Introduction to Primates and Philosophers by Josiah Ober and Stephen Macedo

I like introductions. They provide the first glimpse into the underlying assumptions that the book and its authors are going to make. They frame the house, so to speak. Often introductions don’t do that as clearly as this one did. Within the first paragraph Ober and Macedo list the common ground all the authors in this book share.

• “All contributors to this book accept the standard scientific account of biological evolution as based on random natural selection.”
• “None suggests that there is any reason to suppose that humans are different in their metaphysical essence from other animals, or at least, none base their arguments on the idea that humans uniquely possess a transcendent soul.”
• “A second important premise…is that moral goodness is something real, about which it is possible to make truth claims. Goodness requires, at a minimum, taking proper account of others. Badness, by the same token, includes the sort of selfishness that leads us to treat others improperly by ignoring their interests or treating them as mere instruments.”

After this Ober and Macedo lay out the question of the text: “The question that de Waal and his commentators seek to address is this: How, given that there are strong scientific reasons to suppose that selfishness (at least at the genetic level) is a primary mechanism of natural selection, did we humans come to be so strongly attached to the value of goodness? Or, to put it a bit differently, why don’t we think it is good to be bad?”

I might quibble a bit with the phrase “random natural selection” but assume that this point refers to the mainstream theories of the mechanisms of evolution. So then I agree with the first two points. I think it more reasonable to assume that there is no fundamental difference in the “essence” of humans and other animals and think that if such a thing as fundamental difference (i.e. special creation) is to be proposed, that such a theory needs empirical justification to sustain it.

The premise about moral goodness being real – real is a tough word. Everyone thinks they know what it means but it is chock a block full of unquestioned assumptions about the nature of the world. In this case I am going to assume they mean empirically real, that is, it can be measured and tested. In de Waal’s case this measuring and testing being related to behaviour.

I think where I have most trouble is the phrase “given that there are strong scientific reasons to suppose that selfisness (at least at the genetic level) is a primary mechanism of natural selection…”

This points squarely to Dawkins’ idea and his book The Selfish Gene. It’s not that I disagree with Dawkins (although some scientists do with respect to the level at which selection occurs - see the 6th post about in "supporting literature" about S J Gould), it’s that the word “selfish” is a bit like “real.” Dawkins knows this of course, and he in no way intends the word to carry any intent with respect to genetic material. Yet somehow this meaning seems to have been carried through into what de Waal is calling “vaneer theory.”

There seems to me to be some misunderstanding (or misrepresentation?) of the status of “vaneer” theorists. I certainly don’t think Dawkins can really be classified as one. This is why I started the “Supporting Literature” thread. If you haven’t checked it out, you might want to give it a glance. There’s some cool stuff in there.

Anyway, this possibility of misrepresentation gave me pause. I agree with much of what de Waal is saying but still, having seen that I will read around it rather thoroughly. Hence Damasio, checking out what Darwin actually said, etc. I will also tend to be picky about word use and their implications (like “real” and “selfish”).

If you’ve watched the youtube stuff I posted (or read The Selfish Gene), do you agree? Did de Waal misrepresent Dawkins?

And if you think he did, what does this do to your analysis of de Waal's evidence and resultant theory?

In the introduction they introduce the concept of theory of mind. “Much debate among philosophers and animal behaviorists over human uniqueness has centered on the question of whether any nonhuman animal is capable of developing anything like a real Theory of Mind (ToM)—that is to say, whether or not the capacity to imagine the contents of another being’s mind as different from one’s own is uniquely human.”

The two critical areas the book will address with respect to ToM is 1) whether there is behavioral evidence to suggest that nonhuman animals exhibit behaviors that display this “capacity to imagine the contents of another being’s mind” and 2) whether the criteria we use to test for ToM is fair. That is, is it fair to define a “mind” using human only traits? (sort of like making a defining criteria for "human" a specific colour of skin). Of course the question then is, what other criteria can be used to measure the existence of a ToM?

For those of you who like to do background reading here are some sites about ToM.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_mind
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-animal/

and the last is an article specifically about animal evidence re ToM
http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.heyes.html

So much of whether we agree or not that chimps (for example) have a ToM rests on how we define what a ToM is. Based on what we know about chimp behaviour, even based on what we know about how humans make moral decisions (see Demasio in “Supporting Literature” thread), do we have enough information to make an informed choice about what side of the fence to stake out? Or do we have to do what de Waal did and use something like his “floating pyramid” model for moral-type behaviours that cross species lines?

Maybe I'm confused about what selfishness at the genetic level means. Is this a different meaning than we would give to selfishness at the social level, which is where goodness manifests itself? And I'm not sure why there is a presumption that selfish behavior should be primary in natural selection when we see animal societies that have evolved social systems that stress looking out for the group. In those cases, selfishness did not seem to be selected.

