Ch. 2 - THE GOD HYPOTHESIS

FiskeMiles

Dear Saint:

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Let's say that I assert that A=A and A cannot equal ~A ever. Someone responds to me arguing that this assertion is only based upon my being part of a "logical" world--I assume without reason that the same logical relationships would apply even to an "alogical" world.

The first observation I would make about this argument is you are comparing an analytic statement (A=A etc.) with a synthetic statement about a hypothetical supernatural world. You next invoke "logic" which is fundamental to analytical statements. In fact, you couldn't have an analytical statement without logic. But logic is not fundamental to synthetic statements (only to the analysis of synthetic statements). In other words, natural laws are alogical. Supernatural laws can be assumed to be equally alogical.

Although I may not have made this clear, my intent was to suggest that a supernatural realm might reasonably be supposed to operate by other laws than our natural universe. In fact, this argument is no different than arguments about alternative universes posited by string theorists which operate according to laws totally different from those governing our own universe.

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What reason do you even have to bring up such a realm of existence? Does it even make sense? Can one conceive of an "illogical" existence or a "supernatural" existence?

Let's turn this around. Why is it more reasonable to assume the Big Bang was uncaused than caused? Either position rests on foundational assumptions which cannot be proved.

Can one conceive of an "illogical" existence? Sure. Dissident Heart...

Can one conceive of a "supernatural" existence. Well, er, yes. We have about a zillion religions demonstrating that fact. Not to mention a whole raft of horror stories (RD doubtless includes the Bible among their number), fantasy stories, supernatural tales, etc.

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I think that the point Richard is making is one that is frequently made in debates concerning contingency and necessity in regards to existence. The question asked is, "Why does something exist rather than nothing?" And the answer is supposed to be that God explains this. But then we are left with the question, "Why does God exist rather than nothing?" and the stock response is that this question does not apply to God, it would only apply to contingent matter and energy.

The debate over contingency and necessity is an interesting and vexing problem for theists and non-theists alike, but since Dawkins does not reference the problem in his argument on page 31, I see no reason to include it in a critique of that argument.

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In terms of Richard's point, the question is, "Why does complexity exist", and the answer critiqued is "God creates complexity." Richard is essentially arguing that this doesn't really answer that question, because God himself must be pretty complex.

Agreed.

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Instead of answering the question, the theist is essentially saying, "Complexity doesn't need to be explained, I can posit a being that lives in a realm that dodges these explanations".

Some theists make this argument, which I agree is illogical. However, the argument isn't necessary to theism per se. Here's what I mean:

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"Complexity exists because it is the end product of selective pressures and random changes"

That is only partially correct because "selective pressures and random changes" must occur within a framework of natural laws to operate. Science is well equipped, in fact perfectly equipped, to understand natural laws. But science cannot offer an explanation for why there should be natural laws in the first place. Ignoring the question because science can't answer it is metaphysical naturalism, pure and simple. It is not an unreasonable position, but it is also not the ONLY reasonable position. Asserting that a question must be ignored because an empirical answer is not possible is a philosophical position, not a fundamental truth.

Finally, you haven't responded to the real show stopper in Dawkins' argument, which is that he confuses natural creative intelligences that evolved in the natural world with a hypothetical supernatural intelligence which, by definition, could not have evolved in the natural world. That's what makes the argument meaningless. I don't object that other arguments can be made, but RD didn't make them on page 31, which is where he explicitly concludes that God is a delusion.

The problem I have with that whole idea, and, in fact, the title of the book, is that belief in God cannot shown to be false.

Ultimately, what RD is trying to do on page 31 (what he promised to do on page 2) is demonstrate that belief in God is a scientific hypothesis. I would say his demonstration fails. Utterly.

Fiske

FiskeMiles

Dear Mad:

One thing Dawkins does get right in the God Delusion is stating that Miller cleans the ID crowd's clocks in Finding Darwin's God. But, he doesn't mention that Miller goes on to make a sophisticated argument for theism in harmony with science. Here is a bit from chapter 7, "Beyond Materialism" (p. 213).

