree completely, and I think Fromkin's narrative is a powerful element in making this case.

JtA: Fromkin spends the book describing what actually happened

Actually, it describes how a tiny minority of men made crucial decisions that impacted the lives of millions. How those many millions understood the issues, their ambitions, the alternatives they sought and policies they wanted are left out of the discussion. And I completely disagree with the notion that these highly volatile and conflicting populations would agree upon what courses of action to take.

JtA: instead of pondering various "what if" scenarios.

I think there is enormous value in utilizing history to explore alternatives and challenge decisions. It is an imperfect laboratory, but I think it's useful in helping us think through our contemporary conundrums...as well as highlight the values and goals we pursue in the here and now.

JtA: Still, you can't help wondering what might have transpired had the decision makers been better informed and more competent.

I agree. I would add...had the decision makers been less racist, more egalitarian, and willing to engage the mass of persons in intelligent debate and informed discussion regarding options, alternatives and goals.

Edited by: Dissident Heart at: 7/4/06 12:22 pm

Dissident Heart: Since the majority of Historians have (with noted exceptions in the most recent generations of scholarship) focused upon the statesmen, generals, policy makers, and wealthy magnates...the mainstream of history simply reflects the agendas and policies of the dominant classes.

Wouldn't the dominate classes be, for better or worse, the mainstream of history? Regardless of what the majority of people wanted -- and that's going to be far more difficult to ascertain -- those whose influence is most palpable strike me as the most meaningful definition of the mainstream, from a historical perspective. Whether or not that's just is a wholly distinct question.

I don't think the choices made (per Fromkin's narrative) were viable...even though they were the one's that determined the course of history. I think the only viable alternatives required revolutionary change in Europe and the United States.

Then we probably don't mean viable in the same sense. I mean viable in relation to how well a policy is likely to result in whatever aim motivates it. You seem to me viable in relation to some particular ideal.

I think the question should have been NOT, what do we do about the Ottoman Empire, BUT, what do we do about the Empires of Europe and the United States?

But it's far easier to do something, anything, with an empire in decay. That's precisely what the Ottoman Empire was, whereas the British, American and Russian Empires were at the apex of their strength. How it could be more viable to so something about the European powers than to do something about the Ottoman Empire is beyond me. I don't think it makes any sense at all from a practical point of view, but then, I don't think you're really talking about viability. You're talking about bringing the international political situation into alignment with a particular ideal, which is, as we all know, often the least practical course of action. That doesn't mean it's wrong -- though I think people tend to assume the opposite a bit too easily -- but if we really want to talk about what was within reach at that particular moment in history, there's no doubt in my mind that the more immediately viable course was taken.

What is legitimate to you? Care to take a stab at making a stand on this issue and tell us what you think a legitimate form of governance may be, or should have been...those you find repulsive, ridiculous, and those who want to see enforced or emulated?

My answer would only be applicable to my own situation. And I think you'd probably find that my answer was fairly close to the answer you'd give. I just don't think it's viable given the state of humanity.

It strikes me that there are plenty of people in the world right now who would be happiest in a monarchy, just as there are plenty of people who are perfectly content with a republic. The idea that all people would be happiest in a socialist-anarchist state seems to me to ignore the fact that people all have different emotional and psycholgical needs. That, as far as I'm concerned, is what determines the legitimacy of a form of governance, and I don't consider myself qualified to dictate to other people what would be best for them.

Your retreat to convention is a tiresome form of relativism that saves you from having to make any real choices.

All of my "real choices" are made at several removes from a bulletin board debate, thank you. This is, as far as I'm concerned, a theater of ideas (Giordano Bruno might be proud), and it's far more fun and instructive, to my mind, to use this as a space in which to consider the possibilities rather than dig in my heels and defend my pet philosophy.

Are you arguing that those forces in US politics that argue for more participatory democracy are the ones that yell loudest for war and support of the industrial military establishment?

No. I'm suggesting that nations that do maintain some semblance of participatory democracy are no less prone -- and in our own case, possibly more prone -- to violence of the domestic sort. I might further add that violence arising from foreign policy in such states may serve as a release valve for domestic violence when it grows to severe to contain.

I'm not interested in debating the merits of this principle, in the same way I'm not interested in debating the worth of a Nazi Fuhrer or Russian Czar in creating social cohesion.