This next two paragraphs are from The Selfish Gene

“My own feeling is that human society based simply on the gene’s law of universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live. But unfortunately, however much we may deplore something, it does not stop it being true. This book is mainly intended to be interesting, but if you would extract a moral from it, read it as a warning. Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish. Let us understand what our own selfish genes are up to, because we may then at least have the chance to upset their designs, something that no other species has ever aspired to…it may just be more difficult to learn altruism than it would be if we were genetically programmed to be altruistic…”

“An entity, such as a baboon, is said to be altruistic if it behaves in such a way as to increase another such entity’s welfare at the expense of its own. Selfish behaviour has exactly the opposite effect. ‘Welfare’ is defined as ‘chances of survival’, even if the effect on actual life and death prospects is so small as to seem negligible…it is important to realize that the above definitions of altruism and selfishness are behavioural, not subjective. I am not concerned here with the psychology of motives. I am not going to argue about whether people who behave altruistically are ‘really’ doing it for secret or subconscious selfish motives…My definition is concerned only with whether the effect of an act is to lower or raise the survival prospects of the presumed altruist and the survival prospects of the presumed beneficiary.”

I think that many people responded negatively to the text in the first paragraph above. In a sense I think de Waal wrote Good Natured and then Primates and Philosophers in response to this. The problem with the word selfish as we normally use it is that it has multiple meaning components. When applied to a person’s behaviour the word selfish implies intent. In fact, I rather think that this is the key component of the word. A person takes the last cookie off the plate. How do we know if this is a selfish act? We assess subjective states in conjunction with social factors. A person who has waited to take a cookie until he was sure everyone else got what they needed is not acting in a selfish manner. A person who took the last cookie even though he doesn’t really like them and he knows there is a person in the house who hasn’t had a cookie and really does like then, he is acting in a selfish manner. Intent is everything to assessing selfishness.

The problem is that genes don’t have a subjectivity (and no intent) but since subjectivity is a key component to our reading of the word “selfish,” things seem to get mixed up. The second paragraph of stuff I quoted from Dawkins’ book tries to counter that by saying he is defining selfishness as behavioural and not subjective. It doesn’t stick though. The subjective is really too strong in the way we read the universe to get booted out by a simple re-definition. Nevertheless, that is what Dawkins meant. So if we rewrite a phrase from the first paragraph…he wrote “because we are born selfish.” If we rewrite it to say ‘because we are born to act in such ways as to raise the survival prospects of our genes,’ then it does not seem so controversial. I don’t think de Waal would disagree with that last statement but he does seem to disagree with “we are born selfish.” Yet based on Dawkins’ definition the two statements are saying exactly the same thing.

This is what I mean by misrepresentation. Still, Dawkins is partly to blame. Words are powerful. If you arbitrarily try to alter or limit their meaning, you are going to get caught up when what you tried to eliminate refuses to leave.



There is argument about this. In the supporting literature thread I posted some stuff about the argument about whether natural selection works only at the genetic level (which Dawkins argues) or at other levels as well (which S J Gould argues). It’s the post where I mention S J Gould.

Dawkins argues that altruism is selected for since some limited altruistic behaviours enhance genetic survival opportunities.

From The Selfish Gene
“An apparently altruistic act is one that looks superficially, as if it must tend to make the altruist more likely (however slightly) to die, and the recipient more likely to survive. It often turns out on closer inspection that acts of apparent altruism are really selfishness in disguise. Once again, I do not mean that the underlying motives are secretly selfish, but that the real effects of the act on survival prospects are the reverse of what we originally thought.”

So mirror neurons, although they apparently make some sort of empathy a required component of our experience, and hence our tendency to rush to help those in pain, what they actually do (I’m interpreting Dawkins here) is increase the survival prospects of the gene by ensuring behaviour that increases the probable survival rates of the gene carriers. So altruism is “selfish” in the sense that Dawkins means it.

Just wanted to thank you for taking the time to help untangle my confusion. I would try to make an intelligent comment, but unfortunately I have a trashy TV show to watch!

Sometimes trashy TV is exactly the right thing to do.

While I agree that I like introductions and this one is unusually thorough (in a good way), I was left with the impression that I was reading the cliff notes for the book.

I hope reading the introduction didn't "give away the ending"

If it does, please don't tell me!

When I read introductions I usually wonder what the author(s) had in mind when s(he) organized her thoughts but I suspect it is exactly that, to produce a "cliff notes" version so that academics (and others) who have to keep up with a well populated reading list have a way of “reading” a text without actually having to pass the eyes over all the words.

And ginof – watch for *SPOILER ALERTS* -

funny guy

A valid question: what moral reference should we assume when analyzing animal behavior? I don't expect de Waal plans on providing the answer - it is not a topic which his essay includes.


The subjective ape? But, according to de Waal, apparently not the morally relative ape!!


The individualistic ape? But, according to de Waal, apparently not an ape that should be described in terms of the Rational Agent Theory!!


But what is the source of the intent? Does it arise as a matter of conditioning, or as a sort of emergent property resulting from "plastic" interconnection in highly complex physical structures? Is it evolution (physical) or environment (cognitive) that sources an animals observable behavior? These are some questions the natural direction of which I feel can be appropriately derived from de Waals essay.