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Remarkably, what the critics of evolution consistently fail to see is that the very indeterminacy they misconstrue as randomness has to be, by any definition, a key feature of the mind of God. Remember, there is one (and only one) alternative to unpredictability -- and that alternative is a strict, predictable determinism. The only alternative to what they describe as randomness would be a nonrandom universe of clockwork mechanisms that would also rule out active intervention by any Supreme Deity. Caught between these two alternatives, they fail to see that the one more consistent with their religious beliefs is actually the mainstream scientific view linking evolution with the quantum reality of the physical sciences.

We need not ask if the nature of quantum physics proves the existence of a Supreme Being, which it certainly does not. Quantum physics does allow for it in an interesting way, and certainly excludes the possibility that we will ever gain a complete understanding of the details of nature. We have progressed so much in self-awareness and understanding that we now know there is a boundary around our ability to grasp reality. And we cannot say why it is there. But that does not make the boundary any less real, or any less consistent with the idea that it was the necessary handiwork of a Creator who fashioned it to allow us the freedom and independence necessary to make our acceptance or rejection of His love a genuinely free choice.

Committed atheists like Richard Dawkins would attack with ridicule any suggestion that room for the work of a Deity can be found in the physical nature of reality. But Dawkins's personal skepticism no more disproves the existence of God than the creationists' incredulity is an argument against evolution.

Miller is not setting out to prove the existence of God, just to demonstrate that the existence of God is not contradictory to modern science, and the fact that he is a professional biologist, as well-versed in the subject matter (if not more so) than Dawkins, makes his counterpoint to the latter's claims all the more interesting.

Fiske

FiskeMiles

Dear Gas:

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All Miller is really pointing out is that so long as there are gaps in our knowledge, a God of the gaps can be used to fill them.

You haven't read the book, have you? Miller, in fact, does not argue for a God of the gaps and specifically demonstrates why such arguments fail and are unnecessary. How is it, do you think, that he so successfully demolishes Intelligent Design arguments as Dawkins states on page 131 of The God Delusion?

Fiske

Edited by: FiskeMiles at: 1/5/07 12:36 am

Saint Gasoline

Fiske--

All Miller is really pointing out is that so long as there are gaps in our knowledge, a God of the gaps can be used to fill them.

I'd like to point out how wonderful the God of the gaps hypothesis has been for phenomenon like weather (God creates rain, drought, etc.), complex biological creatures (God apparently had to create differing species), and so on.

I'd argue that committed atheists wouldn't outright state that there isn't room for a God--unless, of course, like me, they felt the whole concept of God was internally contradictory as well as conceptually meaningless--but instead that there is simply no reason to believe in God, and in fact plenty of reasons to disbelieve in God, both pragmatic and otherwise.

Saint Gasoline

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"Creative intelligences, being evolved, necessarily arrive late in the universe, and therefore cannot be responsible for designing it."

This is NOT what theists are asserting, and it very definitely does confuse naturally evolved intelligences with a hypothetical supernatural intelligence.

I realize that this is not what theists are asserting. However, Dawkins' point is that, regardless of what they are saying, their argument is self-defeating because it entails that God himself has to be explained. They are saying one thing, but actually examining the issue leads us to see that what they are saying is misguided.

Dawkins doesn't make it as explicit as I do, which is fine considering that this is supposed to be a popular book written for the average reader. Ultimately, though, I think you are missing the finer points of the argument.

Now, part of the God hypothesis is that God explains the existence of complexity, correct? Of course! This is one of the main justifications offered for God's existence. Dawkins is responding that this argument fails because it posits an entity more complex than the complexity it was meant to explain. If the theist backpedals and remarks that God's complexity does not need to be explained, then essentially what he is saying s that, at some level, complexity need not be explained. Here's the important part: Because God's existence was invoked to explain complexity in the first place, the admission that complexity need not be explained destroys the only reason given to think that this being exists.