So why don't you drop the posture that you're somehow encouraging us all to consider the full range of possibilities and offering open-ended challenges. You're not, and I for one would regard your posts with far less suspicion if I felt that you were being overt about your presuppositions.

JulianTheApostate: While we can find plenty of problems in British and French actions in the Middle East after WW I, it's difficult, even with hindsight, to suggest an explicit alternative that would have produced significantly better results. More accurately, predicting the consequences of other policies is almost impossible.

Thank you!

MA: Wouldn't the dominate classes be, for better or worse, the mainstream of history? Regardless of what the majority of people wanted -- and that's going to be far more difficult to ascertain -- those whose influence is most palpable strike me as the most meaningful definition of the mainstream, from a historical perspective. Whether or not that's just is a wholly distinct question.

I think palpable influence is largely a result of historical perspective. It's a fact that historians have largely focused on a limited portion of the population to tell their stories. If more stories were brought into the stream of narrative, we would have to redefine what we mean by mainstream. Perhaps I'm caught in a hermeneutical circle here...maybe this is one of the severe limitations of historical study.

Perhaps this points to the power of the historian to determine present and future action. If the historian tells us that history has always been shaped by a few movers and shakers, with the vast many shaped and moved along by these elite leaders...then we would be fools (or utopian idealists) to expect anything else. Why pursue policy that requires participatory principles of egalitarian democratic values and practices...history doesn't have any evidence that it's ever existed? History shows much the opposite. Actually, it is the work of historians that create that conclusion...not the flow of actual history. Since historians have overwhelmingly arisen from the elite classes, it seems fitting that they would reproduce the world from which they come, and impart these influences upon future possibilites.

An excellent discussion of this process is in Michael Parenti's book The Assasination of Julius Ceasar: A People's History of Ancient Rome This Pulitzer Prize nominated book (Non-Fiction Book of The Year 2004 for Online Books) carefully exposes the class biases of the leading historians and gentlemen scholars when discussing Ancient History in general, and Julius Ceasar specifically.

There were, and are, more forces at work struggling for influence and offering alternatives to what is (I feel mistakenly) called mainstream history. Historians (perhaps unwittingly, perhaps intentionally) help to reproduce dominant political/social structures when their narratives exclude these alternatives. One of the values of Fromkin's history is the clear ineptitude and dysfunction that can result when leaving crucial decisions in the hands of largely unaccountable, elite bodies of men.

MA: I mean viable in relation to how well a policy is likely to result in whatever aim motivates it. You seem to me viable in relation to some particular ideal.

I still think their policies were not viable in relation to their aims, using your meaning. And I reject their aims as well as the policies they pursued, thus they were not viable in both our senses of the term.

MA: How it could be more viable to so something about the European powers than to do something about the Ottoman Empire is beyond me.

Again, there were hundreds of thousands and millions of European/American men and women who were already not in accord with the status quo Imperial dominance structures. Granted, not all of them had carefully constructed alternative models of the Socialist, Anarchist, Suffragist sort I've referred to...but they were neither accepted in the classes that profited heaviest from the Imperial plunder, nor did they identify with them. They were a powerful force to reckon with and with the right international efforts along lines of working class solidarity...they were a tremendously viable alternative to the launching of War between predatory Empires for the corpse of a dying one.

Now, how to attain that kind of international solidarity along working class lines was a great challenge...and it was fought viciously with all the powers of the Imperial states: using police, propaganda, parliament, etc.

How you consider the lethal Imperial assault of European nations to be viable is hard to understand.

MA: but if we really want to talk about what was within reach at that particular moment in history, there's no doubt in my mind that the more immediately viable course was taken.

Here we simply disagree. If we rely simply on Fromkin's narrative, then we are left with elite Imperial statesmen fumbling, posturing, scrambling, deceving, invading areas of the world they knew little about and cared even less to learn from. What they wanted was not in reach either.

MA: The idea that all people would be happiest in a socialist-anarchist state seems to me to ignore the fact that people all have different emotional and psycholgical needs. That, as far as I'm concerned, is what determines the legitimacy of a form of governance, and I don't consider myself qualified to dictate to other people what would be best for them.