The scope of the topic is broad; however, the essay is rather specific. The exclusion of Rational Agent Theory and Moral Relativism, rather than limiting, actually serves quite well as a seemingly natural embankment for the stream of this debate. The ideas relating to animals in terms of moral cognitive capacity are only suggestive of derivatives such as the technical and logical implications of biologically-determined situational behaviorisms. We are looking at the basics here, the essay gives little room for solid specifics. I only worry that we may be setting the bar for what is required to be considered having morals or a ToM too high to be constructive.

I think de Waals pretty clearly states that only the great apes have been able to take someone else's perspective (put themselves in someone else's shoes) and therefore show a primitive kind of ToM. The last reference given by Mary Lupin says that there is no real evidence that even the apes show ToM, but this was written at least 10 years ago.

I think I would probably be swayed into believing that apes have ToM if the experiment and data used to determince this were deemed to be scientifically valid by at least some experts, but some of my belief would be subjective because I want to believe that apes have ToM.[/quote]

I just received the book, and, reading the introduction, I had some doubt about the rigor of the discussion that was going to follow. It's not clear what moral goodness (or badness) is. Is it enough to avoid doing bad things, or does one have to do an altruistic act to be morally good? Then, where does morality itself fit in? Following a system of morality doesn't necessarily result in acts that we have to judge as good--if they reflect discrimination, for example. It might be highly "moral" to deny gay people the right to marry. In addition, calling moral goodness something real is ambiguous, as Mary has already observed. The question of whether we are basically good or bad is not a difficult question, just a poorly put one. How would we ever be able to determine such a thing?

Things may change in the body of the book (I hope).

I agree with your impressions of the topic here. The relevance of such an inquiry is also questionable, considering that relativism is supposedly off topic I also find the scope rather narrow - but still a bit more focused. But on what exaclty? I think that it would help to separate the topics you mention. There is moral and there is goodness, these I believe we can talk out without too much latent relativism.

Sorry I haven't read the book in a while so I'm much less than fresh for discussion here.

Any thoughts on any kind? Anyone?

I've been pondering de Waal's Veneer Theory of morality, his claim that law, economics, religion and politics assume that human nature is evil and requires a set of moral rules to control it. I think it is a very useful depiction. Veneer Theory has much in common with the Augustinian doctrine of original sin, that our fallen nature requires a higher moral grace - a veneer if you will - to save it.

De Waal is correct in my view that Veneer Theory fails to understand our evolutionary essence, as observation of apes demonstrates that we are originally social beings integrated into community. We are not the autonomous individuals described by Hobbes in his depiction of natural life as nasty brutish and short.

This is a really complicated area. At first I agreed with de Waal because I disagree with Augustine, in the sense that de Waal points to how divine grace bestows an original blessing on humanity rather than a curse. However, de Waal's theory breaks down under analysis. If morality is intrinsic to our genes, we should act morally by instinct. But our instincts are a mixed bag, favouring our kin rather than supporting impartial justice. Impartiality requires a veneer of reason.

The difference between morality and instinct was discussed by Plato in The Republic, where Thrasymachus says justice is helping friends and harming enemies. Socrates points to a higher ideal of justice, linked to equality, fairness and other values. In de Waal's terms, Thrasymachus seems to offer the natural instinctive morality while Socrates argues for something like a veneer.

The Platonic view evolved further in the Christian injunction to love your enemies. The issue here is that Christ says our instinctive morality is not sufficient - even evil people love their friends - so we need to construct higher concepts which will serve to regulate modern needs.

Good post there. Without reverting to Augustine's weird theory of the transmission of original sin, we can still see reflected in the Eden story the essential truth that we are endowed with the capacity for good, but always find it a struggle to place the interests of others over ours. This is not Veneer theory, since that supposedly means that we are bad or selfish at the core.

De Waal claims that the building blocks of morality are in our genes, just as they are in the genes of other primates. But acting morally means acting with a certain disinterestedness, which requires the ability to reason, and which is also, of course, in our genes. It has been said, however, that genes do not necessarily produce complex behaviors or conceptions such as moral thinking. They make it possible for these to occur; possibly they predispose one individual to moral thinking more than they predispose another. I think that while reason is more than a veneer for us--it is just as much a part of our genes as the moral emotions--we certainly do not escape through its presence the conflict with evolutionarily more ancient drives.

Here is what I found interesting in the Introduction:



A normative account of morality does us little good as most humans cannot reach that high ground. It is difficult for any person to constantly promote the greater good while avoiding the amount of harm that they do to others. So, using normative morality may not be the best way to judge morality in humans or in other species.



This does seem to be one of the biggest problems that will be present in the book. Primates lack speech, so they cannot explain the intentions behind their actions. Without intentionality, it is difficult to prove that they are acting morally. They appear to be acting morally, even according to human standards, but we cannot know what they mean by it or if they have the theory of mind to conceptualize how they are acting