Dawkins realizes, as I do, that those who take the route you are advocating--to argue that God's complexity doesn't need an explanation--are essentially shooting themselves in their feet. They say that complexity needs to be explained, posit a complex God to explain it, and then say, "Oh, nevermind, complexity doesn't really have to be explained." His point is that those who choose not to take this self-defeating route also reach a dead-end, because they are positing something just as complex as the complexity they are seeking to explain. Dawkins views the attempts to argue that God is "outside" of explanation, logic, or whatever is merely a cop-out--which it is--that stifles legitimate inquiry into the question.

FiskeMiles

Dear Gas:

I don't see any reason to continue debating this. I assert that the argument on page 31 is flawed as a result of a logical blunder, and you have not provided one shred of counter evidence from the argument.

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Dawkins views the attempts to argue that God is "outside" of explanation, logic, or whatever is merely a cop-out

Good for him! What does that prove?

Anything beyond our universe is outside logical explanation, but it doesn't follow from that that nothing is outside our universe.

The explanation for complexity in the natural world has been convincingly provided by science, (sophisticated theists like Kenneth Miller, and probably MadArchitect, agree to this as easily as non-theists). But the facts that the universe exists and that natural laws exist are beyond science, beyond logical explanation. There is simply no way to prove that the universe and natural laws exist because of God or not because no empirical evidence applies. Maybe the universe is all that exists and maybe it came into existence by itself. Or, maybe the universe is NOT all there is and it didn't come into existence by itself. There is no way to know.

I'm not making this argument because I believe God is responsible for the existence of the universe. In fact, I don't. But I can't prove that and neither can you. Guess what, Richard Dawkins can't prove it either. People who believe in God are not any more deluded than people who don't. (People who believe the Earth is 6,000 years old or that evolution isn't real are another matter,

but neither belief is essential to theism.)

What is really hard to admit is that one just doesn't know. And, in fact, can't know. But this doesn't justify pretending otherwise. Or saying that people who don't agree with you are deluded.

Fiske

Edited by: FiskeMiles at: 1/5/07 1:25 am

Saint Gasoline

I haven't read the book, but I was addressing the snippet you posted.

He says:

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We need not ask if the nature of quantum physics proves the existence of a Supreme Being, which it certainly does not. Quantum physics does allow for it in an interesting way, and certainly excludes the possibility that we will ever gain a complete understanding of the details of nature.

What is he saying? Quantum physics doesn't prove the existence of God, but it can accomodate God.

In other words, quantum physics gives us no reason to believe in God, but it does not rule out God either--this is a God of the gaps argument if indeed he is tryin to say that the fact that it doesn't rule out God gives us reason to believe in God--despite the fact that he admits in the first half that it doesn't prove the existence of God.

The theory of plate tectonics doesn't prove the existence of God, either, nd it is compatible with claims about God's existence, too. This hardly provides a suitable foundation for "finding God", though.

As much as I respect Miller for his work against Creationism, I think this particular argument about God is lacking substance. Perhaps he is trying too hard to show that evolution doesn't preclude belief in God, and bending over backwards to show it. I suppose if people who believed in leprechuans were forming political movements that critiqued evolution, he'd publish a book titled "Finding Darwin's Leprechaun" and explain how science doesn't necessarily rule out their existence, despite the fact that it hasn't proved their existence, either.

FiskeMiles

Dear Gas:

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In other words, quantum physics gives us no reason to believe in God, but it does not rule out God either--this is a God of the gaps argument if indeed he is tryin to say that the fact that it doesn't rule out God gives us reason to believe in God--despite the fact that he admits in the first half that it doesn't prove the existence of God.

Even in the snippet I provided Miller explicitly states that quantum indeterminacy does not prove the existence of God. What he argues is that if God does exist, quantum indeterminacy would be required for him to interact with the natural world. It's an interesting argument, but to understand it you'll have to read the book.