I'm sure you reject some forms of governance no matter the psychological/emotional needs of the adherents. I think you make distinctions between political systems that are abhorrent and appropriate and lend your allegiences and skill to combat the former and support the latter. You may not be the best qualified (who is?) but you make decisions. I am simply (perhaps confusingly) clarifying where my decisions lie...and would like you to clarify where you make where you make yours, as unqualified as they may be.

MA: it's far more fun and instructive, to my mind, to use this as a space in which to consider the possibilities rather than dig in my heels and defend my pet philosophy.

Fair enough. I think there is time to explore possibilities, and there is time to choose. I hope you can respect those of us who have made our choices and refrain from denigrating these choices as "defending pet philosophies".

MA: I'm suggesting that nations that do maintain some semblance of participatory democracy are no less prone -- and in our own case, possibly more prone -- to violence of the domestic sort.

I agree completely. The degree of domestic civil rights (if US history is any indicator) for imperial foreign policy. But that is no reason, I think, to think participatory democratic structures lead to more violence...I think it means the extent of these structures require greater application. I think domestic violence is largely tied to economic class, legacy of racism, patriarchial abuse...which are not examples of participatory democratic structures.

MA: So why don't you drop the posture that you're somehow encouraging us all to consider the full range of possibilities and offering open-ended challenges.

I'm not arguing for the full-range of possibilities, so I've not developed such a posture. I am arguing for a consideration of the internationalist working class, suffragist, etc. solidarity movements...which are (up to my reading so far) completely absent from Fromkin's narrative. As for open ended challenges, I am clear of my ideals and objectives and have posted my biases from the get-go. Why not abandon the disinterested scholar guise for a bit and dig in where it might make a difference?

Dissident Heart: I'm sure you reject some forms of governance no matter the psychological/emotional needs of the adherents.

If a person embraces the witch-hunt as the best form of governance, then I don't pity them too much when they come before the inquisitor.

I hope you can respect those of us who have made our choices and refrain from denigrating these choices as "defending pet philosophies".

When you're out living your philosophy I'm likely to respect it as much as any other. When I'm constantly encountering it in conversations where I've practically begged you to talk about something else, I'm less likely to feel respect for it. I don't have the authority to make you stop, and I wouldn't do so even if I did. But when a band only plays one song, I don't listen for long. You have, over the last year and a half, made it perfectly clear what you believe concerning the legitimacy of government, and now I wish you'd respect my desire to hear a different tune.

Why not abandon the disinterested scholar guise for a bit and dig in where it might make a difference?

I might just. But I don't think this is the place to make much of a difference. If you really want to change the structure of society, I think your time is probably better spent somewhere other than the internet bulletin boards.

MA: You have, over the last year and a half, made it perfectly clear what you believe concerning the legitimacy of government, and now I wish you'd respect my desire to hear a different tune.

I yam who I yam. Considering Fromkin (at least as far as I've read...which has been slow going) says very little about the political forces I continue to refer to, I think it worthy pixel space to explore the meaning and implications of their absence in his narrative.

I think my musical repretoir is a bit more nuanced than your harsh judgement allows...maybe it has more to do with your variations of tone deafness? You don't hear what I'm playing and my response is to play louder until all you hear is my pounding on the keys. I'll do my part to work more delicately with the strings and vary the ensemble of instruments in the chorus.

MA: I don't think this is the place to make much of a difference. If you really want to change the structure of society, I think your time is probably better spent somewhere other than the internet bulletin boards.

All of us, I think, need to consider what it means to spend so much wasted time and intellectual energy typing trivial nonsense into this vast cyber wasteland: pouring our hearts and minds into this internet-abyss.

Perhaps it's part of a nefarious conspiracy led by the Elite Classes to trap writers, thinkers and other culture wonks into waging imaginary battles, building castles of sand, entertaining empty auditoriums....instead of utilizing their time and talent to confront the cages in which they are trapped?

My time at Booktalk is an important element of my overall education (which I see as life-long). It helps me to sharpen my writing and thinking skills and understand better the architecture of an argument and the ways that worldviews interact and collide. I am particularly convinced that the Anarchist/Socialist tradition (for me) is the most worthy set of ideas and practices to claim my allegience. I bring them to Booktalk to have them confronted, challenged, and held accountable. I think Fromkin's book is an excellent laboratory for exploring how their application and consideration could have made a difference in shaping the course of the Middle East in the Modern era...as well as an alternative for today's world. I yam what I yam.