I can't explain in a couple of paragraphs what he covers in 300 pages. And, rather obviously, he did not convince me that God exists. What he did convince me of is that a perfectly reasonable and rational person, in fact a scientist, can believe in God without being deluded.

Fiske

Saint Gasoline

So Miller's argument is this:

Science doesn't prove God's existence, but in fact God's existence is compatible with scientific claims in quantum physics. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe in God. (Even though we are given no "reasons" to believe in God? Perhaps Miller should find out what makes a belief reasonable!)

Belief in extraterrestials with polka dot hats who like to eat stray cats is also compatible with all science tells us, but that doesn't make it reasonable for scientists to go about believing in such a thing. The fact that he has no solid reasons for believing in these beings is what makes his belief unreasonable!

It could only be considered "reasonable" if one accepted that God of the gaps arguments are "reasonable". All Miller is saying is that God is compatible with science, not that anything regarding God is shown to be true. Arguing that God is compatible with science is NOT the same thing as showing that belief in God is reasonable or somehow correct.

Saint Gasoline

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Anything beyond our universe is outside logical explanation, but it doesn't follow from that that nothing is outside our universe.

Actually, I would think that the way you have described it here does make it follow that nothing is outside our universe! Think of everything that is "outside logical explanation". A square circle is one example. Or a dog that is a dog but also a water balloon at the same time and in the same respects. Or how about a cat that both exists and doesn't exist at the same time, and which is also both big and small in the same respects? These are things that clearly do not exist. In fact, one of the definitive ways of proving nonexistence is to show that something is illogical or contradictory. It makes no sense to say that something contradictory or illogical exists. So to argue that there is a realm where "logic does not apply" is essentially to argue that there is a "nonexistent" realm. In other words--such a realm does not, and could not, exist.

But at any rate, I think we can rephrase what you are saying to be less problematic. We can simply say:

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The fact that a realm is beyond our comprehension doesn't entail that such a realm does not exist.

But you are missing the point. Dawkins isn't arguing that God doesn't exist because we can't comprehend him, or because he is outside of our understanding. Instead, he is arguing that God does not exist because a supernatural God is not a legitimate explanatory entity--when it does attempt to explain complexity, it only multiplies it and leaves us pondering how God got to be so complex, and when it doesn't attempt to explain complexity by arguing that at some point complexity needs no explanation, then it leaves us without any reason to posit the God's existence in the first place. To posit a realm "beyond explanation" to dodge criticisms about the lacking explanatory power of an entity is as foolish as positing a realm "beyond logic" to dodge criticisms about the contradictory nature of an entity. This isn't "theology" but instead the most blatant and contrary to reason ad hoc cover-ups ever mustered.

Imagine a student arguing with his teacher about math. The teacher says that one and one don't make three, but the student says that the teacher lacks an understanding of "numerology", which posits the existence of a realm where traditional mathematical rules don't apply, and where one and one DO make three. The teacher would rightly construe this as the flimsiest and most ridiculous ad hoc response ever offered to try and save an incorrect answer.

FiskeMiles

Dear Gas:

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Science doesn't prove God's existence, but in fact God's existence is compatible with scientific claims in quantum physics. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe in God.

This is a non-sequitor, and it's not what Miller argues.

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The fact that he has no solid reasons for believing in these beings is what makes his belief unreasonable!

What do you know of Miller's reasons for believing in God? In fact, you haven't read the book so the only thing you know about it are the three paragraphs I posted above, which you haven't even read carefully. Yet this has not prevented you from leaping to all sorts of conclusions about Miller's arguments.

It seems to me that you're not interested in listening to and understanding what other people are trying to say about theism because you've already made up your mind on the subject.

Fiske

George Ricker · Posted: Fri Jan 05, 2007 3:21 pm Post subject: Re: Ch. 2 - THE GOD HYPOTHESIS

I think my perception of what's going on in this chapter is different than some of the others.

Dawkins describes the god hypothesis as the proposition that "there exists a super-human, supernatural intelligence who deliberately designed and created the universe and everything in it, including us."

He goes on to write, "This book will advocate an alternative view: any creative intelligence, of sufficient complexity to design anything, comes into existence only as the end product of an extended process of gradual evolution."

Since, according to Dawkins, creative intelligences arrive late in the evolutionary process and are, thus, a relatively recent feature of the universe, a creative intelligence cannot be responsible for designing the universe. Thus, "God," in the sense defined, is a delusion. At least, that's the author's contention.

Dawkins states the god hypothesis and then offers an alternative to it that he thinks has more value and that he proposes to defend in his book. The first statement is what will be discussed in this chapter. The second statement is a position that will be defended throughout the book

After stating the god hypothesis, Dawkins considers various approaches that have been made to it. He writes briefly about polytheism, including in that discussion some comments about the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the Catholic pantheon (yes, I know Catholics don't consider them gods——so does Dawkins) of saints.

Turning to monotheism, Dawkins notes that the god hypothesis of this chapter would have to be fleshed out to accommodate the Abrahamic "God" of Judaism, Christianity and Islam because that "God" is a personal deity who may intervene in human affairs. He then segues to the deism of the European Enlightenment and the secularism of the founders of the United States. He notes that deism has been at times as reviled as atheism and cites the treatment of Thomas Paine as an example.

Dawkins spends time on the American experiment in secularism because he is aiming at an American, as well as British and European, audience and because there is a strong effort by some to enshrine a particular variant of monotheism, Christianity, as the unofficial official state religion here in the United States. (He doesn't state this, by the way. This as my interpretation of what he is attempting.)

He also takes a brief side trip talking about the possibility that one or more of the Founding Fathers might have been closet atheists. It's an interesting but unproductive journey because there is no way to know. Based on their written words, I'm inclined to think Jefferson, Franklin and, certainly, Paine were really deists. However, two of the three, definitely Jefferson (possibly Franklin), have been claimed by everyone from atheists to liberal Christians.

In the next section, Dawkins considers agnosticism, which he divides into two types: temporary agnosticism in practice and permanent agnosticism in practice (In passing, I thought the acronyms were much too studied, an attempt at cuteness gone awry). He finds the former to be useful in cases where there is no evidence for either side of a proposition. The latter is less satisfactory because it places some propositions permanently off limits by declaring there can never be, because of the nature of the subject under consideration, any evidence and consequently no way to find answers. Dawkins rejects this form of agnosticism because he points out there are many questions in the history of ideas that once were regarded as out of science's reach but have since been resolved.

This is appropriate to a discussion of the god hypothesis because agnosticism, particularly the permanent kind, is often used to place that hypothesis out of bounds to any scientific inquiry. Dawkins notes that the hypothesis should be considered scientifically because if the god of the hypothesis actually exists, the universe should have a different character than if it does not.

Clearly, Dawkins does not claim the god of the god hypothesis can be shown to exist or not to exist. What he does claim is that it is an appropriate subject for scientific consideration and that while we may not be able to answer the question with certainty, we certainly can evaluate the relevant probabilities. He rejects the notion that because the god-idea cannot be proven or disproven the hypothesis is a 50-50 proposition.

After concluding that section with a discussion of degrees of probability vis-a-vis the god-idea, Dawkins turns his attention to another approach to the god hypothesis, the NOMA (non-overlapping magesteria) approach of Stephen Jay Gould. Not surprisingly, Dawkins rejects out of hand the notion that scientists may not or should not comment on the notion of "God's possible superintendence of nature" as a scientific matter.

This "hands-off" approach is unrealistic anyway because many of the claims of many believers in various versions of the god hypothesis are about people and events that supposedly happened in this universe and, therefore, cannot be immune to scientific inquiry. Religionists, he notes, are all too quick to latch on to anything in science that appears to support their position. They don't reject the opinions of those modern scientists who do accept the god hypothesis as outside the bounds of legitimate scientific inquiry.

Dawkins bristles at, what he calls, the "Neville Chamberlain school of evolutionists" who cling to NOMA in an effort to find allies among the religious. While understanding the impulse, he thinks the approach substitutes a short-term, and short-sighted, tactic for long-term strategy. Dawkins comes down squarely on the side of those who see the attack by creationists (ID advocates) on the teaching of evolution in public schools as part of a larger campaign against science and reason itself. He notes that creationists also have no use for NOMA. While some in the scientific community cling to the proposition that science should not comment on the god hypothesis, and other religious matters, creationists don't hesitate to attempt to substitute their creation myths for genuine scientific inquiry.

Finally, Dawkins concludes with some discussion of another hypothesis, that of extraterrestrial intelligent beings (of the natural sort, not gods) and how we might think about it. He contrasts the evidence we might investigate, the probabilities we might consider and the difference between the "little green men" hypothesis and the god hypothesis. Borrowing terminology from Daniel C. Dennett's Darwin's Dangerous Idea, he notes the difference between "cranes" and "skyhooks."

While I don't think this chapter is the inconsequential hash some of you seem to think it is, I do think Dawkins might have arranged things better. However, the overall consideration of the various approaches that are made to the god hypothesis (as he defines it) is essential to what follows and useful in understanding what he has to say.

Personally, I thought he would have been better served by calling the chapter The God Hypotheses. Clearly there is more than one hypothesis at work here. Dawkins may regard them all as variants on a common theme, but I take the position described by David Eller in Natural Atheism that there is no "God," there are only gods. The notion of a single god-idea seems indefensible. People worship all sorts of gods, and as often as not, they can't clearly describe or define them to themselves, let alone anyone else.

That is not Dawkins' position, however, so I'll leave it at that. I thought Chapter Two was useful and, usually, entertaining.

George

"Godlessness is not about denying the existence of nonsensical beings. It is the starting point for living life without them."

Godless in America by George A. Ricker

irishrosem · Posted: Fri Jan 05, 2007 5:37 pm Post subject: Re: god mattered...

DH: Being unable/unwilling to make the distinction between Bull Connor's God of White Supremacy and Dr. King's God of Agapic Revolution should disqualify anyone from making any meaningful comments on the matter

As I said, to Dawkins, myself and many others, making a distinction between your two versions of god is useless. It’s like making a distinction between the comic book and movie versions of Superman (or Storm in the X-Men who I think was seriously misinterpreted in the films) within a real world context. Just because you believe god exists, doesn’t mean that Dawkins has to tread lightly in making sure he doesn’t insult your particular delusion. His conclusion is outside the interpretation of gods, it is directed at all gods, good or bad. I am not going to comment further, for fear of indulging your mushroomesque posts (you’re not a member of UDV are you?), which could result in steering the discussion away from the book. There’s already a thread largely dedicated to Dawkins’ tone, use that to vent.

Niall:…religion is used to justify anything and everything, both positive and negative, in a religious country.

That’s exactly my point. Religion, or god, didn’t do these things (good or bad), despite the attempt to attribute causality to religion or god. People, not god, are responsible for their actions.

If you want to look at how religion was used to justify slavery I suggest you look up When Slavery was Called Freedom: Evangelicalism, Proslavery, and the Causes of the Civil War (Religion in the South) by John Patrick Daly. This book develops the idea that both pro and anti slavery views developed from the same religious perceptions of “freedom.” I, however, can’t actually recommend the book; I haven’t yet read it through, merely put it on my “to-be-considered” reading list. I also did a quick search on James Henley Thornwell (actually I was looking for some of his quotes) and found this article: “The US Civil War as a Theological War: Confederate Christian Nationalism and the League of the South.” Its works cited list, I think, would give you ample of reading material to further investigate, if you wish.


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